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Abstract 
The covered warrant market in the UK has gained in popularity over time since first 
launched in 2002. This has opened up an alternative investment choice which offers 
derivative securities with a life of typically one to two years. It seems to fulfill many of the 
functions of a traded options market. Since most research has been focused on options 
trading, the investigation on covered warrants trading is still very limited. This is also 
largely due to the lack of readily available data for end-traded covered warrants and the 
existing covered warrants. A unique set of hand-collected data, supplemented by public and 
private data from main covered warrants issuer and the financial database are employed, 
making this thesis possible. The sample periods can be divided into two separate sets.  
 
The UK covered warrants trading during the period July 2004 - December 2006 are 
used to examine the impact of warrant introduction and expiration on the price, volume and 
volatility of the underlying securities. For the introduction analyses, both the announcement 
and listing of covered warrants have negative impacts on the price of underlying securities 
for both call and put features, though the impact of the announcement is more pronounced 
than that of the listing. These affects are temporary and do not persist much beyond the 
introduction of the warrants. Negative price impacts of the expiration event are also 
reported for both call and put covered warrants. However, this study finds no significant 
impacts on the volume of underlying securities trading from the announcement, listing and 
expiration of call and put covered warrants. Further evidence indicates an increase in 
volatility of the underlying securities during the announcement and listing of covered 
warrants. The results hold true for both call and put warrants cases. On the other hand, a 
decreasing stock volatility is found as a consequence of the expiration of both call and put 
covered warrants.  
 
The second data set involves the call covered warrants traded in the UK market 
between April 2007 and December 2008; this was analysed for evidence of the best 
appropriate covered warrants pricing model. This study suggests default risk as a major 
concern for the warrant price which is called the Vulnerable warrant price. The reasons 
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behind this arise from concern about the issuer’s creditworthiness due to traders’ fraudulent 
action and the recent subprime problem, the difficulties of dynamic hedging by issuers 
because of market imperfections, as well as the no guarantees on covered warrant trading 
provided by the London Stock Exchange. The most salient findings of the study are the 
following. The Vulnerable warrant price is generally lower than both the Black-Scholes 
price and warrant market price throughout the warrant’s lifetime. The evidence suggests an 
overvalued warrant price in the UK market. Moreover, the in-the-money warrants indicate a 
higher rate of default in comparison to the out-of-the-money warrants. An additional 
finding shows that the market becomes aware of the default risk only on a short-term basis. 
The presentation of negative abnormal returns of both market and the Black-Sholes prices 
support the assumption that default risk is a relevant factor in pricing the UK covered 
warrants.  
 
These findings add to the literature dealing with the effect of derivatives trading on 
the underlying securities as well as providing more empirical evidence on a particular 
covered warrant market. This could be of interest not only for practitioners to widen their 
investment opportunities but also for regulators to have this as a guideline for their future 
related policies planning.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction          
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Covered warrants definition and characteristics 
 
Warrants are transferable options typically issued by companies. They entitle the 
holder to buy a specific number of shares in a company at a specific price (exercise price) 
during, or at the end of, a specific time in the future. Warrants are fundamentally option-
style instruments although they are securities rather than contracts which mean warrants are 
generally traded freely on the exchange like common stocks rather than strictly traded 
depending upon the number of buyers and sellers able to meet and agree on terms of 
issuance. 
 
Covered warrants are a development of the traditional listed equity (company) 
warrants. Covered warrants are financial instruments that can be considered as extended 
options with call and put features. Unlike company warrants, they are generally issued by 
banks or financial institutions rather than companies. Thus, when they are exercised no new 
shares are issued and no dilution of existing shareholder wealth is involved. They convey 
no information about the underlying companies’ capital structure or investment policy. 
Unlike options, covered warrants are non-standardized contracts traded like other securities 
listed on stock exchanges. They have longer maturity (typically up to 2 years) than traded 
options. Covered warrants have characteristics closer to options than company warrants and 
are issued over a wider range of assets compared to options. The underlying assets can be 
shares, baskets of shares, commodities, international currencies or share price indices. Both 
covered warrants and option offer leveraged exposure to an underlying and are generally 
priced using the Black-Scholes pricing models.  The covered warrants market is dominated 
by large players, such as investment banks and major investors.  
 
Covered warrants involve a higher risk than investing directly in shares. The risk for 
investors investing in covered warrants is that they can rapidly lose their entire initial 
  14 
investment whereas investing in shares brings a very small chance of facing this problem 
except in the case of bankruptcy or default, which is rare. A large movement in the warrant 
price could result from a relatively small movement in the underlying asset’s price, which 
can be favourable or unfavourable to the investor. It suggests that covered warrants can be 
more volatile than normal shares.  
 
1.1.2 Covered warrants compared 
 
A comparison among traditional listed equity warrants, options and covered 
warrants is provided in Table1.1: 
 
 
Table 1.1: The characteristics differences among the company warrants, options and covered 
warrants 
a This is in term of the conditions of the contracts. 
b LIFFE stands for London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange. 
c “Covered” means the financial instrument is covered by the underlying security, which the issuer must held 
in order to satisfy the exercise right upon the expiration of the financial instrument. However, many issuers 
currently use alternative practices such as dynamic hedging techniques, matching financial transactions via 
futures, etc.   
Characteristics Company Warrants Options Covered Warrants 
Issuer Corporation itself 
Agreement between two 
parties  Bank or institution 
Dilution effect Yes No No 
The outstanding issue 
(after the offer) Fixed Unpredictable Unpredictable 
Life time   5-10 years 
Typically maximum 9 
months Typically 1 or 2 years 
Standardization a Less More Less 
Feature Call only Call and Put Call and Put 
Liquidity Restricted Good (in-the-money) Good (close to issue) 
Data and information Scarce Readily available Readily available 
Stamp duty Payable Not payable if cash-settled Not payable if cash-settled 
Listing Market London Stock Exchange LIFFE b London Stock Exchange 
Covered  c  Generally no Generally no Yes/no 
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A covered warrant is just a long term option. However, warrants are generally 
issued on underlyings which are otherwise difficult and very expensive to access for the 
average UK investor. They can be held in a Self-Invested personal pension (SIPP). This 
allows investors to hedge their pensions against market falls and they offer the tightest bid-
ask spreads on many UK blue chips for the exchange-traded equivalent, such as options. 
For example, the spread on 29th September 2009 for a December 09 Vodafone call option, 
for instance, is 18.18% on LIFFE, on a comparable call covered warrant the spread is 
1.53%. Since covered warrants are designed for broader retail investors who often 
otherwise wouldn't have the access either due to the costs associated or the complexity of 
trading LIFFE options, the query against covered warrants in term of the more expensive 
they could become in comparison to identically structured LIFFE options should not be too 
much of a concern. In addition, the tightness of the bid-ask spreads on covered warrants 
goes a long way to compensating the fact that investors are buying a product that might be 
higher priced than other comparative products.  
 
Covered warrants have a higher lot size at issuance in comparison to the traded 
options as shown in Table 1.2 below. There is no minimum or maximum trading size of 
covered warrants. Trades of covered warrants that have been put through the LSE were 
ranging from as low as £1 to as high as £100m worth of covered warrants per transaction. 
This gives a lot of flexibility in covered warrant trading comparing to the trading of options 
in LIFFE.  
 
 
Table 1.2: The Lot size of covered warrants and traded options. 
Lot size (in no. of shares) 
Name of the underlying security  Options Covered warrants 
All                  1,000                 20,000  
Source: LSE and LIFFE 
 
 
As show in Table 1.4, majority of daily traded options have a higher number of 
outstanding issues regarding to the daily traded covered warrants on the same underlying 
securities though few cases do represent the reverse. However, covered warrants are 
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attracting no less trading activities comparing to the options. The daily trading volumes of 
covered warrants are rather large considering per warrant outstanding issue. For example, 
the case of 3I Group PLC as the underlying security, the average value of daily trading 
volume is approximately £145 per option issue whereas approximately £224 per warrant 
issue. This supports the previous fact that covered warrants are very flexible in terms of 
trading activities, therefore, leading to a high trading liquidity of the products. This 
represents a future growth opportunity within this market due to the mentioned trading 
liquidity which likely to attract and capture more potential investors into the market over 
time.  
 
 Table 1.3 provides the monthly trading value of both individual equity options and 
covered warrants. This is consistent with the previous information given in the daily data. 
Even though covered warrants tend to be more liquid in term of trading activities, options 
still have much larger value of overall trading volume due to much longer existent/more 
mature of the options market in relation to the covered warrants market.    
 
 
Table 1.3: The monthly trading value of individual equity options and covered warrants. 
 
Monthly trading value (£'m) 
Month Individual equity options Covered warrants 
Jun-09 9644.1 39.4 
Jul-09 7966.4 15.5 
Aug-09 6985.4 29.5 
Sep-09 10199.5 29.9 
Oct-09 8916.6 27.3 
Nov-09 10644.0 27.5 
Dec-09 8471.9 14.5 
Jan-10 11155.4 14.8 
Source: Euronext-LIFFE (Monthly statistics) and LSE (historical Covered Warrant factsheets) 
Notes: Individual equity options: included both call and put equity options traded in LIFFE 
            Covered warrants: included both call and put covered warrants traded in LSE 
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Table 1.4: The number of issues and value of daily trading volume of options and covered warrants on the same underlying security 
 
Number of outstanding issues Value of daily trading volume (£) 
Name of the underlying security Individual equity options Covered warrants Individual equity options Covered warrants 
3I Group PLC 20 5 2900 1122* 
Anglo American PLC 223 19 279205 1000 
Antofagasta PLC 5 14 2487.5 3000 
AstraZeneca PLC 77 14 54525 3000* 
Aviva PLC 26 10 4690 14767* 
Barclays PLC 1169 26 140022.5 134480 
BG Group PLC 56 7 10205 14917* 
BHP Billiton PLC 213 15 236035 2000 
British Airways PLC 502 9 2800 16431 
British Land Company PLC 3 5 802.5 4000* 
British Petroleum (BP) PLC 846 20 67515 17000 
British Telecommunications Group PLC 611 9 62472.5 270000 
Cable & Wireless PLC 50 5 5875 1108 
Cadbury PLC 42 4 3990* 995 
Source: Datastream; observed on 11th February 2009 
Notes: *value observed on the latest trading day of the derivatives due to the unavailability of the data on 11th February 2009 
            Individual equity options: included both call and put equity options traded in LIFFE 
            Covered warrants: included both call and put covered warrants traded in LSE 
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Table 1.4 (con’t) The number of issues and value of daily trading volume of options and covered warrants on the same underlying security 
 
Number of outstanding issues Value of daily trading volume (£) 
Name of the underlying security Individual equity options Covered warrants Individual equity options Covered warrants 
Centrica PLC 23 1 2530* 178 
Diageo PLC 259 2 77060 4000* 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC 237 10 59070 4500* 
Home Retail Group PLC 17 3 2550* 3700* 
HSBC Holdings PLC 171 13 73810 55000* 
Kazakhmys PLC 12 4 5295 20000* 
Kingfisher PLC 150 3 5125 1137* 
Land Securities PLC 12 8 4355 5000 
Legal & General Group PLC 27 8 1167.5 168471* 
Lloyds TSB Group PLC 193 15 11595 122901 
Lonmin PLC 45 4 10125* 850* 
Man Group PLC 215 12 10700 175377 
Marks & Spencer PLC 15 4 1162.5 7421* 
Next PLC 16 2 6700 40000* 
Source: Datastream; observed on 11th February 2009 
Notes: *value observed on the latest trading day of the derivatives due to the unavailability of the data on 11th February 2009 
            Individual equity options: included both call and put equity options traded in LIFFE 
            Covered warrants: included both call and put covered warrants traded in LSE 
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Table 1.4 (con’t) The number of issues and value of daily trading volume of options and covered warrants on the same underlying security 
 
Number of outstanding issues Value of daily trading volume (£) 
Name of the underlying security Individual equity options Covered warrants Individual equity options Covered warrants 
Persimmon PLC 24 4 3180* 483* 
Prudential PLC 7 12 472.5 1000* 
Rentokil Initial PLC 15 3 2887.5* 1000* 
Rio Tinto PLC 854 22 556165 55075 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC 72 2 22310 1600* 
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 529 23 9682.5 1470 
Royal Dutch Shell PLC  35 6 6935 5000* 
Standard Chartered PLC 28 6 31245 24853* 
Standard Life PLC 7 4 2432.5* 6000* 
Tesco PLC 20 3 5300 5000 
Tullow Oil PLC 25 5 9875 20213* 
United Utilities PLC 19 3 4675 7500* 
Vodafone Group PLC 4748 11 41130 100000* 
Xstrata PLC 436 20 171170 81000 
Source: Datastream; observed on 11th February 2009 
Notes: *value observed on the latest trading day of the derivatives due to the unavailability of the data on 11th February 2009 
            Individual equity options: included both call and put equity options traded in LIFFE 
            Covered warrants: included both call and put covered warrants traded in LSE 
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 Covered warrants can also be compared with other listed structured products to see 
their potential growth and trading trends. Other listed structured products include Knock-
out products, Investment products (Capital Protected, Trackers, Yield Enhancement and 
Participation) and other leveraged products. All of these financial instruments are traded 
within the LSE. Regarding Table 1.5 and Figure 1.1, the covered warrants have been doing 
very well over the year as shown from the recent record from the beginning of year 2009 to 
the beginning year 2010 and likely to continue so in relation to other listed structured 
products which are traded within the same stock the exchange. Even if there has been a 
slow down in the trading activities in the January 2010 which probably are affected by the 
recent sharp drop in the overall UK market following worries about the debt repayments 
needed by Spain, Portugal and Greece, the covered warrants were traded at £14.8m which 
is still considerably large in comparison to the Knock-out products of £1.8m and other 
certificates of £0.1m. Moreover, covered warrants were able to maintain approximately 
36% of other combined listed structure products trading value in January 2010. Therefore, 
the trading of covered warrants has been very active within the UK markets relative to 
other existing products. 
 
 
Table 1.5: The monthly trading value of Covered warrants and other Listed structured 
products within the LSE 
 
Monthly trading value (£'m) 
Month Covered warrants Knock-out products Other Leverage certificates Investment products 
Jun-09 39.4 4.3 20.1 3.7 
Jul-09 15.5 2.3 5 185.7 
Aug-09 29.5 2 17.6 50.8 
Sep-09 29.9 1 0.1 43.6 
Oct-09 27.3 1.1 0.4 25 
Nov-09 27.5 1.6 0.3 78.1 
Dec-09 14.5 1.5 0.1 299 
Jan-10 14.8 1.8 0.1 40.3 
Source: LSE; historical Covered Warrant factsheets 
Notes: Other leveraged products mean all leveraged products excluding covered warrants and  
            knock-out products.  
            Investment products mean all investment products including Capital Protected, Trackers,           
            Yield Enhancement and Participation.  
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Figure 1.1: The monthly trading value of Covered warrants and other Listed structured 
products within the LSE (£'m) 
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1.1.3 History of covered warrants 
 
Covered warrant markets are well established in Europe, particularly Germany, 
Switzerland, Italy and Spain. According to Hildrey (2003), there are more than 50,000 
covered warrants listed in Europe, offered by 40 issuers with a total value of  €290billion. 
In 2002, Europe’s covered warrants market saw a total turnover of €75billion, with 
approximately 85,000 trades per day. The world’s largest covered warrants market is in 
Germany. In 2002, Germany’s turnover was €17.5billion compared with €16.5billion in 
Italy and €16billion in Switzerland. Covered warrants have proved to be popular wherever 
they have been launched. Moreover, there does not seem to have been any widespread 
problem with investors lacking understanding or appreciation of the risks. 
 
The extent to which derivatives interact with their underlying stocks is an 
increasingly important issue in the study of financial markets. Black & Scholes (1973) view 
options as redundant securities. However, Ross (1976) theorizes that stock prices in 
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incomplete markets are generally affected by the introduction of new options. Detemple & 
Selden (1991) and Detemple (1990) also demonstrate that general equilibrium price effects 
are possible when non-redundant stock options begin trading in incomplete markets. These 
theoretical models, however, provide little indication about the direction or magnitude of 
such price effects. The majority of studies in the area of the effects of derivative issuance 
and trading have used data from US markets. Much of the research has been conducted 
using older pre-90’s data such as Conrad (1989) and Detemple & Jorion (1990). However, 
newer research findings suggest that the conclusions of earlier research may not be as 
robust as first thought. In addition, the phenomenal growth in the derivative markets over 
the past decade has provoked further interest in this area. Greenspan (1999) shows US 
outstanding derivatives contracts as having a notional value of $33 trillion at year-end 1998, 
a measure that has been growing at a compound annual rate of 20% since 1990. He also 
states the size of the global OTC derivative market as $70 trillion, a figure that follows a 
rising trend. Recent research has also moved from US data, with research being published 
on the UK (Gemmill & Thomas (1997)), Hong Kong (Chan & Wei (2001), Chen & Wu 
(2001)),Taiwan (Lee & Chen (2005)), Australia (Aitken & Segara (2005)), Switzerland 
(Stucki & Wasserfallen (1994)), Norway (Gjerde & Sattem (1995)), etc. 
 
1.1.4 An overview of the UK covered warrants market 
 
Warrants were issued in the 1970s (and before) in London but it was not until the 
mid 1980s that significant growth took place. Since then many warrants have been listed on 
the London Stock exchange. During the initial periods, the warrants were traditional listed 
equity (company) warrants. Covered warrants were first launched in 1986 but were 
privately traded and it was not until around 1990 that the market began to attract public 
attention. They were traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the first time on 28th 
October 2002. Even though it is still a small market in comparison with other well 
established markets in Europe, trading value has been increasing over time. The end of 
2006 the annual total value traded on the LSE was £726.74million, more than triple the 
annual figure of a couple of years ago (Figure 1.2).  
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 Figure 1.2: Yearly Covered Warrant Value 
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  Data source: The “Covered warrants trading reports” which are publicly reported by the LSE. 
 
In addition, Figure 1.3 and 1.4 present the recent monthly trading volume and value 
of the UK covered warrants. Over the years, trading has become more and more popular. 
Warrants have been at the forefront of financial innovation, providing a wide range of 
financial instruments for private investors such as equity warrants, currency warrants and 
index warrants, etc. The popularity of warrants stems from the gearing. It means that price 
changes in warrants will exaggerate movements in the underlying assets. However, covered 
warrant trading involves with certain risks and is not suitable for every investor. Since 
covered warrants are issued by the third party, financial institutions, the holders are 
exposed to credit risk in respect of the issuers. The holders are unsecure creditors of an 
issuer and have no preferential claim over any assets an issuer may hold. Moreover, 
covered warrants have an expiry date and therefore a limited life. They become worthless at 
the expiration unless they are in-the-money. One should also be aware that the value of 
covered warrants will decrease over time when other factors being equal. Thus, covered 
warrants should not be viewed as products that bought and sold as long term investments. 
In term of volatility, covered warrants are very sensitive to the movement of the underlying 
assets as well as the demand and supply related to their own trading activities. 
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Figure 1.3: The monthly trading volume of covered warrants 
 
 
Source: LSE; historical Covered Warrant trading report 2010 
 
 
Figure 1.4: The monthly trading value of covered warrants 
 
 
Source: LSE; historical Covered Warrant trading report 2010 
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 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) introduced new rules to facilitate the listing 
of covered warrants as part of its objective to "seek to maintain the competitiveness of the 
UK markets for listed securities". In late June 2002, the FSA published its new rules 
governing the listing and conduct of business for securitised derivatives which represent a 
new class of investment that includes covered warrants. Although the launch date for 
covered warrants was not until 28th October 2002, the new rules officially came into force 
on 1st August 2002 in order to give the issuers time to set up all of their systems with the 
new rules and for the Inland Revenue to authorise the waiving of stamp duty. The new rules 
have two principal elements: 
 
1. The listing rules 
The FSA’s intention in drafting the listing rules was to create a regime which 
achieved a balance between investor protection and facilitating access to listed 
markets whilst maintaining the integrity and competitiveness of the UK market for 
listed securities. One such section involves the types of underlying assets that are 
acceptable. There are no restrictions on the style of the warrants themselves as long 
as there is full disclosure in the documentation. 
2. The conduct of business rules 
These apply obligations to authorised firms selling securitised derivatives to private 
customers. 
 
 In the UK, covered warrants can only be issued by financial institutions. The well-
known investment banks who currently issue covered warrants are Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, Societe General (SG), TradingLab, Dresdner Kleinwort Limited1, Barclays Capital 
and Merrill Lynch International & co. Covered warrants can be traded on the LSE through 
brokers just like ordinary shares. Warrants can be traded on the LSE order book system (the 
Central Warrants Trading Service, CWTS), during the same hours as for shares. The 
trading hours are from 8.00am to 4.30pm, Modays thru Fridays except banking holidays. 
Those traded through the Retail Service Provider (RSP) Gateway can involve trading 
outside these hours.  
                                                 
1 Previous name was Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Limited. It changed its name since September 2006. 
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The sample of current prices data on covered warrants issued by the major issuer in 
the UK market, Societe General (SG), including bid-ask prices is provided in order to give 
an indicative picture of the market. The data clearly shown that bid-ask spreads of covered 
warrants are very small as presented in Table 1.6. Since the bid-offer spreads are tight as 
previously mentioned, this can help to drastically reduce costs of covered warrants trading 
which mean lower commission rates of warrants trading. 
 
 Covered warrants are listed and traded on the LSE through more than 20 private 
client stockbrokers such as Abbey National, Charles Stanley & Co Ltd, Barclays 
Stockbrokers, etc. as well as other UK brokers through a regular share dealing account. 
Warrants do not have to be held until expiration but can be bought and sold at any time 
during LSE trading hours. Commission is charged at a similar rate as standard equities at 
the time of trading. The smallest amount by which the covered warrant price can move is 
called the “tick size”. It has been specified and defined in the following bands: 
 
 Price    Tick Size 
<10p     0.25p 
≥ 10p<£1    0.50p 
≥ £1     1p 
 
 These tick sizes apply to all covered warrants traded on the order book CWTS. 
However, for warrants traded on alternative services like the RSP Gateway, the tick size is 
0.25p for all warrants. 
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      Table 1.6 The sample of current prices data on covered warrants issued by Societe Generale (SG) on 29-Sep-2009 
 
 
        
        Data source:  the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
 
 
WARRANT 
TIDM ISSUER UNDERLYING 
UNDERLYING 
PRICE 
EXPIRY 
DATE  TYPE 
STRIKE 
PRICE PARITY BID OFFER(ASK) 
SR06 SG ANTOFAGASTA  751.5 18/06/2010 C 8 1/1 1.255 1.27 
SR07 SG ANTOFAGASTA  751.5 17/09/2010 C 9 1/1 1.16 1.17 
SR11 SG AVIVA 418.8 18/12/2009 C 4.5 1/1 0.295 0.306 
SR13 SG AVIVA 418.8 19/03/2010 C 5 1/1 0.325 0.333 
SR15 SG BARCLAYS 365 18/06/2010 C 3.5 1/1 0.691 0.701 
SR23 SG BARCLAYS 365 17/09/2010 P 2.5 1/1 0.342 0.35 
SR25 SG BG GRP. 1090 18/06/2010 C 12 10/1 0.117 0.12 
SR26 SG BG GRP. 1090 17/12/2010 C 14 10/1 0.124 0.129 
SR37 SG BT GROUP 130.85 18/12/2009 C 1.5 1/1 0.0449 0.0489 
SR39 SG BT GROUP 130.85 18/06/2010 C 1.75 1/1 0.053 0.057 
SR56 SG MAN GROUP 303.8 18/12/2009 C 2.5 1/1 0.585 0.595 
SR57 SG MAN GROUP 303.8 18/06/2010 P 2.5 1/1 0.347 0.355 
SR29 SG BHP BILLITON 1738 18/12/2009 C 15 10/1 0.302 0.307 
SR30 SG BHP BILLITON 1738 18/06/2010 C 17 10/1 0.312 0.32 
SR32 SG BP 559 18/12/2009 C 5 1/1 0.646 0.656 
SR36 SG BP 559 18/06/2010 P 4.6 1/1 0.361 0.369 
SR41 SG Glaxosmithkline 1251.5 18/06/2010 C 15 10/1 0.05 0.054 
SR43 SG Glaxosmithkline 1251.5 18/12/2009 P 11 10/1 0.0316 0.0356 
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       Table 1.6 (con’t) The sample of current prices data on covered warrants issued by Societe Generale (SG) on 29-Sep-2009 
 
 
WARRANT 
TIDM ISSUER UNDERLYING 
UNDERLYING 
PRICE 
EXPIRY 
DATE  TYPE 
STRIKE 
PRICE PARITY BID OFFER(ASK) 
SR46 SG HSBC  723.3 18/12/2009 C 6.5 1/1 0.964 0.974 
SR47 SG HSBC  723.3 18/06/2010 C 8 1/1 0.604 0.614 
SR51 SG LLOYDS  103.75 18/12/2009 C 1 1/1 0.147 0.152 
SR52 SG LLOYDS  103.75 18/06/2010 C 1.25 1/1 0.141 0.146 
SR59 SG PRUDENTIAL 586 18/12/2009 C 5.5 1/1 0.812 0.822 
SR60 SG PRUDENTIAL 586 18/06/2010 C 6.5 1/1 0.764 0.774 
SR63 SG ROYAL BANK SCOT 51.6 18/12/2009 C 0.6 1/1 0.0345 0.0385 
SR66 SG ROYAL BANK SCOT 51.6 19/03/2010 C 0.8 1/1 0.0116 0.0216 
SR77 SG Royal Dutch Shell 1779 18/06/2010 C 18 10/1 0.188 0.193 
SR79 SG Royal Dutch Shell  1779 18/06/2010 P 12 10/1 0.0495 0.0535 
SR72 SG RIO TINTO 2686.5 18/12/2009 C 28 10/1 0.229 0.234 
SR75 SG RIO TINTO 2686.5 18/06/2010 C 30 10/1 0.372 0.38 
SR76 SG RIO TINTO 2686.5 19/03/2010 P 20 10/1 0.156 0.161 
SR81 SG TESCO 392.7 18/06/2010 C 4 1/1 0.408 0.416 
SR82 SG TESCO 392.7 17/12/2010 C 5 1/1 0.251 0.256 
SR84 SG VODAFONE 144.45 18/12/2009 C 1.5 1/1 0.065 0.066 
SR85 SG VODAFONE 144.45 19/03/2010 C 1.7 1/1 0.047 0.049 
SR87 SG XSTRATA 928 18/12/2009 C 9.5 1/1 1.08 1.09 
SR89 SG XSTRATA 928 19/03/2010 C 11 1/1 1.035 1.045 
 
        Data source:  the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
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 Market makers (or committed principals as they are known by the LSE) are obliged 
to provide two-way prices throughout the trading day and for the lifetime of the covered 
warrant. They are generally, but not necessarily, the issuers. Moreover, both issuers and 
market makers of the covered warrants in the UK are obliged to comply with LSE 
animation and spread rules. Therefore, the liquidity for each covered warrant is guaranteed 
by the issuer and it is regulated by the LSE throughout the trading day. In the past, it was 
difficult to examine warrants on conventional securities since there were only a small 
number of such warrants traded in the UK, the majority of them being company warrants 
and a few traded OTC covered warrants. Pricing of company warrants can also be very 
complicated.2 However, covered warrants pricing is more straightforward and calculation 
against the underlying assets largely automated. Pricing models are based on option pricing 
theories such as the Black-Scholes (1973) model and the binomial method (Cox, Ross & 
Rubinstein (1979)). Covered warrant pricing is influenced by the price or level of the 
underlying asset, the exercise price of the covered warrant, the time left to expiry, volatility 
of the underlying instrument, interest rates, dividends and exchange rates. These factors 
affect each particular warrant in various degrees. 
  
1.2 Objectives and Motivations of the Research 
  
There have been arguments that capital markets become more complete with the 
introduction of derivative securities such as options, etc. Arditti & John (1980) suggest that 
the availability of options expands capital markets across the possible returns space. The 
view that the existence of option markets should lead to an increase in investor welfare and 
expand the returns space is supported by Hakansson (1982). Moreover, a number of studies 
have been done on the impact of derivatives introduction on the underlying products. Most 
of the literatures relates to options. Several studies such as Conrad (1989), Detemple & 
Jorion (1990), Watt, Yadav & Draper (1992), Sahlstrom (2001) examine the effect of 
option introduction on returns of the underlying security. They find that the listing of 
                                                 
2 References can be seen in Chapter 2, section 2.5.1: the company warrants pricing model. 
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options is associated with a positive price effect on the underlying security. Bhattacharya 
(1987) and Pope & Yadav (1992) indicate that there is a negative price effect on returns of 
the underlying security around the option expiration date.  
 
The trading volume effect on the underlying securities has also been examined. 
Hayes & Tennenbaum (1979) reported an increase in underlying trading volume after the 
listing of options. Bansal, Pruitt & Wei (1989) grouped option listings by time period and 
reported increases in market-adjusted volume only prior to 1979. Damodaran & Lim (1991) 
suggest no significant change in market-adjusted volume. Chamberlain, Cheung & Kwan 
(1993) also show no significant change, even though a gradual increase in trading volume 
seemed to occur after the listing period on an unadjusted as well as a market –adjusted 
basis.  
  
A variety of empirical works have reported a decrease in volatility due to options 
introduction. For examples, Conrad (1989), Skinner (1989), DeTemple & Jorion (1990) and 
Haddad & Voorheis (1991) seem to support a decrease. In fact, they provide the evidence 
of no effect on beta risk whereas total risk declines. Since both options and futures are used 
to reduce the risk that investors face from potential future movements in an underlying 
market variable, the introduction of the two financial instruments should be reasonably 
comparable. Edwards (1988a; 1988b) finds no evidence of increased volatility of the 
underlying over a period up to May 1987 for equity-index futures and interest-rate futures. 
A totally different result is presented in Damodaran (1990). He shows that stocks 
underlying the S&P 500 futures had significant but slight increase in both beta and total 
variance after the futures listing. 
 
There have been other studies on the impact of trading options. However, my 
attention is on recent trading of covered warrants in the UK market. They fulfil many of the 
functions of an existing options market. Since covered warrants were first listed, there has 
not yet been a study of their impact on the market (price, volume and volatility) for the 
underlying securities in the UK. This thesis therefore aims to analyse covered warrants 
within the UK market over the period July 2004- December 2006.3 
                                                 
3 The beginning of the testing period was chosen as the earliest time at which historically available data are 
available for covered warrants. This sample period was employed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Another topic of relevance is how to price covered warrants. The Black-Scholes 
(1973) model has become the most popular way for options valuation since it was first 
introduced. Almost all of the derivatives pricing studies are developed from this basic 
option model. Counterparty, default risk for option trading is minimised through the use of 
standardised securities traded on an exchange. No such mechanism exists for covered 
warrants. Prior research which taken default risk into consideration has focused mostly on 
products such as forward contracts and swaps. For example, Kane (1980), Hull (1989), and 
Cooper & Mello (1991), etc. The exception can be made by the work of Johnson & Stulz 
(1987). They assume stochastic processes for both the asset value of the option issuer and 
the asset value of the underlying. The examination of default risk on option prices can 
therefore be done and the closed form solutions for the prices of European options in 
various conditions derived. They also show that option prices which are subject to default 
risk are different from those with default-free options. 
 
Because of a large number of similarities in characteristics between options and 
covered warrants, the previous analysis of options pricing can be adapted to price covered 
warrants. The period of my study is based on the covered warrants traded in the UK market 
from April 2007 until December 2008.4 The UK experience can add new evidence to 
current literature. Moreover, the trading of covered warrants in the UK market is still in the 
early stage of the development and the result of this early stage studies could also be very 
useful for other countries considering the introduction of covered warrants trading. 
 
This thesis can therefore be summarized as having three major objectives. Firstly, I 
aim to conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of the introduction/expiration of covered 
warrants on the underlying securities in the market, and examine in particular the effect on 
price and volume of trading. This study compares the listing effect with the announcement 
effect and further analyses the delisting effect at the end of a warrant life. The persistence 
and quantity of the effects over time are also taken into consideration. The extant research 
on covered warrants is still very limited; especially on the UK market. Secondly, I explore 
further to examine the relationship between the stock return volatility and covered warrants 
                                                 
4 This sample period of study covers the recent financial distress which associated with the default risk (major 
factor that influence the pricing model introduced in the study). It was employed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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trading subject to three cases of announcement, listing and delisting conditions. The 
expectation of increased speculation during warrants trading makes this topic even more 
interesting. Thirdly, I am trying to arrive at the best possible pricing model for covered 
warrants recognising current problems such as financial distress. The covered warrants 
pricing model associated with the default risk is tested. The trading activity of the covered 
warrant market has grown rapidly over the years and now amounts to around a 50% market 
share of all warrants listed on the LSE.5 There is considerable potential for the covered 
warrants market to become more and more important in coming years.  Furthermore, better 
availability of recent covered warrant data sets on the LSE as well as unique set of hand-
collected data makes research possible. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
 
The organization of the research is as follows. 
 
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction to covered warrants and the evidence on 
an international basis as well as for the UK. The motivations of the research are outlined 
and the relevant research objectives are discussed.  
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review. It is divided into four major areas: 
underlying price effect on derivatives trading, underlying volume effect on derivatives 
trading, underlying volatility effect on derivative trading, and the pricing of derivatives. 
The review provides background knowledge to establish the theoretical framework. 
 
The general theoretical framework is presented in Chapter 3. The main 
methodology of the event study employed throughout the research is explained and justified 
and the model choice discussed. The benefits and limitations of each model and the tests 
are explained in detail.  
 
                                                 
5 The data taken on 21/04/2006 from the Datastream database shows 1305 covered warrants (about 50%) out 
of 2604 total warrants.   
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Chapter 4 discusses the price impact study examining the effect on the underlying 
securities of covered warrants introduction/expiration. It is followed by an examination of 
volume effect. The empirical results show that over the sample period, there are significant 
changes in price of the underlying securities as a result of covered warrants 
introduction/expiration in the UK market. There is stronger evidence of effects on the 
announcement than the listing dates of the warrants introduction for both call and put 
warrants. The negative price effect could be explained by the relaxation of short sales 
constraints, a transfer of trading from the stock to the warrant markets, or shareholders’ 
belief that warrants act as a destabilizing factor on the underlying stocks. On the delisting 
of call warrants, the in-the-money warrants reveal a significant price reduction effect 
whereas the out-of-the-money warrants reveal no price effect in the underlying securities. 
The price reduction effect of in-the-money call warrants during delisting might be because 
issuers unwind their position by selling stocks on the delisting of call warrants. The 
delisting of put warrants results are similar to the call case, even though put warrants cannot 
be separated into in/out-of-the-money due to the limited samples. With regard to the 
volume analysis, there is no significant effect on the underlying securities trading volume at 
the introduction/expiration of covered warrants. A possible explanation for the study is that 
during the early stage of the introduction of the covered warrants there is insufficient 
publicity and information to capture the attention of investors. Thus, no effect on trading 
volume is observed.  
 
Chapter 5 investigates the covered warrants trading effect on stock return volatility. 
The evidence indicates a significant increasing effect in the underlying securities’ volatility 
from the covered warrant introduction for both call and put cases. Three possible 
explanations are stock exchanges generally choose to allow the issuance of warrants on 
stocks where they expect to see an increase in volatility, the profit motive of warrants 
issuers and their ability to tell when is an appropriate time to issue warrants (because 
warrant premiums increase when the stock price is expected to be more volatile), and the 
increased speculation in the derivatives market from informed traders. In contrast, the 
delisting of warrants is accompanied by a decrease in the volatility of the underlying stocks.  
 
Chapter 6 examines the Vulnerable Warrant model for pricing UK call covered 
warrants. The model incorporates credit risk into the pricing model. The outcomes suggest 
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warrant prices in the UK market are overvalued. The mean difference between the 
Vulnerable Warrant price and the market price is large when a warrant is in-the-money 
because investors seem to face a higher rate of default. There is also little difference 
between Vulnerable warrant and Black-Scholes prices which is likely to be because of 
unreliability of some parameters’ estimate used in the Vulnerable model. Moreover, the 
negative effects around financial distress for both market and Black-Scholes cases suggests 
that credit risk is a significant factor when considering the most suitable model for UK 
covered warrants valuation.       
 
The conclusion of the study is presented in Chapter 7. The research limitations are 
discussed. Recommendations for future research are also given. The benefits and 
knowledge that both practitioners and academics could gain from the use of covered 
warrants as an alternative financial instrument are also discussed.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The covered warrants market in the UK that launched on the LSE in 2002 is the 
main focus of this research. The objective of the research is to enhance existing knowledge 
in the area of covered warrants as well as give indications as to their impact and trading 
opportunities.  
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section focuses on the 
underlying price impact of having derivatives traded. It covers both the introduction and 
expiration of derivatives trading. The introduction period examines the listing and 
announcement periods. The second section is dedicated to documenting prior literature on 
the volume effect on the underlying securities upon derivatives introduction. The third 
section looks at how derivatives trading may influence the underlying securities’ volatility. 
The final section presents the variety of warrant pricing methods available and the 
development of valuation models for covered warrants.   
 
2.2 Pricing effect of derivatives trading 
 
Classic pricing theory (Black & Scholes, 1973) suggests that an option is a 
redundant security because it can be synthetically replicated by a combination of assets 
already existing in the market. Under assumed perfect capital market conditions (the 
concept of the complete market with no trading frictions), options can be replicated by 
combining the underlying stock and riskless borrowing-lending investments. Under these 
perfect market assumptions, it is unlikely that options can have any direct effect on the 
underlying stock. However, it is difficult for the assumptions of the perfect capital market 
to hold completely true in practice. Thus, when the stock market is incomplete, the 
introduction of options will generate payoff patterns not previously available, which 
enhancing market efficiency, and affecting trading patterns and the price behaviour of the 
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underlying stocks. Derivatives’ trading expands the opportunity set of investments. It helps 
information to be more quickly impounded in underlying stock prices and reduces 
transaction costs, a consequence of greater competition among market makers. Moreover, 
the pricing argument of the Black & Scholes (1973) model relies upon the ability to 
continuously adjust one’s holding of the underlying asset. In reality, trading frictions 
prevent this. The trading of derivatives helps make the market more complete and 
efficient.6 If this is true, it can be argued that stock prices could be expected to increase 
with the introduction of derivatives. A positive price effect from the introduction of 
derivatives is found in numerous studies. Branch & Finnerty (1981) use a sample of options 
listed between 1973 and 1977. They suggest that initial option listings tend to provide a 
positive impact on the underlying stock price for the US market and the stocks with fewer 
shares outstanding seem to experience a proportionately larger increase in marketability 
associated with an initial option listing. Conrad (1989) demonstrated for US data over the 
period 1973 to 1980 that option introduction (not announcement) caused a permanent price 
increase in the underlying security, beginning approximately three days before introduction. 
The paper claimed that dealers/traders were building inventories for hedging purposes. The 
examination of the effect  of option introductions on stock prices for US sample period 
1973-1986 in Detemple & Jorion (1990) shows no announcement effect but positive 
cumulative abnormal returns of 2.8% in the two weeks around the listing date. They also 
document that the listing effect considerably lessened in later years (1982 to 1986) in their 
sample. The absence of positive price effects in later years is attributed to the introduction 
of options on S&P500 futures in April 1982 that essentially completed the markets. Haddad 
& Voorheis (1991) reported a positive price impact only on the introduction day for US 
data from 1973 to 1986, based on a sample of 327 options. Stucki & Wasserfallen (1994) 
examine the impact of options trading on 11 stocks in Switzerland. Though they observe a 
positive price reaction, the sample only includes options introduced on one single day. For 
the Norwegian market, Gjerde & Sattem (1995) employ daily data during 1990-1994. An 
event study is used and excess returns are calculated from the market model. They found a 
temporary price increase with a positive average excess return on the introduction day. 
 
                                                 
6 See Ross (1976) 
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 Sorescu (2000) paid no attention to announcement data but rather concentrated on 
the introduction period. He found a positive price effect for US option listing from 1973 to 
1980 and a negative price effect for option listing from 1981 to 1995. The reasons for this 
switch in regime are inconclusive. He suggested that future research could try to 
concentrate on short sale restrictions as these seem to have the potential to explain the 
switch. There may be a case to use better proxies than age and size as in his paper. Watt, 
Yadav & Draper (1992) contribute to the literature by analyzing UK data. The results show 
that option listing is associated with a temporary price increase, with an increase before the 
listing date followed by a decrease after. The outcomes also indicate an increase in 
efficiency of price adjustment to new information after option listing. Draper, Mak & Tang 
(2001) examine a positive temporary underlying stock price effect of derivative warrants 
announcement within the Hong Kong market from 1993 to 1996. The excess return rises 
over the seven days before the announcement event and then falls during the next seven 
days. A similar result for the Hong Kong market during 1991-1997 is presented in the study 
of Chan & Wei (2001). They report a significant underlying stock price build up that occurs 
a few days prior to derivative warrant announcements, followed by a price decline a couple 
of days after. This suggests net demand for hedging by warrant issuers as they build up 
inventory a few days prior to warrant issuance.    
 
Studies also exist that support the converse effect of a reduction in stock price once 
derivatives are introduced. Rao & Ma (1987) documented a negative excess return on 
announcement days consistent with the hypothesis that existing shareholders view the 
initial  trading of options as a destabilizing influence on the underlying stocks. Evidence of 
an increase in information efficiency in the market is presented by Figlewski & Webb 
(1993). The relaxation of short sales constraints brought about by the introduction of 
options causes negative information to have a faster impact on the security’s market price. 
Investors with unfavourable information can now buy puts and write calls instead of facing 
limitations in shorting the underlying stocks. This is evidenced by upward pressure on put 
prices and downward pressure on calls. The results from options introduction appear to 
support the predicted decline in stock price. The negative effect on stock price is consistent 
with the argument of Figlewski (1981) who suggests that buying put options or writing call 
options allow pessimistic investors to get around short sales constraints more efficiently 
and permits bearish views to be reflected in stock market prices. A more recent study on the 
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Australian Stock Exchange by Atiken & Segara (2005) shows significant negative 
abnormal returns to the underlying stocks on both the announcement and listing date of 
derivative warrants, followed by a steady decline in price.  
 
Early studies suggest that stock option expiration results in a downward price 
pressure on the underlying stock just prior to the maturity date and an upward price 
pressure immediately afterwards. Klemkosky (1978) used US weekly data in 1975 and 
1976. He focused on two weeks surrounding the expiration period and found approximately 
a negative 1% average residual price change in the expiration week followed by a positive 
0.4% mean residual return in the subsequent week, though not nearly as significant as for 
the expiration week. Furthermore, the residual returns of the individual securities over all 
the periods in which options expire showed that a majority of the 76 companies 
experienced negative residual returns in the week of expiration and positive residual returns 
in the subsequent week. Officer & Trennepohl (1981) using US daily data from 1977 to 
1978, observe statistically significant negative abnormal mean returns two days preceding 
the option expiration date and statistically significant positive abnormal mean returns on the 
second day afterwards. The former downward securities price pressure is possibly 
attributed to arbitrage activities and position adjustments by market makers and option 
investors. However, they indicate that it is unlikely that a trading strategy based on this 
expiration information could generate excess returns (after transactions expenses) due to 
the small size of the abnormal returns. Bhattacharya (1987) extends the literature of 
derivatives’ expiration effect to cover this subject in the futures area. The study employs 
US data from 1982 through 1985. It uses a variant of the Comparison Period Approach 
(CPA) and finds no evidence of abnormal price behaviour in the underlying asset for 
Treasury bond futures either before or after the date of the option expiration, although 
evidence of increased price prior to the expiration of the option was detected. Pope & 
Yadav (1992) examine UK options data from 1982 to 1987. They show downward price 
pressure immediately prior to option expiration. The average residual return on the option 
expiry is statistically significant, but only negative 0.5% which is small in terms of 
economic significance since it can barely cover transaction costs associated with a trading 
rule based on this result. 
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As the empirical research on the price effect of covered warrants is still scarce and 
conflicting views abound, it is an empirical issue as to whether the introduction/expiration 
of a covered warrant has a price effect on the underlying stock. The issuance market for 
covered warrants is dominated by a few large financial institutions, with interests different 
to those prevalent in the option market. Moreover, different trading and regulatory 
mechanisms from option exchanges may lead to the expectation of significant evidence of 
price impacts at warrants introduction/expiration. The issuer is more likely to take a long 
position in the underlying securities both for hedging purposes before the initial trading of 
covered warrants and in an attempt to drive the price upward in order to gain a better 
warrant issue price. In addition, due to information leakage, other investors might receive 
this private information and buy the underlying securities prior to the covered warrant’s 
introduction to capture the profit opportunity. This enhances the stock price rise further. 
Similar notions apply to the increase in the underlying security’s price prior to the covered 
warrants expiration. On the other hand, there also exist arguments which predict a decrease 
in stock price during the covered warrants introduction. Firstly, investors could circumvent 
the short sale constraints by using warrants trading, either writing a call warrant or buying a 
put warrant. Investors who could not previously take a short position can now trade in 
warrants and benefit from trading on negative information. Secondly, the diversification of 
trading from the stocks to the warrants leads to the stock price reduction. Thirdly, the 
covered warrants trading could possibly be viewed by the existing shareholders as a 
destabilizing factor for the underlying stock and result in the selling of the stock which 
would generate a decline in stock price. In truth, the question as to the real underlying price 
impact created by the introduction of covered warrants is still left unanswered.    
 
2.3 Volume effect of derivatives introduction 
 
The investigation on stock trading volume of the effect of the introduction of 
derivatives has had mixed results. Gjerde & Sattem (1995) report volume impacts for the 
Norwegian market, using 1990 to 1994 daily data. The analysis of trading volume was 
conducted using a time-series regression model. They found a significant increase in 
optioned stocks trading volume due to option listing. Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1998) using 
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US data also report an increase in trading volume of the underlying security after option 
listing whereas Damodaran & Lim (1991) report a decrease in trading volume after the 
introduction of options in the US. Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1995) document a decline in 
volume for the index option stocks as a result of option listing. The result is consistent with 
the view that option trading causes a movement of speculative and market-wide 
information-oriented trading activity from the underlying stock market to the option 
market. Evidence for Canada of no change in trading volume is presented in Chamberlain, 
Cheung & Kwan (1993). 
 
Covered warrants may be expected to give investors more investment alternatives 
and can induce more hedging activities, particularly when there is no other similar contract. 
Moreover, the existence of warrants could entice trades towards warrants from the 
underlying stocks. This would result in an expected reduction in trading volume of the 
underlying stock.  
 
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence suggesting a rise in trading volume 
during warrant listing. Chan & Wei (2001) examine the volume effect on the underlying 
stock behaviour around the announcement date of derivative warrants for the period 1991 
to 1997 in Hong Kong. They found a high level of trading activity in the underlying stock 
for five days around the warrant announcement date and also find a sharp increase in 
volume of the underlying stocks during the last 5 trading minutes on the announcement 
day. However, they report no significant effects around the listing dates of the warrants. 
Chen & Wu (2001) base their study on Hong Kong data from 1989 to 1997. There is a 
strong positive relationship between price impact and trading volume of the underlying 
securities on both introduction and expiration of derivative warrant. Trading volume 
increases significantly during the introduction day as measured using the daily turnover rate 
method to generate the abnormal trading volume. Furthermore, the trading volume drops on 
the first warrant trading day therefore indicating a temporary volume effect. Draper et al. 
(2001) analyze the effect of the introduction of derivative warrants on the volume of trading 
in the underlying security with the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). They report a 
rise in volume of underlying stock trading because of the warrant introduction. According 
to the previous literature, it would be very useful to test for further evidence of the 
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underlying volume effect from covered warrants traded in the UK market in order to add 
supporting results of impact direction to the prior studies.    
 
 
2.4 Volatility effect of derivatives introduction 
 
Under the assumption of complete markets with no transaction costs, any new 
security can be synthesized from existing securities within the market. This generates a 
belief that the introduction of derivatives should not have any effect on underlying assets. 
Grossman (1988) suggests the possibility that options can have an impact on the underlying 
due to the existence of incomplete market and transaction costs in the real world. The study 
employs a theoretical framework to analyze the informational content of a traded option in 
relation to its synthetic counterpart. The conclusion indicates derivatives may affect the 
variance of the underlying assets. 
 
The early empirical studies on this aspect of the effect of derivatives suggested that 
volatility is reduced with the introduction of derivatives. Hayes & Tennenbaum (1979) is 
the earliest research in this area. They analyse US stocks on which call options were listed 
during 1972 to 1977. The comparison with a control group of non-options listed stocks 
during the same period shows a decrease in volatility of 15-20% of the optioned stocks 
relative to non-optioned stocks. Bansal, Pruitt & Wei (1989) using the square-return 
volatility tests find a 6.4% decrease in return volatility after option listing over the period 
1973-1986 in the US market. Skinner (1989) presents a decline on average of 4.8% of total 
stock return variance after options introduction. Conrad (1989) estimates that the daily 
excess return variance drops from 2.29% for 200 days before option listing to1.79% for the 
200 days after option listing. The survey by Damodaran & Subrahmanyam (1992) reviews 
more studies which look at the impact of option listing on the return variance of the 
underlying securities. A more recent US study by Mayhew & Mihov (2000) find that the 
volatility of stocks are increased because of the introduction of option trading. There are a 
number of studies conducted in other markets which provide results that are similar to the 
early US evidence. By analysing UK data, Watt et al. (1992) report a decrease in variance 
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after the option listing. However, option trading has no significant effect on beta. 
Supporting evidence for Switzerland is provided by Stucki & Wasserfallen (1994). For 
Japan, Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1995) report a decrease in stock volatility as a consequence 
of options trading. For Sweden, Alkebäck & Hagelin (1998) find a reduction in volatility 
for both unadjusted and adjusted volatility after stock option introduction. To take account 
of possible changes in market volatility, the adjusted volatility measure is used. 
Nevertheless, they report no change in volatility surrounding company warrant 
introduction. For Finland, Sahlastrom (2001) suggests a lower volatility of the underlying 
stock is due to option listing. However, there is conflicting evidence employing Canadian 
data. Elfakhani & Chaudhury (1995) find a reduction in stock variance from option listings. 
On the other hand, Chamberlain et al. (1993) report no statistically significant change in the 
volatility of option listings. Earlier research by Whiteside, Dukes & Dunne (1983) also 
demonstrates no statistically significant change in the volatility instantaneously after 
options are introduced in the US market for both daily and yearly traded shares. Pierre 
(1998) uses an EGARCH model to capture changes in unconditional volatility observed in 
the study sample. He documents an absence of any significant change in underlying stock 
volatility from an initial option listing during 1973 to 1990, using US daily data.  
 
The work by Freund, McCann & Webb (1994) and Bollen (1998) show that similar 
effects occur in both a sample of optioned stocks and a matched control sample of non-
optioned stocks. Moreover, the direction of the volatility effect is not consistent over time. 
For instance, Bollen (1998) documents that after 1987, the residual variance increased 
during option listing for both options stocks and  non-optioned stocks in a matched control 
sample. This control sample related evidence can be explained in various ways. Firstly, 
there is no true effect on volatility. Thus, the apparent increase in volatility effect is 
spurious. Such a result could be expected if a common factor is a driving force of different 
companies’ non-systematic risk. Secondly, as mentioned in the theoretical work by Cao 
(1999), the volatility effect of the listing of an option on one stock can spill over to other 
stocks, especially those with returns most strongly correlated with the optioned stock. In 
other words, the option listing would influence the dynamics of other related stocks. This 
means stocks in the control sample would not be immune to the effects of option listing in 
this particular case. 
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Three possible components of stock return volatility are mentioned in Amihud & 
Mendelson (1987). The first component is the underlying firm’s instability, an intrinsic part 
of variance. Thus, it would not be affected by option listings. The second and third 
components are a consequence of an imperfect price adjustment process and noise which 
results from information noise and the bid-ask spread. Both of these two components occur 
because of imperfect markets. The imperfect price adjustment process in the market might 
be due to friction in the trading process which cause autocorrelation in the return series as 
stock values cannot adjust simultaneously to new information. The noise is related to the 
problems from the use of information stated in Black (1986). The information may not be 
understood by all market participants. The misunderstanding and misinterpretation of 
information could lead to errors creating noise in the trading process. In addition, even if all 
information is observed, its impact might be too complicated to detect with certainty. Noise 
trading may provide more liquidity due to an increase in the trading in the market. 
Nevertheless, it could also increase the volatility of the market. Noise trading has been used 
as a significant factor affecting volatility such as in the study of French & Roll (1986) and 
Jones, Kaul & Lipson (1994). If option trading improves the underlying security markets’ 
activity and the efficiency of the market, it would result in a more accurate price adjustment 
process and a decline in the noise effect and lower bid-ask spreads. Hence, stock return 
volatility would expect to be lower after the option listing than before. Moreover, the 
trading intentions of investors may be revealed by derivatives trading. Stocks can become 
less volatile with the increased incentive to acquire new information. A decrease in stock 
volatility after derivative introduction could be a consequence of the increase in trading 
volume of the underlying stock, hedging activities by issuers or market makers, and wider 
media coverage. Furthermore, researchers also suggest more reasons why a reduction in 
stock return variance could follow the derivative introduction. The underlying stock must 
meet certain criteria to be qualified for option listing. The selection criteria may cause a 
bias in the sample due to an expectation in stock return variance reductions. The Exchange 
tends to have a criterion of high or increasing variance as a reason to list options. Therefore, 
mean reverting theory would result in stock reverting back to the mean at some point after 
option listing which may result in a correlation of option listing and a decline in the 
underlying stock variance. Another reason for a stock variance reduction is lower bid-ask 
spreads. Fedenia & Grammatikos (1992) have indicated that bid-ask spreads in the stock 
markets narrow after option listings, hence reducing the bid-ask fluctuation in stock prices 
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and the variance of stock returns. The option introduction might create more efficient 
opportunities for hedging risks for market makers therefore allowing them to narrow their 
spreads.   
 
The underlying stock volatility can be increased by derivatives introduction. 
Trading in a derivative market may attract more investors which may cause increased 
volatility in underlying stock prices. The existence of derivatives trading may cause a 
diversion of trading from the stock market to the derivative market. If the introduction of 
derivatives lures a significant amount of trading volume away from the underlying stock 
this could lead to a decrease in stock trading volume. The decline in liquidity may then 
increase the stock price volatility. Damodaran (1990) tests the effect of the S&P 500 futures 
contract introduction in April 1982 on the stocks in the index. The data employed included 
1250 trading days before and after the introduction of the futures contract. He shows that 
stocks in the index had significantly but modestly higher betas and total variances after 
futures listing. The evidence provided in the paper explains that these increases 
corresponded to a trading activity variable, and suggests much heavier trading and noise 
after the listing.      
 
There are several theoretical and empirical arguments that derivative introduction 
might affect the underlying stock return variance: the precise direction of the effect is still 
debatable. Moreover, the covered warrants evidence is inconclusive. Covered warrant 
introductions on the Mexican Stock Exchange (MSE) are investigated by Hernandez-Trillo 
(1999). The investigation uses daily data from 1992 to 1996. He suggests that their 
introduction did not reduce stock return volatilities even before the Mexican financial crisis 
of 1994. The distinct feature of the MSE is the absence of a clearinghouse for derivatives 
trading. Therefore, Mexican warrants can be seen as OTCs. Both an event study 
methodology and an ARCH/GARCH methodology are used in the study. Draper et al. 
(2001) report no significant impact on the underlying stock return volatility post-covered 
warrant introduction in Hong Kong market, whereas Aitken & Segara (2005) find a 
significant increase in underlying stock volatility after covered warrant listing on the 
Australian market.  
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2.5 Valuation of derivatives 
 
2.5.1 The company warrants pricing models 
 
Black and Scholes (1973) claim that their model can be used as an approximation to 
give an estimate of the warrant value in many cases. However, they warn that over a period 
of years, which is normal for warrant life, the variance rate of return on the stock may 
change substantially. This could lead to a problem as Black-Scholes assumes that equity 
return variance is constant. The empirical evidence of Christie (1982) shows that return 
volatility is not constant but rather is negatively correlated with stock prices. In other 
words, stock volatilities decrease as stock price rise and vice versa. A better approach might 
be based on the Cox (1975) constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model.  
 
Based on the Black-Scholes (1973) model, Lauterbach & Schultz (1990) propose 
the warrant pricing formula known as the Black-Scholes dilution-adjusted model. They 
follow an idea suggested by Galai & Schneller (1978) who show a way to take the dilution 
effect into account. Lauterbach & Schultz also made a comparison of Black-Scholes and 
CEV model forecasts. They follow the suggestion about potential parameter values 
discussed in Beckers (1980) in order to overcome the noise associated with estimating an 
additional parameter for Cox’s CEV model. Applying this with the dilution adjustment 
used for the Black-Scholes warrant model, they obtain a specific form of the CEV model 
known as the Square-Root CEV model (SRCEV). This model was shown in their paper 
using US daily data (during 1971-1980) to provide more accurate price forecasts than the 
Black-Scholes dilution-adjusted model. 
 
Hauser & Lauterbach (1997) suggest the Longstaff extendible-warrant model which 
is obtained by adopting the dilution adjustment used in the Black-Scholes dilution-adjusted 
model with the Longstaff (1990) writer-extendible call option model. They assume that the 
exercise price remains unchanged upon extension and warrants are allowed to be extended 
only after they expire out of the money. In addition, based on the notion that the callability 
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feature of warrants should not be ignored in determining warrant value, Burney & Moore 
(1997) derive and test a simple valuation model for callable warrants which results in less 
error in price prediction in comparison to the simple Black-Scholes model. However, they 
claim the stock price should already incorporate the potential impacts of dilution. 
Therefore, a dilution adjustment could be ignored because of the stochastic process 
followed by the underlying stock.    
 
Referring to Ritchken (1987), Hauser & Lauterbach (1997) suggest that binomial 
approximation formulas could be used for the CEV case as well as adjusting for dilution in 
order to overcome the limitation of the parameter assumption underlying the square-root 
CEV model. This approach has been introduced under the name of the Free-Theta CEV 
model. 
 
Evidence that supports the CEV-based models over the Black-Scholes-based 
models is discussed in Hauser & Lauterbach (1997). Alternative version are provided in 
Noreen & Wolfson (1981) and Ferri, Kremer & Oberhelman (1986). 
 
2.5.2 Covered warrants pricing models 
 
The previous studies on alternative pricing models of options are referred in order to 
find the best possible pricing model of covered warrants due to several similar 
characteristics between options and covered warrants. It has traditionally been assumed that 
Black-Scholes option prices have no default risk. However, many options and financial 
instruments containing option-like payoffs are issued by financial institutions that have 
limited assets. Thus, default risk is frequently possible. Johnson & Stulz (1987) has taken 
this seriously and named options subject to default risk as Vulnerable options. An improved 
method of pricing Vulnerable Black-Scholes options is presented in Klein (1996). The 
exposure to potential credit risk arises because the options are not traded and have no 
marked to market rule. There is the possibility of the counterparty (issuer of option) being 
unable to make the necessary payments at the exercise date. This paper extends Johnson & 
Stulz (1987) by allowing the option writer to have other liabilities which rank equally with 
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payments under the option and also extends Hull & White (1995) and Jarrow & Turnbull 
(1995) by relaxing the assumption of independence between the assets of the counterparty 
and the asset underlying the option, and by specifying a payout ratio which explicitly 
relates to the value of the assets of the counterparty (a proportional recovery of nominal 
claims of option in default). The model calculates the effect of credit risk on Black-Scholes 
options values as being much less when there is positive correlation between the assets of 
the counterparty and the asset underlying the option, in contrast to when this correlation is 
negative. This supports the finding that the price of an option under the model introduced in 
this paper is higher than in Johnson & Stulz (1987) which understates the real option value 
especially for the positive correlation case. The results are also compared to Hull & White 
(1995). The comparison examines reductions in option values due to credit risk. The effect 
of credit risk calculated using the model is generally less than that reported by Hull & 
White (1995) for European options, and is similar to their calculations for American 
options. This difference is due to the relatively higher payout ratio assumed in this paper 
which allows the possibility of the assets of the counterparty to be recovered subsequent to 
an event of default before the option maturity date. Hence, this paper presents results 
suggesting that Hull & White (1995) seem to understate the option value under their 
assumption of credit risk.  
 
Chen (2003) conducted a study on daily data of 23 Taiwan call covered warrants 
from August 1997 to December 2000. The study involves investigating the difference in the 
theoretical value of a Vulnerable warrant, Black-Scholes option price and the market price 
of warrant. The valuation model for Vulnerable warrants is adapted from a generalized 
pricing model for Vulnerable option in Klein (1996). There are two main motivations to 
adapt this model to Taiwan warrant data. Firstly, the Taiwan market provides no margin 
settlement mechanism for existing covered warrants. Therefore, the credit risk of the 
warrant issuer should be taken into account when evaluating a covered warrant price. 
Secondly, perfect hedging is not practical because of market imperfections, thus the warrant 
issuer cannot perfectly hedge their exposure in the spot market. In addition, warrant issuers 
not only face underwriting risk, but also other operating and financial risks. Hence, the 
issuer’s credit risk must be considered in warrant pricing. The findings show that after 
considering the default risk of the warrant issuer, the daily price of the theoretical value of a 
Vulnerable warrant is consistently lower than the non-Vulnerable warrant value (Black-
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Scholes option value). Moreover, except one warrant, the average daily theoretical values 
of Vulnerable warrants are lower than their market prices. The market prices of Taiwan 
covered warrants, after allowing for the credit risk of the issuers, are possibly overvalued. 
The study further divided each warrant lifetime into in-the-money, at-the-money and out-
of-the-money, and then examined the difference between the Vulnerable warrant value and 
Black-Scholes option value. The Vulnerable warrant value is lower than Black-Scholes 
option value. The magnitude of this is larger for in-the-money warrants than that for out-of-
the-money warrants. Investors face the default risk of issuers only when the Vulnerable 
warrant is in-the-money. When a warrant is out-of-the-money, the exercise value is zero, 
thus it is not necessary to consider credit risk. Furthermore, the study shows that the 
Vulnerable warrant price will be close to Black-Scholes option price when the warrant is 
approaching expiration because the shorter time to maturity, the lower the probability that 
the asset value of the issuer will drop below its liability (lower probability of issuer’s 
bankruptcy). Consequently, the Vulnerable warrant price and Black-Scholes option price 
will be equal some days before warrant’s maturity.  
 
 The recent financial distress makes the matter of default risk a reasonable factor in 
covered warrants pricing. Thus, further investigation of Vulnerable covered warrants in the 
UK would be a valuable comparison with the existing literature. 
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Chapter 3 : Research Methodology  
 
This chapter provides the general background and a theoretical framework for the 
main methodology, an event study, used throughout this study in order to analyse UK 
covered warrants. The event study methodology has a long history and is reviewed and 
summarized in detail by MacKinlay (1997).7 It is an often used method of measuring 
security price changes in response to events. The event study process involves several 
important steps. These will be considered in the following sections 3.1 to 3.5. 
 
3.1 Event and estimation period 
 
 The event of interest must be decided. Then, the event period (window) and the 
estimation period (window) are identified. Typically the event period is not allowed to 
overlap with the estimation period to prevent the influence of the event affecting the long 
run estimates. The event period often covers both days before and days after the event in 
order to capture the whole effect of the event. Following Brown & Warner (1985) the event 
period should be kept small. They indicate that a decrease in the power of the tests occurs 
when a long interval for the event period is used.  
 
 
                
 
  
    Figure 3.1: Time line for an event study 
 
                                                 
7 Other important references are  Peterson (1989) ,Henderson (1990), Strong (1992) and Armitage (1995). 
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3.2 Calculation of returns 
 
 There are two choices, discrete or logarithmic returns. 
 
  Discrete (simple) return:             1
1
it it it
it
it
P D P
R
P
−
−
+ −
=  
  Logarithmic return:      
1
ln it it
it
P D
P −
 +
 
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Where 
itP  = the price of security i at the end of period t 
itD = the dividend of security i during the period t 
  1itP − = the price of security i at the end of period t-1 
 
Reasons for preferring logarithmic returns over discrete returns are suggested by 
Strong (1992). Logarithmic returns are analytically more tractable when returns over longer 
intervals are formed (one can simply sum up the continuously compounded returns of the 
subperiods).8 Moreover, logarithmic returns are more likely to be normally distributed and 
are therefore more compatible with the assumptions of standard statistical techniques. Fama 
(1977) explains that the general distributions of stock returns are slightly right-skewness 
relative to normal distributions. The use of continuously compounded returns has the 
impact of pulling in the right tails of the distributions and stretching out the left tails, thus 
reducing the degree of right-skewness of the distribution.  
 
3.3 The benchmark for Abnormal returns 
 
 There are four main classes of techniques to determine the abnormal return that 
have been used in previous research. Moreover, there are several variations to choose from 
choices available within each class: 
                                                 
8 whereas the discrete return involves a product of the subperiod discrete returns in order to form return over 
longer interval 
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3.3.1 Market Models 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) model, OLS regression 
 
This is the most common model of adjusting returns for influences that affect all 
stocks.9 It is also said by Armitage (1995) to be the most common benchmark employed in 
event studies. 
 
it i i mt itR Rα β ε= + +       (1) 
 
      where itR  = the rate of return on a security i  in period t  
 
mtR = the rate of return on a market portfolio in period t  
iα  = the intercept of the regression line 
iβ  = the effect of the market portfolio return on a                        
              security i  
itε  = the zero mean disturbance term 
var( itε ) = 
2
tεσ  
 
In order to examine the event’s impact, the abnormal returns before and after the 
event must be measured. Using the parameters estimated ( iα  and iβ ) for the market model, 
the abnormal returns ( AR ) can be calculated. They are the difference between the actual 
and the normal (predicted/market model) returns. 
                  
          ititit RRAR
ˆ−=     where ˆit i i mtR Rα β= +    (2)
10 
 
                                                 
9 The use of OLS parameter can be seen in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, &Rice (1984), Dodd (1980), Mikkleson & 
Partch (1986) Smith (1977) 
10 The abnormal return is basically the disturbance term, itε , of the market model computed on an event 
period outside the estimation period.  
itititit RRAR ε=−= ˆ  
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However, the iβ  calculated using OLS may be biased due to the securities trading 
delay or trading frequencies different from the market index. This problem is generally 
known as nonsynchronous trading bias. There are several alternative adjustments for this 
problem (Scholes & William (1977), Dimson (1979)). However, Brown & Warner (1985) 
do not find any improvement to the power of tests for abnormal performance from 
employing either of the Scholes & William (1977) or Dimson (1979) methods.11 The detail 
discussions of these two methods are the following.  
 
Scholes and William (1977)
12 
 
This procedure was developed to support the use of the daily returns data in the case 
of infrequently traded securities. It involves the estimation of three OLS regressions using 
the T daily security returns within the estimation period. 
 
1 1 1it i i mt tR Rα β ε= + +          for  t = 1, 2, …,T 
2 2 , 1 2it i i m t tR Rα β ε+= + +      for  t = 1, 2, …,T-1 
3 3 , 1 3it i i m t tR Rα β ε−= + +       for  t = 2, 3, …,T 
 
The Scholes-Williams beta is formed as follows: 
 
1 2 3
(1 2 )
i i i
iSW
P
β β β
β
+ +
=
+
 
 
where  
ikβ     = the effect of the market portfolio return on a                        
                   security i  for k = 1, 2, and 3 
   iSWβ   = the estimated Scholes-Williams beta 
   P      = the estimated serial correlation of mtR  
  from t = 2 to t = T-1 
                                                 
11 The power of the test in this context means the ability to detect abnormal security performance (return) 
under a use of test statistic when abnormal security performance (return) is present. For example, reject the 
null hypothesis of no abnormal return when it should be rejected which reduces Type 1 error. 
12 The use of  the Scholes-Williams methodology can be seen in Rendleman, Jones, & Latane, (1982) and 
Moore, Peterson, &Peterson (1986)  
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 , 1m tR −  = the market return in period t-1 
 , 1m tR +  = the market return in period t+1 
 
The corresponding Scholes-Williams intercept ( iSWα ), is calculated 
as: 
1 1
2 2
1
2
T T
iSW it iSW mt
t t
R R
T
α β
− −
= =
  = −   −   
∑ ∑  
    
   Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
   
   ititit RRAR
ˆ−=     where ˆit iSW iSW mtR Rα β= +  
 
Dimson (1979)
13
 
 
This procedure was developed to avoid biased estimation of parameters using daily 
returns of infrequently traded securities. The purpose is the same as for the Scholes & 
William (1977) method. 
  
The procedure involves a multiple regression of lagged, current, and lead values of 
the return on the market index, and the aggregation of the slope coefficients in the 
regression: 
 
1 , 1 2 3 , 1it i i m t i mt i m t tR R R Rα β β β ε− += + + + +      for   t = 2,3,4,…,T-1  
 
   The Dimson beta is thus; 
 
   1 2 3iD i i iβ β β β= + +  
 
                                                 
13 The use of the Dimson methodology can be seen in Basu (1983) and Bhagat (1983). In addition, there have 
been criticisms of the method relating to properties of the estimator by Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz & 
Whitcomb (1983) and Fowler & Rorke (1983).  
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The corresponding Dimson intercept ( iSWα ), is calculated as: 
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   Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
   
   ititit RRAR
ˆ−=     where ˆit iD iD mtR Rα β= +  
 
3.3.2 Mean-adjusted Models14 
 
The mean-adjusted return model (the average return model/the constant mean return 
model) 
 
Although this is perhaps the simplest model, Brown & Warner (1980; 1985) find it 
often yields results similar to those of more sophisticated models. It assumes that the 
expected return of security i is a constant itR , 
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Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
 
ititit RRAR
ˆ−=   where iit RR =ˆ  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The use of the mean-adjusted return methodology can be seen in Kalay & Loewenstein (1985). 
 55 
The control portfolio model
15
 
 
This is a modification of the mean-adjusted return methodology for determining 
expected returns. In this method, returns of a test portfolio are compared with those of a 
control portfolio designed to have the same risk, measured by beta. It is presumably that the 
control portfolio should not be affected by the event in the event study.  
 
Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
 
pt pt ctAR R R= −    
 
where  ctR  = the return on the control portfolio c , designed to have      
                      the same beta as p. 
 
3.3.3 Market-adjusted Model (Index model) 
 
This model can be viewed as a restricted market model with iα  constrained to be 
zero and iβ  constrained to be 1. It assumes that the best predictor of returns for a given 
security is the current return on the market mtR . Therefore, no information other than that 
available in the event period is necessary to assess abnormal/excess returns during the event 
period.  
 
Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
 
ititit RRAR
ˆ−=   where mtit RR =ˆ  
 This method is generally very useful when there is limited data availability. For 
example, the normal model parameters derived from a pre-event estimation period may not 
                                                 
15 The use of the control portfolio concept is presented in Bradley (1980), Asquith (1983) and Asquith & 
Mullins (1986).  
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be feasible. Moreover, using this method to support others should help ensuring the validity 
of the final outcomes.  
 
3.3.4 Economic Models 
 
The Capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
16 
 
The CAPM (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)) is an equilibrium theory which 
assumes the expected return of a given asset is a linear function of its covariance with the 
return of the market portfolio. It was commonly used in event studies during the 1970s.17 
However, during the past two decades, the use of the CAPM in event studies has almost 
ceased due to concerns on the validity of restrictions imposed by CAPM on the market 
model.  
 
   ( )ij ft i mt ftR R R Rβ= + −  
 
   where  mtR  = the expected return on the appropriate stock market of  
period t. 
ftR  = the risk free rate of interest of period t. 
iβ  = the covariance of ijR  with mtR over some estimation    
         period which is ( )( )cov ,ij mtR R divided by the variance   
         of mtR over that period ( )( )var mtR . 
                                                 
16 The CAPM model collapses to the mean-adjusted return model if a security’s systematic risk (
iβ ) is 
constant and if 
ftR and mtR are constant over time. Moreover, the CAPM model can also collapses to the 
Market-adjusted Model (Index model) if all securities have the same systematic risk as the market which 
means 
iβ =1. 
17For further reference see Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay (1997). 
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Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
 
ititit RRAR
ˆ−=   where ˆit ijR R=  
 
 Since the restrictions imposed by CAPM can be relaxed at a small cost by 
employing the market model, it would not add much benefit to use CAPM in the study.  
 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
 
According to Ross (1976), the APT is an asset pricing theory where the expected 
return of a given asset is a linear combination of multiple risk factors. A general finding is 
that with the APT the most important factor behaves like a market factor and additional 
factors add relatively little explanatory power. Hence, the gains from using the APT 
motivated model versus the market model are small. Moreover, the complications 
associated with its implementation in an event study add very little advantage over the 
unrestricted market model. (see Brown & Weinstein (1985) for an example) The model is: 
 
   0 1 1 ...ij i k kiR λ λ β λ β= + + +  
            where ijR = the rate of return on a security i  in period j  
0λ = the expected return on the security when all factors take  
        the value zero 
    
kλ = the k-th zero mean factor that influence ijR  
    kiβ = the sensitivity of security i  to the k-th factor 
     
Then, the excess return calculation becomes: 
 
ititit RRAR
ˆ−=   where ˆit ijR R=  
 
Due to the above drawbacks of the APT model, this economic model is no longer 
often used in event studies.  
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The chosen models of measuring normal and abnormal performance 
 
This study employs three models which are the market model (the OLS model), the 
mean-adjusted model (the average return model) and the market-adjusted model (the index 
model) in order to analyse the effects of covered warrant trading on both the underlying 
security price and volume. The advantages for using these three models in comparison to 
others existing models are discussed previously. It seems that the additional benefits from 
other more complicated models are not worth the cost that must be involved when actually 
employed them in practice (Brown & Warner, 1980, 1985). Therefore, this study is 
designed according to the three simple models to measure the normal and abnormal 
performance of the underlying securities of the UK covered warrants.   
 
3.4 Aggregation of Abnormal Returns  
 
Two alternative methods are commonly used. This will be discussed below. 
 
3.4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return, CAR 
 
To accommodate a multiple period window, a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is 
employed. The aggregation can be conducted either through time or across securities’ 
dimensions: 
 
Approach I: Time-series aggregation  
 
This approach considers the CAR through time for an individual security; 
  
∑
=
=
2
1
),( 21
τ
ττ
τττ ii ARCAR     (5) 
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Where        2211 TT ≤≤< ττ  
       τ  = each event period 
        1T  = the beginning of the estimation window 
       2T  = the end of the post-event window 
        These are previously discussed in detail in section 3.1 
 
After forming the CARs for each security, aggregate them through time. Then 
average them across the number of securities in the study sample: 
 
),(
1
),( 21
1
21 ττττ ∑
=
=
N
i
iCAR
N
CAR     (6) 
 
Where N = numbers of securities  
 
Approach II: Cross-sectional aggregation 
 
This approach aggregates the individual securities’ abnormal returns for each event 
period and averages them across the total number of securities; 
 
ττ i
N
i
RA
N
AR ∑
=
=
1
1
      (7) 
 
Moreover, the average cumulative abnormal return can next be estimated over the 
event window via the summation of the average abnormal returns; 
∑
=
=
2
1
),( 21
τ
ττ
τττ ARCAR      (8) 
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3.4.2 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return, BHAR 
 
The BHAR calculates the abnormal return from investing equal amounts in each 
security and then holding these securities over the cumulation period. The portfolio is not 
rebalanced at any point. Thus, the BHAR does not implicitly assume rebalancing of a 
portfolio each period unlike the CAR. 
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Where ( )itE r = the expected return on security i in period t (obtained from    
    the chosen benchmark model) 
 
The comparison between CAR and BHAR 
  
Barber & Lyon (1997) show that cumulative abnormal returns are a biased predictor 
of long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns. This means CARs are subject to measurement 
bias in tests designed to detect long-run abnormal stock returns.18 However, both CARs and 
BHARs are subject to the new listing bias. Due to the evidence that the newly listed firms 
that go public underperform an equally weighted market index (Ritter, 1991), the new 
listing bias will lead to a positive bias in the population mean over long horizons’ abnormal 
returns. In addition, both CARs and BHARs are positively skewed but the positive 
skewness is less pronounced in CARs because the cumulative abnormal returns are 
summed rather than compounded like in BHARs. This reason can also explain why BHARs 
suffer from rebalancing bias when an equally-weighted market index is used whereas CARs 
are not. Therefore, the CAR method is usually employed in short-run studies whereas the 
                                                 
18 The long-run is generally applies to event windows of one year or more. 
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BHAR method is more appropriate in long-run analyses.19 Given the short-run event 
windows employed in this thesis, I have chosen to use CAR approach.  
 
3.5 Choice of estimation procedure and significance test 
 
 In the general case, a null hypothesis ( 0H ) of no abnormal return is tested against 
an alternative hypothesis ( 1H ) of significant abnormal return. There are various approaches 
(dependent on a set of assumptions) which have been used to measure the significance of 
estimated abnormal returns.20  
 
3.5.1 Simple t-tests  
 
Simple t-tests of abnormal returns 
 
It is the simplest procedure to test the significance of abnormal returns. There are 
two main assumptions of this procedure. Firstly, abnormal returns (
itAR ) are identically 
distributed and independent across securities. Secondly, itAR  is drawn from a normal 
distribution (with zero mean under 0H ). 
 
The test statistic can be calculated as: 
 
 
AR R
s N
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τ
τ
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=  
 
where    ττ i
N
i
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N
AR ∑
=
=
1
1
= average abnormal return at time τ  which are        
                                                time during the event period. 
                                                 
19 For further reference, see Barber & Lyon (1997), Trojanowski (2006) and Gregory (2007). 
20 These assumptions include independence, normality, lack of skewness,  homogeneity of variance, etc. 
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                R  = mean = 0 
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under 0H , τθ  has a student-t distribution with ( 1N − ) degrees of freedom. 
 
Simple t-tests of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
A similar procedure to the simple t-tests of abnormal returns can be done with some 
modification to calculate the significance t-test of cumulative abnormal returns. 
 
The test statistic can be calculated as: 
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under 0H , τθ  has a student-t distribution with ( 1N − ) degrees of freedom. 
 
In both cases, the distribution of τθ  converge to a normal 
distribution, ( )0,1N , as N →∞ . 
 
Thus, in order to test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal returns or the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns are equal to zero for a sample of N securities, the above two 
parametric test statistics can be employed. 
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3.5.2 Patell test 
 
Modifications to the basic approach of the Simple t-tests presented previously are 
possible. To standardize each abnormal return employing an estimator of its standard 
deviation is one common modification. Patell (1976) demonstrates tests based on 
standardization. Patell test can be referred to as a standardized abnormal return test or a 
standardized residual test. The test allows for heteroskedasticity of abnormal returns and 
assumes cross-secctional independence and normally distributed of returns. The normal 
returns are generated by market model under the basic procedure.  
 
Under 0H , each itAR  has mean zero and variance 
2
itAR
σ . The maximum likelihood 
estimate of the variance is: 
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iL  = the number of observations for firm i  in the estimation period 
 
Mtr = the observed return on the market index on day t  
 Mr = the mean market return over the estimation period 
 
 Define the standardized abnormal return (or standardized prediction error) as: 
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Under 0H , each itSAR  follow a Student-t distribution with 2iL −  degrees of 
freedom. Summing the itSAR  across the sample, we obtain: 
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The expected value of itTSAR  is zero. The variance of itTSAR  is 
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 The test statistic for 0H  that 1 2, 0T TCAAR =  is shown below: 
 
( )
2
1
1 2,
1
2 1
1
2
1
4
T
itN
t T
T T
i i
i
SAR
z
N L
T T
L
=
=
 
 
 =
 −
− +  − 
∑
∑
 
 
The distribution of the test statistic converges to a standard normal distribution for large 
sample under 0H . A similar procedure can be employed in order to test for significance of 
itAR . 
 
The comparison between Simple t-tests and Patell test 
 
The Simple t-tests is generally used for a given performance measure such as the AR 
and CAR. The test assumes distribution under 0H  that mean abnormal performance equals 
zero as shown previously. However, an alternative would be a Patell test which aggregates 
standardized abnormal returns into the procedure. A test using standardized abnormal 
returns like this is in principle superior and more powerful under certain conditions but 
Brown & Warner (1980; 1985) provide comparison with the basic approach and 
 65 
empirically report that in short-horizon studies it typically makes little difference. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the use of the Simple t-tests.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The theoretical framework of the event study methodology has been proposed in this 
chapter. This includes the determination of the event and estimation period, choosing the 
way to estimate returns, finding the benchmark for normal and abnormal returns, 
aggregating the abnormal returns and selecting the estimation procedure and significance 
test. The next chapter follows these steps to test the price and volume effects of the 
underlying securities from the introduction and expiration of covered warrants traded in the 
UK market.  
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Chapter 4 : Price and volume effects of covered warrants 
trading 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Background 
 
It is generally thought that one of the reasons for the 1987 stock market crash was 
the use of index futures and options as part of computer-based program trading strategies 
(Lee & Ohk (1992)). Therefore, the growing interest and concern over the derivative 
markets have introduced many queries about the role and impact they may have on the 
financial markets or in other words, the underlying markets. There have been a number of 
debates over how important and useful the trade in derivative products is, and whether the 
trade is beneficial or detrimental to the existing financial markets.  
 
The introduction of derivatives trading has been argued to make the stock markets 
more complete. Ross (1976) was the first to suggest that option introduction would have 
some impact on the underlying security price. He used the complete market theory which 
states that options introduction expand the opportunity set of risk-return patterns available 
to investors, contrary to the traditional view (Black & Scholes, 1973) which implicitly 
assumed that option securities are redundant, and thus should have no impact on the 
underlying security.21 The analysis was continued by Breeden & Litzenberger (1978), 
Hakansson (1978), Arditti & John (1980) and John (1981). They also show that options 
make the underlying market complete as they allow more desirable positions for investors 
than is possible in a market without derivatives. Moreover, the improved informational 
efficiency allows investors easier access to private information and its benefits. Short-sale 
constraints are also reduced by derivatives trading. Smaller transaction costs are also 
associated with derivatives in comparison to stock trading.  
 
                                                 
21 Black & Scholes (1973) show that, when continuous rebalancing is possible, call and put options may be 
thought of as equivalent to (time-varying) multiples of the underlying security. The feasibility of continuous 
rebalancing is a key (and of course unrealistic) assumption of their analysis. 
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Even though there is no formal evidence relating to the concern that derivative 
instruments such as options may well be detrimental to the trading activities of the 
underlying market, contention on this matter still exists. Some believe that derivatives act 
as a destabilizing factor and this may lead to a reduction in trading volume of the 
underlying stock. Another argument could be that diversion of trade from the stock market 
to the option market results in a decrease in stocks’ trading volume.  
 
All the debates regarding this area of the effect of the derivatives trading on the 
underlying securities will never be existed without the inefficient market assumption. 
Therefore, the development of all research hypotheses through out my thesis in both 
Chapter 4 and 5 are based on the empirical literature which rejecting the strong efficient 
market theory. There are number of arguments as to the strength of market efficiency but 
there is no final agreement whether the efficient markets hypothesis and its mathematical 
model of random walk is a reasonable explanation of market behaviour. Some people do 
not believe in the theory at all whereas some do to a certain degree if not all. According to 
the survey of Fama (1970), majority of studies were unable to reject the efficient market 
theory of the stock market. However, several later studies have found and recorded some 
anomalous departures from market efficiency. Keim & Stambaugh (1986) have uncovered 
empirical evidence which suggested statistically significant predictability in stock prices by 
using forecasts based on certain predetermined variables. Moreover, the significant 
negatively serially correlated are discovered in long holding period returns by Fama & 
French (1988). They show that 25%-40% of the variation of longer-period returns is 
predictable via past returns. The important implication here is that the forecasting of long-
term as well as short-term price movements would become almost useless if markets are 
efficient, therefore, the efficient market concept tends to be rejected by both 
fundamentalists and technicians. The fundamentalists who rely heavily on significant 
information they learn form their analyses could hardly make any profit if the information 
is quickly reflected in stock prices. This is no better case for the technicians. They would be 
wasting their time reading news while all these news is reflected quickly in stock prices and 
these stock prices have no memory. Thus, tables, charts and other technical available tools 
might turn out to be purposeless. The facts that there are existing investors who make large 
amounts of money over long periods help provide hope. In addition, the work by Lo & 
 68 
MacKinlay (1988; 1999) shows some evidence leading to the rejection of the true random 
walks of stock prices. They find many successive moves in the same direction as well as 
indicate that short-run serial correlations are not zero. This means short-run stock prices 
possibly be predictable, therefore, it is consistence with the stock price momentum strategy. 
Another more recent research by Lo, Mamaysky & Wang (2000), they use nonparametric 
kernel regression tests in the study to evaluate the effectiveness of technical analysis. The 
study presents similar finding and stating that technical analysts can be useful with a 
modest predictive power in recognizing the patterns of the stock price movement. The 
earlier studies by Pruitt &White (1988), Neftci (1991), Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron 
(1992), Neely, Weller & Dittmar (1997), Neely & Weller (1999), Osler & Chang (1995), 
and Allen & Karjalainen (1999) have also provided relevant support for technical analysis. 
Moreover, because of the rising popularity in the field of behavioural finance, the idea of 
short-run momentum is also introduced in consistent with psychological feedback 
mechanisms. Shiller (2000) provides evidence on the psychological finding of the stock 
market’s movement. Due to the inefficient market, the anomalies resulting from the 
covered warrant trading may be possible which lead to the full development of all 
hypotheses employed in Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis as mentioned earlier.    
 
4.1.2 Motivation 
 
A large number of studies have examined the price effect of option listing on the 
underlying stocks. Most initial research was conducted on data from the US market, Branch 
& Finnerty (1981), Conrad (1989), Skinner (1989), and Kim & Young (1991). Later studies 
expanded to cover other markets. Stucki & Wassserfallen (1994) conducted their analysis 
on the Swiss market. The Norwegian market has been tested by Gjerde & Sattem (1995). 
They all report a statistically significant and permanent positive price effect whereas Watt, 
Yadav & Draper (1992) and Hamill, Opong & McGregor (2002) show a temporary positive 
price effect prior to the UK option listings followed by a negative price effect after listing. 
A negative underlying price effect was indicated by Rao & Ma (1987) on option 
announcement days. The results seem to be inconclusive as to whether the effect is more 
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prevalent at the announcement or listing date, though the majority of US studies seem to 
suggest that the listing date is more relevant.  
 
The empirical evidence concerning the volume effect during derivatives trading is 
also examined but with mixed results. Hayes & Tennenbaum (1979), Skinner (1989) and 
Gjerde & Sattem (1995) detected a significant influence from option introduction on the 
underlying trading volume while the study by Chamberlain, Cheung & Kwan (1993) did 
not detect any influence. 
 
The variety of studies on price and volume effects on the underlying stocks when 
options are introduced (and which have many similarities to covered warrants), motivated 
me to undertake a study of the impacts of covered warrant trading within the UK market.22 
My analysis is based both on call covered warrants and also put covered warrants. The 
impact of put introduction may be expected to differ substantially from the impact of call 
introduction. Moreover, some believe that market makers are unlikely to buy, sell or short 
the stocks as a preparation for the start of put trading. Even though trades are generated 
because of the introduction of puts, strategies vary and investors may purchase puts rather 
than short the stock while others may create a long position in stock which they can protect 
with a put purchase. These activities are unlikely to significantly affect demand for the 
underlying stock market. We may thus expect not to detect much effect on the underlying 
stock performance. 
 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses idea 
based on the previous literature on price and volume effect of derivatives trading. Section 
4.3 gives information on the developments of the research hypotheses. The data sources 
and constructions are presented in Section 4.4 and the methodology in Section 4.5. Section 
4.6 reports the findings, while Section 4.7 concludes.   
 
                                                 
22 To the best of my knowledge, Chan & Peretti (2009) is the only recent working paper using the UK data 
testing on price. They show no lead and lag relationship between covered warrants and the underlying shares 
traded on the London Stock Exchange. 
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4.2 Review of Literature 
 
4.2.1 Background on Price effect 
  
As we have noted earlier, an option is a redundant security due to the possibility of 
replication which means that existing marketable assets could be combined in order to 
provide a similar payoff as the option. The combination of the underlying security and risk-
free borrowing-lending investments can replicate an option under the strong assumptions of 
a perfect capital market. However, the assumptions of the perfect capital market are 
unlikely to hold true in practice. Therefore, numerous impacts might be expected from the 
trading of options. Like any other financial instruments, options make capital markets more 
complete because they open up more investment opportunities for investors. Information 
about the underlying can be disseminated faster than before options trading. This results in 
a more efficient market. If we allow the relaxation of short-sale constraints due to 
alternative trading in options then a lower transaction cost results because of the increased 
degree of competition among market makers. According to the research, one might expect 
an increase in the underlying prices at the time of the options introduction.  
 
The majority of previous research in the area of derivative effects on the underlying 
security is based upon the introduction of options, with limited studies available on other 
introductions. The impact of option introduction examined by several studies look at the 
announcement as well as the listing date. Based on the US market during 1974-1980, 
Conrad (1989) finds a permanent positive stock price effect after the listing of call options 
but observes no significant price effect after the announcement of option trading. Detemple 
& Jorion (1990) report similar findings via US data but also demonstrate a decline in the 
magnitude of price effect during the post-period of option listing. A later study on the 
Swiss market by Stucki & Wasserfallen (1994) provides evidence of a positive underlying 
price effect from options trading on 11 stocks despite a small sample which includes 
options introduced only on one single day. Many researches conducted in Asian countries 
seem to recognize the impact of derivatives introduction especially on the announcement 
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day. Chan & Wei (2001) and Draper, Mak & Tang (2001) base their analyses on the Hong 
Kong market. They observe a positive price effect due to the announcement of derivative 
warrant.23 In Taiwan, Chan & Jelic (2005) present a positive price effect on the 
announcement of covered warrants trading. Nevertheless, there also exist arguments which 
predict a reduction in underlying prices once options are introduced. Watt et al. (1992) 
investigate option listing in the UK market. They find a steady price decline after option 
listing.24 
 
4.2.2 Background on Volume effect 
 
There are empirical studies documenting the impact of derivative introductions on 
the volume of the underlying. The trading volume effects are mixed. According to Anthony 
(1988), trading volume on options leads trading on stocks with a one-day lag. This suggests 
that informed investors trade on the option market rather than on the stock market. 
Moreover, it is widely claimed that derivatives create greater choice for investors and 
induce more hedging related activities of issuers, especially in the absence of similar 
contracts. If this is true, we should expect to see a decrease in the volume of trading of the 
underlying stock market. For the US data, Branch & Finnerty (1981) report an increase in 
underlying stocks trading volume when call options are listed. In addition, the study of 
Hong Kong’s derivative equity warrants data by Chen & Wu (2001) presents an increase in 
underlying trading volume after warrants listing. However, Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1998) 
examine the Nikkei 225 index options which traded in the Japanese market. They report a 
decline in trading volume of the stocks contained in the index after the index listing while 
the US study by Whiteside, Dukes & Dunne (1983) shows no change in trading volume of 
securities for both announcement and listing days of the options. 
 
                                                 
23 Draper et al. (2001) only find a temporary positive price effect pre-announcement day of derivative warrant. 
24 Though, they also find a temporary positive price effect before the option listing.  
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4.3 Research hypotheses 
All of the hypotheses introduced in this chapter are fundamentally based on the 
literature against the efficient market theory. Please refer back to section 4.1.1 for the detail 
discussion. 
4.3.1 Price effect hypotheses 
 
Numerous empirical researchers support the argument of positive changes in the 
equilibrium underlying security prices as a consequence of the introduction of derivatives. 
As previously discussed the incomplete market becomes more complete due to derivatives 
trading which enhances the investment opportunities. Ross (1976) and Hakansson (1982) 
support this view. They analyse some conditions under which derivatives like options may 
have an impact on investors’ opportunity sets. Ross actually stated that in a non-perfect 
world derivatives issued on existing assets could improve efficiency by allowing an 
expansion of investment opportunities. On the other hand, some researchers indicate that 
derivatives introduction may create a decline in value of the underlying securities. This 
view is supported by the studies concerned with short-selling. Miller (1977), Figlewski 
(1981) and Danielsen & Sorescu (2001) suggest derivatives provide investors with 
alternative trading choices on the receipt of negative information about the underlying 
stocks which used to be restricted by short-sale constraints. Pessimistic information moves 
very quickly into the underlying stock market and leads to a decline in stock prices.   
  
Because of these conflicting views and lack of a conclusive theoretical argument 
especially in the area of covered warrants, empirical analysis must be employed to seek out 
the answer. The covered warrants market is generally dominated by a few big financial 
institutions. These issuers may have much better information about the market and would 
only issue call covered warrants if they think they can profit from the issue. One possibility 
of profit is if they anticipate some negative signal affecting the underlying stocks. Hence, 
the issuance of call covered warrants would be followed by a decline in underlying stock 
price. The relaxation of short-sale constraints due to derivatives introduction also supports 
this view. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be introduced: 
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Hypothesis 4.1: There should be a significant negative price effect on the underlying 
securities during both the announcement and listing of call covered warrants. 
 
The stock price trading impact around the expiration dates of covered warrants is 
also investigated. Investors usually attempt to close their positions in the derivatives market 
not long before expiration to avoid physical delivery on the expiration day. Of course, 
investors may sell stocks after they are acquired from the exercise of call warrants. The 
issuers of call warrants may liquidate their hedging position by selling out their existing 
stocks before the call warrants expiration if they are likely to be out-of-the-money. These 
strategies may lead to a negative effect on stock price around expiration because of the 
selling pressure. Put covered warrants will be subject to analogous strategies as call covered 
warrants. This could lead to the opposite effect. In addition, it would be interesting to see 
whether there are any differences effects during the expiration period between in and out-
of-the-money warrants.   
 
Hypothesis 4.2: There should be a reduction in price of the underlying securities when call 
covered warrants expire. 
 
Hypothesis 4.3: There should be an increase in price of the underlying securities when put 
covered warrants expire. 
 
Put covered warrants are also analysed in this study. The impact of put warrant 
introductions is likely to differ from those for call introductions. However, activities related 
to put covered warrants trading possibly have less impact on the underlying stock market.25 
Therefore, there should be less expectation of an impact on the underlying stock. 
 
Hypothesis 4.4: There should be no significant impact on the underling securities price due 
to both the announcement and listing of put covered warrants.  
 
                                                 
25 Detailed discussion of this is provided in the above section 4.1.2 (Motivation) 
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4.3.2 Volume effect hypotheses 
 
Campbell, Grossman & Wang (1993) documented that abnormal returns patterns 
are quite frequently associated with abnormal trading volumes. However, construction of 
an appropriate hypothesis regarding the expected change in stock volume reactions because 
of covered warrant introduction and expiration is difficult. The previous literature discussed 
in this study (section 4.2.2 theoretical background on volume effect) reveals contrasting 
empirical findings and sometimes directly opposite outcomes.26 This thesis tests the 
following general hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4.5: There are significant changes in the volume of the underlying 
security traded during the announcement, listing and delisting of both call and put covered 
warrants. 
                                                 
26 More references to the literature are provide in Chapter 2 Literature Review 
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4.4 Data/Sample construction 
 
4.4.1 Data sources and description 
 
Data on UK covered warrant on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) are provided by 
Datastream (DS). The data set consists of both call and put covered warrants listed on the 
Exchange over the period 26th July 2004 – 15th December 2006. The start date was initially 
chosen to coincide with the first covered equity warrant traded on the Exchange27 but data 
difficulties caused me to start some time later in  2004 instead. The sample is selected on 
the following criteria. Firstly, covered warrants begin trading and expire during the sample 
period. Secondly, with multiple warrants on the same underlying security, I include only 
those that have at least a one month-gap between each other. The dataset specifies the 
announcement date and the expiration date of the warrants but provides no information on 
the listing date of the warrants. To analyse the effects of the warrants listing on the 
underlying securities, I assume that the first day availability of the warrant record coincides 
with the listing date of each particular warrant. My final sample was as follows: 
 
For warrant announcement analysis, I divide the sample into two parts. For call 
warrants, I use 42 warrants which have only call warrants issued on the underlying stock. 
For put warrants because of the small sample of put only data, we use 58 warrants which 
have both call and put warrants issued on the same underlying stock.  
 
For the listing of warrants, I again separate the sample into two parts. Based on the 
listing dates’ data, 39 call only warrants are used for the call investigation and 54 warrants 
with both call and put features on each underlying securities are used for the put 
investigation.  
 
For warrant delisting, both call and put warrants are examined. 36 call only warrants 
are used for the call analysis. I also examine whether moneyness of the warrants would 
                                                 
27 The first time trading of covered warrants in the LSE was in 28th October 2002. 
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influence the results. For this the sample is divided into 25 in-the-money and 11 out-of-the-
money call warrants. For the put effect, 58 warrants which have both call and put on the 
same underlying are employed. However, due to the small sample size of put only data, 
further analysis to separate the moneyness factor influence cannot be done.  
 
4.4.2 Data construction 
 
 The underlying security returns data     
 
For dividend paying stocks and stock indices, data is often used in the form of a 
total return index that reflects both the price of the security and the accumulated dividends 
that it pays. Datastream DS code of RI (Return Index) provides this.28 Gross dividends 
where paid are included in the RI rather than net dividend (net of investor level taxation). 
Studies suggest that around an ex-dividend date, share price will fall by the net amount of 
                                                 
28 From 1988 onwards (and from 1973 for US and Canadian stocks), the availability of detailed dividend 
payment data enables a more realistic method to be used in which the discrete quantity of dividend paid is 
added to the price on the ex-date of the payment. Then: 
 
except when t = ex-date of the dividend payment Dt then: 
 
Where: 
  = price on ex-date 
  = price on previous day 
  = dividend payment associated with ex-date t 
Gross dividends are used where available and the calculation ignores tax and re-investment charges. Adjusted 
closing prices are used throughout to determine price index and hence return index. At this point the RI is 
calculated back to the base date. 
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the dividend (Campbell & Beranek (1955) and Duran & May (1960)). However, using 
gross dividend rather than net dividend should not alter the results significantly as dividend 
payments are infrequent relative to the number of observations designed for each firm. 
Moreover, the discrepancy drop off in prices between gross and net dividends are very 
small.  
 
For each underlying stock of covered warrant, RI is used to calculate the natural 
logarithmic return.29 
 
RI of stock(i) at period t
Rate of Return on stock(i) ln
RI of stock(i) at period t-1
 
=  
 
 
 
The total stock market return index (FTSE All Share Index) is also obtained (DS 
code of RI).30 The return index represents the theoretical aggregate growth in value of the 
constituents of the index. The index constituents are deemed to return an aggregate daily 
dividend which is included as an incremental amount to the daily change in the price index. 
For each daily index value, the obtained total return index is used to calculate natural log 
return. 
 
RI of FTSE index at period t
Rate of Return on the Market Portfolio ln
RI of FTSE index at period t-1
 
=  
 
 
 
 
 The volume of trading of the underlying securities 
 
The underlying securities volumes come from Datastream (DS code is VO). It 
provides the number of shares traded of a stock on a particular day/ the total number of 
constituent shares traded on an exchange on a particular day. The raw trading volume data 
are not normally distributed. This is supported by the study by Ajinkya & Jain (1989). They 
claim that the distributions of the prediction errors of raw trading volume data have positive 
                                                 
29 The reasons for preferring logarithmic returns over the discrete returns are discussed in Chapter 3: Research 
Methodology; Calculation of returns. 
30 The investigation also uses the FTSE100. However, this does not make much difference. Both FTSE100 
and FTSE All Share provide similar results. This study reports only in the results for the FTSE All Share. 
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sample skewness (right-skewed distribution), left tails are very thin, and right tails are very 
fat. Since a normally distributed variable is an important requirement of standard 
parametric statistical tests, they suggest the use of the natural logarithm transformation to 
solve the problem. The natural log transformed volume can reduce the departure from 
normality exhibited by the distribution of raw trading volume. The transformed volume 
becomes more symmetric in prediction error distributions as the skewness problem is 
solved (the means nearly equal to the medians), and both tails conform reasonably well 
with the normal distribution. Previous papers such as Morse (1980), Pincus (1983) and 
Richardson, Sefcik & Thompson (1986) have all suggested taking the natural log 
transformation in order to ‘correct’ the volume data. In the event study analysis used here, 
it requires percentage change in volume. I therefore define the following metrics.31  
 
                     
it
it
it-1
V ln
v
v
 
=  
 
 
        
m t
m t
m t-1
V ln
v
v
 
=  
 
 
where itV    = normalized volume traded for firm i in day t 
           mtV  = normalized volume traded for the market (FTSE100) in day t 
            i tv    = securities trading volume of firm i in day t 
            i t -1v  = securities trading volume of firm i in day t-1 
            m tv   = market trading volume in day t 
            m t-1v = market trading volume in day t-1 
 
                                                 
31 Even though there are number of studies (such as Cready & Ramanan (1991), Campbell & Wasley (1996), 
Chen & Wu (2001), etc.) which define the metric as the ratio of the number of securities traded over the 
number of securities outstanding, this study use the previous day trading volume rather than the outstanding 
as the denominator due to several reasons as the following. Firstly, the variation of the daily outstanding 
trading volume is very small or almost constant leading to the invalid over all results when employed. 
Secondly, the problem of the scale effect because of very large difference between numerator (number of 
securities traded) and denominator (number of securities outstanding) which consequence in a too small 
percentage change needed to do the analysis.   
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4.5 Methodology 
 
4.5.1 Price effect analysis 
 
The impact of the UK call/put covered warrants on underlying stock returns can be 
divided into three major events: announcement, listing and delisting. The event study 
methodology is employed to analyse these impacts using daily adjusted closing price 
returns. A detailed explanation of the event study methodology can be found in Chapter 3: 
Research Methodology. In this study, a 21-day event window is chosen comprised of 10 
trading days before and after the event day (announcement or listing or delisting date of the 
covered warrants).32 Day 0 is the event day. The 300 days preceding the event window is 
the estimation window used in the study.33  
 
Three models are chosen to generate normal returns from which abnormal returns 
are measured. They are widely used in event studies and are seen as providing 
valid/reasonable results. 
 
• Market Model  
• Market-adjusted Model 
• The mean-adjusted return Model 
 
 Brown & Warner (1980; 1985) conclude that there is no evidence that more complicated 
methodologies convey any additional benefit. 
 
For the aggregation of abnormal returns, this study uses the cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) due to its suitability for short-run studies.  
 
                                                 
32 Event window is the period from day (t) -10 to 10.  
33 Estimation window is the period from day (t) -310 to -11 
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4.5.2 Volume effect analysis 
 
I study the impact on the trading volume of the underlying securities during the 
listing, announcement and delisting of covered warrants. A similar event study 
methodology as for the price effect analysis is used to test for the trading volume effect of 
the underlying stocks from both call and put covered warrants. 21-day event window and 
300-day estimation window are employed using the three general models (market, market-
adjusted and mean-adjusted volume models).  
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
4.6.1 Pricing/Return effects  
 
The effect of the introduction of covered warrants on the price of the underlying 
securities is examined using an event study methodology. Both announcement and listing 
dates are examined to identify any introduction effect. Intuitively, the announcement date 
should be more reliable because the information released to the market is normally new and 
fresh. It is used for example in Draper et al. (2001). However, some previous findings 
(Whiteside, Dukes & Dunne (1981)) suggest that the announcement date of the 
option/warrant introduction has no impact on the stock (Clarke, Gannon & Vinning (2005)) 
and the listing date is appropriate. There are various arguments for selecting either of these 
two event dates. Therefore, this study analyses both of them for comparison. In addition, 
the results of the effect of the covered warrants delisting on the underlying securities are 
also presented. 
 
 The initial focus is on the call warrant case. The results are reported in Table 4.1 
(abnormal returns around the announcement event for call event), the market model 
suggests a negative 0.29% excess return (statistically significant abnormal return at 10% 
level) affecting the underlying security on the day of announcement. The market-adjusted 
model and mean-adjusted model provide supporting evidence of negative abnormal returns 
of 0.33% (5% significance level) and 0.49% (1% significance level) consecutively. 
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Although the absolute numbers are not high, the consistency of results between the three 
models is sufficient to make the interpretation in this study valid and useful. Similar results 
can be observed throughout Figure 4.1. All three graphs estimated using the market model, 
market-adjusted model, and mean-adjusted return model show considerable fluctuations in 
abnormal return. The return rises and remains fairly high before the announcement day. 
This is clearly illustrated in the third graph (the mean-adjusted return model). This change 
in underlying securities prices may reflect the securities buying activities (the hedging 
activities) of the issuing investment banks as they cover their position as sellers of the call 
warrants. The investment bank will generally try to cover its position before the market 
becomes aware of the issue, otherwise it risks expensive adverse movement in price as it 
attempts to cover its position. Other investment banks (its competitors) might also attempt 
to increase the underlying security prices when they are aware of the issue. Thus, it is safer 
for the investment bank (issuer) to cover its outstanding position at an early stage in order 
to avoid buying relatively expensive securities later on. Stock price rises may also be 
caused by the issuers themselves with the intention of pricing the warrant issue higher 
(Chen & Wu (2001)). This is driven by the market pricing mechanism where the issuing 
price of derivatives depends on the difference between the exercise price of the warrant 
issue and the closing price of the underlying security (known as premium). Prices rise until 
the investment bank stops buying on announcement of the warrant issue. The rise in price 
leads to a higher return for existing holders as well as higher abnormal return. Security 
prices drop when the investment bank terminates its buying activities on the announcement 
date. Additional explanations for falling security prices (Kabir (1999)) are the relaxation of 
short sales constraints by warrant introductions, the new investment opportunity as well as 
low transaction with high leverage lead to shifts of trading from the stock market to the 
warrants market, and the shareholders selling existing stocks because they see warrants as a 
destabilizing factor for the underlying stocks. The temporary decline in the price after the 
day of announcement may be a reflection of what has been described as a price pressure (or 
distribution effect, or liquidity premium) under the “block trades” theory (Copeland & 
Weston (1992)). Therefore, the temporary decline of underlying security prices is the 
summarize impact from the announcement of call covered warrants trading.  
 
Other influences may also affect prices. Investors may assume that the issuing bank 
has additional positive knowledge about the company and warrant announcements may 
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result in a rise in the underlying security price (this is contrary to the finding of this study 
which is explained earlier). This study also provides results contrary to the confusion 
hypothesis (Gemmill & Thomas (1997)). They suggest that because of investor confusion 
securities with warrants are valued more highly by investors (as investors do not understand 
the concept that the more the warrants are worth, the less the value of the underlying 
securities.).34 
 
                                                 
34 They examine the special case of investment trust/company warrants and the effect of company warrants 
would be different from covered warrants in any event. 
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Table 4.1: Abnormal returns around the announcement event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the UK call 
covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 -0.0025 -0.8924 -0.0025 -0.8924 -0.0019 -0.6849 -0.0019 -0.6849 -0.0015 -0.5162 -0.0015 -0.5162 
-9 0.0004 0.2724 -0.0020 -0.6435 0.0004 0.2428 -0.0015 -0.4589 -0.0009 -0.4439 -0.0023 -0.7092 
-8 -0.0012 -0.9554 -0.0033 -0.8763 -0.0015 -1.1263 -0.0030 -0.7848 -0.0017 -1.1315 -0.0041 -1.0507 
-7 0.0001 0.0287 -0.0032 -0.8013 0.0008 0.4678 -0.0022 -0.5317 0.0044 2.2032** 0.0003 0.0773 
-6 -0.0009 -0.7729 -0.0041 -0.9457 -0.0007 -0.5687 -0.0029 -0.6342 0.0029 2.1100** 0.0032 0.6923 
-5 0.0019 0.8046 -0.0023 -0.4667 0.0020 0.8899 -0.0009 -0.1739 0.0018 0.7038 0.0050 1.0126 
-4 0.0013 0.8114 -0.0010 -0.1977 0.0014 0.8948 0.0006 0.1167 0.0049 2.8659*** 0.0099 1.9694** 
-3 -0.0019 -1.2093 -0.0029 -0.6135 -0.0021 -1.3046 -0.0015 -0.3172 -0.0014 -0.7737 0.0085 1.8132* 
-2 -0.0006 -0.3345 -0.0035 -0.6615 -0.0005 -0.2774 -0.0020 -0.3896 -0.0037 -1.8490* 0.0047 0.8996 
-1 0.0005 0.3169 -0.0030 -0.5304 0.0003 0.1826 -0.0017 -0.3111 0.0028 1.4507 0.0075 1.3419 
0 -0.0029 -1.8789* -0.0059 -1.0403 -0.0033 -2.1058** -0.0050 -0.8920 -0.0049 -2.8823*** 0.0026 0.4639 
1 0.0000 0.0021 -0.0059 -0.9781 0.0002 0.1455 -0.0048 -0.8137 -0.0020 -1.3000 0.0007 0.1081 
2 -0.0044 -1.6848* -0.0103 -1.5738 -0.0042 -1.5923 -0.0090 -1.3978 -0.0017 -0.6099 -0.0011 -0.1622 
3 -0.0005 -0.3600 -0.0107 -1.5952 -0.0010 -0.7567 -0.0100 -1.4809 -0.0038 -2.5577** -0.0048 -0.7085 
4 0.0015 1.0071 -0.0093 -1.3050 0.0017 1.0755 -0.0083 -1.1638 -0.0001 -0.0470 -0.0049 -0.6645 
5 -0.0012 -0.5555 -0.0105 -1.4024 -0.0010 -0.4553 -0.0094 -1.2298 -0.0001 -0.0601 -0.0051 -0.6544 
6 -0.0006 -0.2820 -0.0110 -1.4701 -0.0009 -0.4560 -0.0103 -1.3484 -0.0005 -0.2115 -0.0055 -0.7259 
7 0.0026 1.7930* -0.0084 -1.0731 0.0031 2.0528** -0.0071 -0.8950 0.0016 0.9162 -0.0040 -0.4963 
8 0.0004 0.2004 -0.0080 -1.0198 0.0001 0.0444 -0.0070 -0.8636 -0.0001 -0.0365 -0.0041 -0.4940 
9 0.0021 1.0062 -0.0059 -0.6992 0.0021 0.9966 -0.0049 -0.5538 0.0045 1.7044* 0.0004 0.0469 
10 0.0000 0.0152 -0.0059 -0.7256 0.0003 0.1648 -0.0046 -0.5277 0.0019 1.0750 0.0023 0.2777 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Figure 4.1: Abnormal returns around the announcement event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the announcement event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model 
and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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        Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
          The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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 Table 4.2 shows abnormal returns around the listing event for calls. Under the 
market model and the market-adjusted model, similar negative and statistically significant 
results for CARs from day -2 to day +3 are evident. Listing dates are on average 7 days 
after the announcement event of call warrants (Table 4.4). Thus, the analysis of the listing 
event seems to provide an after effect following the announcement event. Figure 4.2 reveals 
the behaviour of excess return around the listing event. The figures emphasise the 
continuous temporary fall in security return after the announcement day. Moreover, returns 
do not fully recover to their original level before the announcement date. This may be a 
reflection of a permanent effect or the information effect from the “block trades” theory 
(Copeland & Weston, 1992). In this case, the market may believe that the issuing 
investment bank has better information about the stocks prospects compared to others. The 
issuing of call warrants can be interpreted as the bank’s expectation of a decrease in the 
underlying stock price for the period following warrant listing. In summary, there are 
evidences of negative prices’ effect on underlying securities around the listing event of call 
covered warrants. 
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Table 4.2: Abnormal returns around the listing event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the listing event of the UK call covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
  
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0032 2.1294** 0.0032 2.1294** 0.0033 2.1291** 0.0033 2.1291** 0.0029 1.7576* 0.0029 1.7576* 
-9 -0.0020 -1.3113 0.0012 0.5354 -0.0018 -1.1483 0.0015 0.5856 -0.0004 -0.2472 0.0025 0.9522 
-8 -0.0016 -0.8325 -0.0003 -0.1047 -0.0016 -0.8396 -0.0001 -0.0372 -0.0020 -0.9810 0.0004 0.1442 
-7 0.0004 0.2420 0.0001 0.0236 0.0004 0.2621 0.0003 0.1038 -0.0004 -0.2087 0.0001 0.0282 
-6 -0.0003 -0.1614 -0.0002 -0.0631 -0.0002 -0.0808 0.0002 0.0455 0.0027 1.2137 0.0028 0.7443 
-5 -0.0012 -0.8219 -0.0014 -0.3569 -0.0017 -1.1532 -0.0015 -0.4161 -0.0026 -1.5546 0.0001 0.0364 
-4 -0.0005 -0.2657 -0.0019 -0.5081 -0.0003 -0.1641 -0.0018 -0.5288 0.0002 0.0936 0.0003 0.0878 
-3 -0.0006 -0.4254 -0.0025 -0.6726 -0.0005 -0.3317 -0.0023 -0.6487 0.0010 0.6630 0.0013 0.3403 
-2 -0.0038 -3.2750*** -0.0062 -1.6568* -0.0036 -3.1520*** -0.0059 -1.6524* -0.0047 -3.4851*** -0.0034 -0.8311 
-1 -0.0034 -1.2061 -0.0096 -1.8254* -0.0035 -1.2517 -0.0094 -1.8094* -0.0047 -1.5962 -0.0081 -1.5080 
0 -0.0015 -1.0321 -0.0081 -1.7359* -0.0013 -0.8891 -0.0081 -1.7566* -0.0014 -0.8771 -0.0067 -1.2456 
1 -0.0021 -1.4971 -0.0102 -1.8252* -0.0017 -1.1732 -0.0099 -1.7080* -0.0020 -1.2017 -0.0087 -1.5399 
2 -0.0020 -1.2041 -0.0123 -2.0300** -0.0023 -1.3720 -0.0122 -1.9691** -0.0033 -1.6303 -0.0120 -1.8629* 
3 -0.0013 -0.7289 -0.0135 -2.1007** -0.0009 -0.4597 -0.0131 -1.9278* -0.0010 -0.4420 -0.0130 -1.8747* 
4 0.0072 2.7830*** -0.0063 -0.9680 0.0065 2.4928** -0.0066 -0.9615 0.0044 1.5037 -0.0086 -1.2765 
5 0.0042 1.8906* -0.0021 -0.3001 0.0038 1.6652* -0.0027 -0.3703 0.0038 1.4495 -0.0047 -0.6777 
6 -0.0018 -1.4103 -0.0039 -0.5368 -0.0013 -0.9789 -0.0040 -0.5249 0.0023 1.6340 -0.0024 -0.3398 
7 -0.0026 -1.3470 -0.0065 -1.0131 -0.0026 -1.2551 -0.0066 -0.9498 0.0003 0.1117 -0.0021 -0.3342 
8 0.0016 1.2697 -0.0049 -0.7343 0.0011 0.8137 -0.0055 -0.7557 -0.0017 -0.9911 -0.0038 -0.5624 
9 -0.0021 -1.4154 -0.0070 -1.0969 -0.0022 -1.3939 -0.0077 -1.0871 0.0003 0.1722 -0.0035 -0.5351 
10 0.0039 2.0737** -0.0031 -0.4646 0.0044 2.2863** -0.0033 -0.4559 0.0063 3.2387*** 0.0028 0.4264 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Figure 4.2: Abnormal returns around the listing event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the listing event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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       Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
        The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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              The effect of put warrant introductions is also of interest. The underlying security 
price should fall before the warrant issuing date. Issuers want to cover their position from 
exposure to the risk involved in transactions of this type. By selling the underlying 
securities in advance (hedging activities), they can protect themselves as sellers of put 
warrants. Even if they do not own any of the underlying security, they can sell stocks short 
to cover the outstanding positions. However, issuers are constrained by the costs of 
employing a short selling strategy as it may be very expensive and/or almost impossible if 
stock borrowing is difficult. This is likely to be a particular problem for longer dated 
warrants. This study shows a fall in the underlying securities prices and a fall in returns to 
existing holders as illustrated by a negative abnormal return. Table 4.3 (abnormal returns 
around the announcement event for put event) supports these claims. There are negative 
abnormal returns of 0.34% on day -2 and 0.28% on day -3 (5% significance level) using the 
market model. The market-adjusted model suggests a negative abnormal return of 0.29% 
(5% significance level) on day -2 and a negative abnormal return of 0.23% (10% 
significance level) on day -3. Thus the underlying stock price seems to decrease a few days 
before announcement day 0 according to the decrease in abnormal returns. A clearer picture 
can be seen in Figure 4.3 (CARs). The figures demonstrate a similar trend in which the 
stock returns start to plummet a couple of days before the announcement day. This may be 
because of the issuing investment banks’ hedging activities. To hedge the put warrants, the 
investment bank (issuer) sell stocks short. Therefore, the price of the stocks falls due to the 
shorting of stocks. When the investment bank stops selling, the fall in the stock price 
should also stop. The results in this study provide supporting evidence. It reflects the 
ending of the selling transactions in the underlying stocks by the investment banks on 
announcement. The underlying stock prices start to recover and rise back after the 
announcement day. The slow price recovery is explainable by a temporary decline in price 
as a reflection of price pressure (Copeland & Weston, 1992). However, the stock price 
fluctuates a lot over time as can be seen from Figure 4.3 (ARs) and supports the hypothesis 
that banks attempt to keep high volatility within the market to secure high warrant 
premiums. This will be discussed in more detail in the analysis of the effect on the return 
volatility of the underlying stock, Chapter 5 of this research. Anyway, for this section, it 
can be concluded that the announcement event of put covered warrants creates negative 
impacts on the underlying stocks. Though the impacts are only temporary and are not 
persistent beyond the event day. 
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Table 4.3: Abnormal returns around the announcement event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the UK put 
covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0017 1.5145 0.0017 1.5145 0.0021 1.8700* 0.0021 1.8700* 0.0019 1.3739 0.0019 1.3739 
-9 0.0042 3.1325*** 0.0059 3.5752*** 0.0045 3.1568*** 0.0067 3.7797*** 0.0028 1.5027 0.0047 2.0079** 
-8 0.0028 1.2216 0.0087 4.0009*** 0.0024 0.9684 0.0091 3.8129*** -0.0008 -0.2459 0.0039 1.1781 
-7 0.0011 0.6495 0.0099 3.3233*** 0.0017 0.9547 0.0108 3.3415*** 0.0024 1.3276 0.0063 1.5761 
-6 0.0022 1.2873 0.0121 3.3443*** 0.0025 1.4254 0.0133 3.4165*** 0.0028 1.6018 0.0092 2.0340** 
-5 0.0006 0.3623 0.0126 3.1695*** 0.0013 0.7686 0.0146 3.4038*** 0.0009 0.4646 0.0101 1.9477* 
-4 0.0012 0.8301 0.0139 3.3475*** 0.0007 0.4207 0.0153 3.2833*** -0.0045 -2.1899** 0.0056 0.8774 
-3 -0.0028 -2.0542** 0.0111 2.8471*** -0.0023 -1.6915* 0.0130 2.9755*** -0.0021 -1.4428 0.0034 0.5616 
-2 -0.0034 -2.2646** 0.0077 1.9398* -0.0029 -1.9636** 0.0100 2.2389** -0.0037 -2.3541** -0.0002 -0.0352 
-1 -0.0014 -0.6616 0.0063 1.2770 -0.0011 -0.4899 0.0090 1.7005* 0.0001 0.0517 -0.0001 -0.0148 
0 -0.0016 -0.4460 0.0047 0.7200 -0.0018 -0.4885 0.0072 1.0718 -0.0049 -1.3284 -0.0050 -0.6727 
1 0.0012 0.5302 0.0059 0.9392 0.0022 0.9874 0.0094 1.4756 0.0054 2.1435** 0.0003 0.0479 
2 -0.0003 -0.1686 0.0056 0.8022 -0.0007 -0.4494 0.0088 1.2363 -0.0052 -3.3858*** -0.0049 -0.6309 
3 -0.0005 -0.3133 0.0051 0.6965 0.0000 -0.0254 0.0087 1.1531 -0.0001 -0.0684 -0.0050 -0.6068 
4 0.0036 2.0609** 0.0087 1.1419 0.0051 3.0513*** 0.0138 1.7593* 0.0105 6.0398*** 0.0055 0.6881 
5 0.0023 1.6970 0.0110 1.3822 0.0028 1.9936** 0.0166 2.0108** 0.0024 1.2081 0.0079 0.9428 
6 -0.0004 -0.1748 0.0106 1.2951 0.0007 0.2842 0.0173 2.0475** 0.0035 1.5507 0.0114 1.3662 
7 -0.0011 -0.5374 0.0095 1.0828 0.0002 0.0925 0.0175 1.9281* 0.0041 1.6537* 0.0155 1.7651* 
8 -0.0028 -1.6183 0.0067 0.7857 -0.0029 -1.6845* 0.0146 1.6561* -0.0053 -3.3568*** 0.0102 1.1919 
9 0.0002 0.1490 0.0069 0.8127 0.0009 0.6405 0.0155 1.7551* 0.0042 2.2989** 0.0144 1.6713* 
10 -0.0011 -0.8264 0.0058 0.6878 -0.0009 -0.6452 0.0146 1.6712* -0.0026 -1.5730 0.0117 1.3863 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
 
 90 
Figure 4.3: Abnormal returns around the announcement event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the announcement event of the UK put covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model 
and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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 Table 4.4 shows there are 17 days on average between the announcement and the 
listing dates of put warrants. Hence, the listing event analysis provides interesting outcomes 
in comparison with the announcement effect. Nevertheless, it does not result in a large 
significant (statistically or economically) effect. Figure 4.4 (Abnormal returns around the 
listing event for put event: Market model) presents a similar trend as for the announcement 
event.35 That is a decline in the underlying stock return before and on the listing day with 
an increase in return after that. The same reasons as for the announcement event analysis 
can be used to explain the phenomenon here.    
 
 
Table 4.4: The difference between Announcement and Listing dates (days) 
 
  The different between Announcement and Listing dates (days) 
  Call event Put event 
Average 7 17 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 29 59 
Median 7 6 
Note:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Abnormal returns around the listing event for put event 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the announcement event of the UK put covered warrants where market model is used to generate 
normal return.  
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       Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
                                                 
35 The figures of abnormal returns around the listing event for put event under the market-adjusted model and 
the mean-adjusted return model are presented in Appendix 4.2. Moreover, the numerical presentation of this 
information can be seen in Appendix 4.1. 
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For call covered warrants, the direct results of the effect of the warrants introduction 
on the underlying securities can be seen from looking at the announcement event. The 
listing event provides an after affect continuing after the announcement date. However, 
both the announcement and the listing date employed to test the introduction effect of put 
covered warrants in this study provide similar results. The announcement event provides a 
much clearer picture of the effect compared to the listing event, but the results support each 
other.  
 
 The present study also reports evidence of the underlying stock market reaction 
after covered warrant delisting. One of the motivations to study this effect is to test the 
hypothesis that the results from option delisting effects should be opposite to those of 
listing effects (Detemple & Jorion (1990)).  
 
Table 4.5 present the results for the whole delisting sample for the effect of call 
warrants. Figure 4.5 estimated using the market model, market-adjusted, and mean-adjusted 
return models show similar trends. The excess returns presented in Table 4.5, rise around 
0.7% (though not significant) from day -5 until day -2 for both the market model and the 
market-adjusted model. These reflect an upward movement in the underlying stock market 
before the warrant delisting date. The more obvious evidence can be seen in Table 4.5 
under the mean-adjusted return model which shows around a 1.7% rise in excess return 
(from day -5 until day -2), significant at a 1% level. The excess return of the underlying 
securities might come from activity resulting from approaching the warrant expiry date. 
This activity refers to the demand from the warrant issuer to adjust its position on the 
underlying security according to the moneyness of the warrants. In the case of call warrants, 
if they are about to expire in-the-money, the issuer may have accumulated a large amount 
of the underlying security (a long security position by hedging activity, delta hedging) 
(Chen & Wu (2001)).36 
                                                 
36 A “delta hedging” strategy is normally used to hedge the price risk. The delta is a measure of the sensitivity 
of the price of a derivative (warrant) to small changes in the underlying security price. By undertaking a delta 
hedging strategy, the issuer has to buy a number, delta shares of the underlying security for every call warrant 
sold. The issuer must always adjust its position because delta values change through time. The non constant 
delta value results from the dependency of delta on both security price and time to expiration (as these two 
factors move through time). 
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Table 4.5: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the UK call covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0014 1.5023 0.0014 1.5023 0.0020 1.8836* 0.0020 1.8836* 0.0072 5.8109*** 0.0072 5.8109*** 
-9 -0.0005 -0.3953 0.0009 0.5354 0.0000 -0.0228 0.0020 0.9399 0.0051 3.3654*** 0.0123 5.7377*** 
-8 -0.0003 -0.2261 0.0005 0.2748 -0.0005 -0.3110 0.0015 0.6238 -0.0014 -0.8880 0.0108 4.5593*** 
-7 0.0019 1.8893* 0.0025 1.3432 0.0012 1.0070 0.0027 1.3820 -0.0058 -4.7148*** 0.0050 2.6384*** 
-6 -0.0026 -1.0666 -0.0001 -0.0513 -0.0037 -1.4338 -0.0010 -0.3763 -0.0142 -5.0870*** -0.0091 -3.4338*** 
-5 0.0003 0.1765 0.0001 0.0381 0.0005 0.3905 -0.0005 -0.1758 0.0034 2.5886*** -0.0058 -1.8454* 
-4 0.0041 2.1328** 0.0042 1.1451 0.0034 1.6299 0.0029 0.7497 0.0017 2.6924*** -0.0041 -1.9502* 
-3 0.0021 1.3735 0.0064 1.3727 0.0027 1.9673** 0.0056 1.2368 0.0093 6.8921*** 0.0052 1.0682 
-2 0.0004 0.3115 0.0067 1.4035 0.0004 0.3178 0.0060 1.2935 0.0023 2.7111*** 0.0075 1.4324 
-1 -0.0012 -0.7618 0.0055 1.3272 -0.0014 -0.8633 0.0046 1.1599 -0.0029 -1.7391* 0.0047 0.9675 
0 -0.0026 -0.9306 0.0029 0.4888 -0.0025 -0.8797 0.0021 0.3619 -0.0035 -1.2559 0.0011 0.1737 
1 0.0013 0.7326 0.0042 0.8975 0.0013 0.7404 0.0034 0.7900 0.0037 1.9084* 0.0049 0.8859 
2 -0.0016 -1.2104 0.0026 0.5411 -0.0025 -1.9857** 0.0010 0.1943 -0.0105 -7.3088*** -0.0057 -0.9020 
3 0.0021 1.1703 0.0047 0.7830 0.0026 1.4679 0.0035 0.5929 0.0068 3.8696*** 0.0011 0.1611 
4 0.0028 1.5983 0.0076 1.2640 0.0033 1.8354* 0.0068 1.2162 0.0055 2.7032*** 0.0066 1.0396 
5 -0.0024 -2.5144** 0.0051 0.8682 -0.0035 -3.6535*** 0.0033 0.5632 -0.0131 -2.2780** -0.0066 -0.9736 
6 -0.0003 -0.1603 0.0049 0.6742 -0.0006 -0.2951 0.0027 0.3843 -0.0070 -3.3136*** -0.0135 -1.6695* 
7 0.0005 0.3002 0.0053 0.7181 0.0016 0.8555 0.0043 0.6334 0.0089 3.8475*** -0.0046 -0.5960 
8 0.0011 0.8399 0.0065 0.8838 0.0020 1.1026 0.0063 0.9486 0.0081 4.2304*** 0.0034 0.4586 
9 0.0002 0.1175 0.0067 0.9779 0.0008 0.5297 0.0071 1.2001 0.0050 3.1956*** 0.0084 1.2257 
10 0.0010 0.5978 0.0076 1.0703 0.0007 0.4211 0.0077 1.2760 0.0023 1.2467 0.0108 1.5194 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Figure 4.5: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Alternatively, the excess return/increase in price of the underlying securities might come 
from other banks (competitors of the issuing bank) trading pressure as they attempt to push 
the underlying securities price up in order to make the warrants exercise in-the-money and 
potentially disadvantage the issuing bank. Thus, for “in-the-money” call warrants, the 
investment bank keeps its hedge in place and on delisting sells the underlying security to 
unwind its position. In addition there is an incentive for existing holders to 
liquidate/exercise the warrants and sell out the underlying securities after acquiring them 
from exercising the warrants into the market, assuming that delivery has been in securities 
and not in cash. The negative abnormal returns on day 0 may be the consequence shown in 
Table 4.5. The negative abnormal returns a day before the event provides similar evidence 
because of early trading from knowing the delisting dates within the market. However, this 
can only be explained as a temporary negative price effect as it does not persist beyond the 
delisting date. Possible explanations are early unwinding by the warrant holders and selling 
activities by other speculators as they see the future falling trend in stocks price so they act 
early in order to take advantage before the fall. By the expiration date, there may not be 
many outstanding warrants left in the market. However, this delisting effect coincides with 
the results of Draper et al. (2001), who observe a large negative price effect for call covered 
warrants around the delisting date.  
 
For further analysis the whole sample of call warrants is separated into two groups: 
in-the-money and out-of-the-money. Due to the limitation of data, this analysis assumes 
that the price of the underlying security at the warrant listing date is equal to the exercise 
price for each particular warrant. This assumption is used because exercise prices for some 
warrants are not available. The in-the-money call warrant can be indicated when the 
underlying security price on delisting is more than the underlying security price on listing 
(or the warrant exercise price). The out-of-the-money call warrant can be indicated when 
the price of underlying security at the warrant delisting less than at the warrant listing (or 
the warrant exercise price). Table 4.6 presents 36 call warrants in total with all the 
underlying securities prices on the listing dates (or the warrant exercise prices) and 
delisting dates. The differences in prices between each pair of these two dates are used to 
separate 25 in-the-money call warrants from 11 out-of-the-money call warrants.   
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Table 4.6: The differences of the underlying securities prices on listing and delisting dates of 
36 call warrants  
 
  Underlying securities prices on
 b
   
  Listing date Delisting date Delisting – Listing
 a
 
BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP* 500 562 62 
MAN GROUP 327.62 426.96 99.34 
WILLIAM HILL* 600 630 30 
ASTRAZENECA 3033 3219 186 
HBOS 957 959.5 2.5 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 1461 1464 3 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 1492 1506 14 
TESCO* 330 367.75 37.75 
BT GROUP* 220 259 39 
BT GROUP* 240 259 19 
SMITHS GROUP* 1000 895.13 -104.87 
BP* 650 584.5 -65.5 
BP 712 633 -79 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO* 1300 1501 201 
BAE SYSTEMS* 425 376 -49 
BARCLAYS 681.5 622 -59.5 
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. 580.33 600.67 20.34 
BRITISH LAND* 1000 1348 348 
LAND SECURITIES* 1800 1890 90 
CABLE & WIRELESS* 110 127.5 17.5 
ANGLO AMERICAN* 2100 2229.72 129.72 
BRITISH AIRWAYS* 350 425.75 75.75 
SAINSBURY* 300 370 70 
WPP GROUP* 600 640 40 
ANTOFAGASTA 373.4 454.75 81.35 
ANTOFAGASTA 483.2 454.75 -28.45 
REUTERS GROUP 403.5 406.25 2.75 
ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP* 400 429.55 29.55 
VODAFONE GROUP* 130 144.75 14.75 
VODAFONE GROUP 123.64 127.64 4 
VODAFONE GROUP 115.4 116.5 1.1 
VODAFONE GROUP 127.14 116.5 -10.64 
VODAFONE GROUP 127.64 118.89 -8.75 
CORUS GROUP 438.75 368.75 -70 
QINETIQ GROUP* 300 182 -118 
Party Gaming* 180 110.25 -69.75 
Note: Out of these 36 calls warrants, there are 20 warrants with available exercise prices. The 20 warrants are marked with * 
a 
 Positive number indicates in-the-money call warrant whereas negative number indicates out-of-the-money call warrant. 
b
 All underlying securities prices are in pence. 
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Table 4.7: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants  
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 25 UK in-the-money 
call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return. 
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0017 1.3020 0.0017 1.3020 0.0019 1.3130 0.0019 1.3130 0.0070 4.1691*** 0.0070 4.1691*** 
-9 -0.0005 -0.3371 0.0011 0.6130 -0.0004 -0.1925 0.0015 0.5898 0.0047 2.5270** 0.0117 4.4096*** 
-8 -0.0011 -0.5834 0.0001 0.0314 -0.0010 -0.5493 0.0005 0.1673 -0.0022 -1.0830 0.0095 2.9596*** 
-7 0.0010 0.8166 0.0011 0.4598 0.0010 0.6873 0.0016 0.6055 -0.0062 -3.9881*** 0.0033 1.3136 
-6 0.0006 0.3434 0.0017 0.5661 0.0006 0.3135 0.0022 0.7850 -0.0099 -4.1449*** -0.0066 -2.2932** 
-5 0.0004 0.2376 0.0021 0.6337 0.0005 0.3399 0.0026 0.8577 0.0031 2.2175** -0.0035 -1.0322 
-4 0.0061 2.6143*** 0.0081 1.8296* 0.0055 2.1695** 0.0082 1.7953* 0.0027 0.9823 -0.0007 -0.1451 
-3 0.0019 1.0673 0.0100 1.8314* 0.0019 1.3262 0.0101 1.9106* 0.0082 5.8246*** 0.0075 1.3325 
-2 0.0003 0.1530 0.0103 1.8315* 0.0002 0.1290 0.0103 1.9295* 0.0018 1.1054 0.0093 1.5812 
-1 -0.0019 -1.3210 0.0084 1.6130 -0.0018 -1.2356 0.0085 1.6997* -0.0033 -2.2887** 0.0060 1.0570 
0 0.0008 0.3716 0.0092 1.4681 0.0013 0.5981 0.0098 1.6433 0.0007 0.3165 0.0067 0.9747 
1 -0.0009 -0.5729 0.0083 1.5702 -0.0011 -0.6542 0.0087 1.8060* 0.0007 0.3783 0.0074 1.2498 
2 -0.0021 -1.5640 0.0062 1.1882 -0.0022 -1.9145* 0.0065 1.2841 -0.0106 -7.6788*** -0.0032 -0.5001 
3 0.0047 2.2264** 0.0109 1.6131 0.0050 2.4192** 0.0115 1.7720* 0.0092 4.4516*** 0.0060 0.7939 
4 0.0017 0.6854 0.0126 1.7858* 0.0021 0.8611 0.0136 2.1403** 0.0044 1.7613* 0.0104 1.4267 
5 -0.0031 -2.4647** 0.0095 1.4035 -0.0032 -2.5637** 0.0103 1.6336 -0.0133 -9.7101*** -0.0029 -0.3855 
6 0.0000 0.0041 0.0095 1.1421 0.0005 0.2310 0.0109 1.3853 -0.0053 -1.9954** -0.0082 -0.8794 
7 -0.0011 -0.5409 0.0084 0.9934 -0.0004 -0.1622 0.0105 1.4159 0.0076 2.6529*** -0.0006 -0.0687 
8 -0.0001 -0.0803 0.0083 0.9785 0.0003 0.1293 0.0108 1.4914 0.0065 2.9879*** 0.0059 0.6800 
9 -0.0013 -0.7883 0.0070 0.8708 -0.0009 -0.5028 0.0099 1.4615 0.0036 2.1111** 0.0096 1.1508 
10 0.0013 0.6859 0.0084 0.9358 0.0009 0.4689 0.0108 1.4307 0.0017 0.7521 0.0113 1.2609 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.7.1: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 15 in-the-money call warrants    
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 15 UK in-the-money 
call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return. 
 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0027 1.9077* 0.0027 1.9077* 0.0026 1.4256 0.0026 1.4256 0.0087 3.9039*** 0.0087 3.9039*** 
-9 -0.0012 -0.5159 0.0015 0.7141 -0.0012 -0.4285 0.0014 0.4144 0.0040 1.5414 0.0127 3.8604*** 
-8 -0.0020 -0.6512 -0.0005 -0.1344 -0.0017 -0.5674 -0.0003 -0.0710 -0.0026 -0.8008 0.0100 2.4641** 
-7 0.0009 0.4342 0.0004 0.1129 0.0014 0.5687 0.0011 0.3007 -0.0066 -2.9441*** 0.0034 0.9500 
-6 0.0007 0.3605 0.0011 0.3471 0.0014 0.5263 0.0025 0.8363 -0.0103 -3.4336*** -0.0069 -1.8229* 
-5 0.0004 0.2329 0.0015 0.3669 0.0005 0.3483 0.0030 0.7645 0.0032 1.9931** -0.0037 -0.7432 
-4 0.0062 1.7827* 0.0077 1.2622 0.0066 1.6996* 0.0096 1.4916 0.0009 0.2329 -0.0028 -0.3743 
-3 0.0031 1.2198 0.0108 1.3969 0.0030 1.3922 0.0127 1.6860* 0.0092 4.7057*** 0.0065 0.7520 
-2 0.0031 1.7386* 0.0139 1.6217 0.0033 1.9146* 0.0159 1.9616** 0.0038 1.9541* 0.0102 1.0703 
-1 -0.0009 -0.5787 0.0130 1.5920 -0.0006 -0.3740 0.0154 1.9635** -0.0022 -1.2896 0.0081 0.8383 
0 0.0036 1.2137 0.0166 1.7569* 0.0038 1.3068 0.0192 2.1115** 0.0042 1.4190 0.0123 1.1191 
1 -0.0029 -1.1900 0.0137 1.7169* -0.0028 -1.0857 0.0164 2.2023** -0.0018 -0.7221 0.0104 1.1106 
2 -0.0013 -0.6696 0.0124 1.6677* -0.0008 -0.5334 0.0156 2.0992** -0.0106 -6.8728*** -0.0001 -0.0110 
3 0.0062 1.8369* 0.0187 1.8653* 0.0062 1.8746* 0.0218 2.2564** 0.0110 3.3206*** 0.0109 0.9572 
4 -0.0006 -0.1785 0.0181 1.8748* -0.0006 -0.1876 0.0212 2.3965** 0.0035 1.0607 0.0143 1.3710 
5 -0.0042 -2.0383** 0.0139 1.5303 -0.0035 -1.6613* 0.0177 2.0060** -0.0151 -7.2659*** -0.0007 -0.0674 
6 0.0018 0.6345 0.0157 1.4485 0.0021 0.7157 0.0198 1.8598* -0.0023 -0.7494 -0.0030 -0.2332 
7 -0.0010 -0.3262 0.0147 1.2710 -0.0013 -0.3484 0.0185 1.7959* 0.0091 2.4389** 0.0061 0.4879 
8 -0.0024 -1.2094 0.0122 1.0548 -0.0025 -0.9130 0.0160 1.5999 0.0058 2.1573** 0.0119 0.9841 
9 0.0000 -0.0330 0.0122 1.0494 -0.0001 -0.0703 0.0159 1.6151 0.0055 3.0756*** 0.0174 1.4848 
10 -0.0020 -0.6693 0.0102 0.7569 -0.0017 -0.6031 0.0141 1.2230 -0.0037 -1.2575 0.0137 1.0052 
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The first group is presented in Table 4.7 and shows the abnormal returns around the 
delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants. All three models (the market model, the 
market-adjusted model, and the mean-adjusted return model) employed under this analysis 
provide similar outcomes/trend.37 In Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6, under the mean-adjusted 
return model, there is a positive abnormal return of 1.6% over day -5 to -2. This means the 
underlying security price is increasing before the delisting date as a result perhaps of 
hedging activity/delta hedging by the issuer to adjust its position before the call warrants 
are approaching expiration in-the-money (Chen & Wu (2001)) or as a result of trading 
pressure from competitors of the issuing bank. The increase is then followed by a negative 
abnormal return of 0.33% (at 5% significance level) on day -1.  This indicates a fall in price 
of the underlying security a day before the delisting and supports the previous evidence of 
early trading from knowing the delisting dates within the market. Even though the delisting 
date (day 0) does not have a negative abnormal return, the return remains small and points 
to a falling trend in price of the underlying security as the delisting effect. However, this 
presents only a temporary small negative price effect which does not persist beyond the 
delisting date. These outcomes are similar to those for the whole delisting sample for the 
effect of call warrants previously analyzed.  Therefore, the validity of previous explanations 
of the results is confirmed by this in-the-money call warrants’ evidence. 
 
Figure 4.6: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 25 UK in-the-money call covered warrants where mean-adjusted return model 
are used to generate normal return.  
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          Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
          The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
                                                 
37 The abnormal returns around delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants under the market model and 
the market-adjusted model are also presented in graphs, Appendix 4.3. 
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To confirm the validity of the assumption used to categorise the 25 in-the-money 
call warrants’ result, this study examines a further 20 call warrants for which exercise 
prices data is available. The 20 call warrants are divided into 15 in-the-money call warrants 
and 5 out-of-the money call warrants. The outcome can be seen in Table 4.7.1 which 
presents the abnormal returns around the delisting event for 15 in-the-money call warrants. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.6.1 (the mean-adjusted return model), the price/abnormal 
returns’ pattern is similar to the case for the 25 in-the-money call warrants.38 Even though, 
the results are less significant due to the smaller data set, this confirms the validity of the 
assumption consequently the results produced according to the assumption.   
 
Figure 4.6.1: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 15 in-the-money call warrants     
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 15 UK in-the-money call covered warrants where mean-adjusted return model 
are used to generate normal return.  
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          Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
          The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
 
The second group is out-of-the-money warrants. There is no need for hedging 
activity before the expiration (the delta value should reasonably fall toward zero) and the 
issuer gradually unwinds its position (selling out the underlying securities) long before 
expiration. Hence, there should not be any effect on the delisting event. Appendix 4.4 and 
appendix 4.5 show the abnormal returns around delisting event for 11 out-of-the-money 
call warrants. Both table and graphs show no effect on the delisting of out-of-the money 
call warrants. This may be because there is no sale of the underlying stocks by the 
investment bank on the delisting day due to early unwinding (as expected), and no selling 
                                                 
38Appendix 4.3.1 presents the abnormal returns around delisting event for 15 in-the-money call warrants 
under the market model and the market-adjusted model in graphs. 
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activity in the underlying securities by the out-of-the money warrants holders. However, 
appendix 4.4 (for the mean-adjusted return model) presents some evidence of a significance 
negative abnormal return during the delisting that might result from other information 
effects. 
 
To confirm the validity of the assumption used to categorise the results for these 11 
out-of-the-money call warrants, this study examines further the 5 out-of-the-money call 
warrants (from 20 call warrants that have exercise prices data available). Appendix 4.4.1 
and Appendix 4.5.1 present outcomes in term of table and graphs, consecutively. The 
outcomes confirm the evidence of no effect on the underlying securities due to the delisting 
of the 11 out-of-the-money call warrants.  
 
After considering both 25 in-the-money call warrants (Table 4.7) and 11 out-of-the-
money call warrants (Appendix 4.4) together, the overall impression (Table 4.5) is of a 
delisting effect since a large proportion of the total call warrants are in-the-money. There is 
a fall in price of the underlying security a day before and on the delisting date which 
indicates a temporary small negative price effect (that does not persist beyond the delisting 
date). It is consistent with the work of Draper et al. (2001) and Chen & Wu (2001) that 
present a negative price effect prior to the option expiration day and positive effect post 
expiration. However, the results are inconsistent with Klemkosky (1978) and Officer & 
Trennepohl (1981). 
 
 Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7 reveal the results of the study of delisting effects for the 
put warrants and indicate a slight fall in abnormal returns/stock prices before and shortly 
after the delisting date. This may result from the very early stage of unwinding the bank’s 
position. The stock price has started to fall back to the normal level (after a sharp rise from 
early unwinding) and is confirmed by the significance level of negative CARs from day -4 
to day 3 (Table 4.8) at around 5% significance level. It then remains quite steady (as it 
reaches the normal price level). We cannot separate into 2 cases (for both in/out-of-the 
money) because there are not enough put warrants in the sample. 
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Table 4.8: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the UK put covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0002 0.1245 0.0002 0.1245 0.0016 1.0099 0.0016 1.0099 0.0052 3.1285*** 0.0052 3.1285*** 
-9 0.0005 0.3609 0.0007 0.3792 0.0021 1.2896 0.0037 1.7562* 0.0068 4.2496*** 0.0120 5.6843*** 
-8 0.0014 0.9575 0.0021 0.8480 0.0009 0.6768 0.0046 1.7310* -0.0030 -2.2611** 0.0090 3.3711*** 
-7 -0.0025 -2.7698*** -0.0005 -0.1779 -0.0039 -3.6884*** 0.0007 0.2666 -0.0113 -9.0950*** -0.0024 -0.9877 
-6 -0.0026 -1.9216* -0.0031 -1.0391 -0.0043 -2.9602*** -0.0037 -1.2463 -0.0128 -6.7395*** -0.0151 -4.9804*** 
-5 -0.0018 -1.5799 -0.0049 -1.5004 -0.0010 -0.9017 -0.0046 -1.4606 0.0005 0.4678 -0.0146 -4.4717*** 
-4 -0.0034 -1.6288 -0.0083 -2.0393** -0.0042 -1.8832 -0.0088 -2.1600** -0.0091 -3.9185*** -0.0237 -5.4420*** 
-3 -0.0033 -1.4317 -0.0116 -2.2404** -0.0016 -0.6872 -0.0105 -2.0753** 0.0034 1.4676 -0.0203 -3.9330*** 
-2 -0.0022 -1.5302 -0.0138 -2.8063*** -0.0013 -0.9148 -0.0117 -2.4410** 0.0007 0.5161 -0.0196 -3.8444*** 
-1 -0.0004 -0.2341 -0.0142 -3.1039*** -0.0005 -0.2848 -0.0122 -2.7656*** -0.0026 -1.6121 -0.0222 -4.6544*** 
0 -0.0006 -0.2461 -0.0147 -2.3085** 0.0003 0.1102 -0.0119 -1.9038* 0.0021 0.8471 -0.0201 -2.9928*** 
1 -0.0009 -0.6963 -0.0157 -2.8208*** -0.0006 -0.4689 -0.0126 -2.3252** -0.0015 -1.0047 -0.0216 -3.7738*** 
2 0.0012 1.0058 -0.0145 -2.5914*** -0.0003 -0.2793 -0.0129 -2.3071** -0.0084 -6.4513*** -0.0300 -4.9481*** 
3 -0.0006 -0.4345 -0.0151 -2.3085** 0.0008 0.5784 -0.0121 -1.8963* 0.0050 3.4208*** -0.0249 -3.6477*** 
4 0.0018 0.8809 -0.0133 -1.7777* 0.0025 1.1685 -0.0096 -1.3516 0.0033 1.4793 -0.0216 -2.8478*** 
5 0.0016 1.6002 -0.0117 -1.6021 -0.0007 -0.5046 -0.0103 -1.4245 -0.0117 -8.0572*** -0.0333 -4.2905*** 
6 -0.0027 -1.5637 -0.0144 -1.7076* -0.0032 -1.7283* -0.0134 -1.5914 -0.007 -3.6710*** -0.0402 -4.4310*** 
7 -0.0007 -0.4512 -0.0151 -1.8534* 0.0022 1.1141 -0.0112 -1.4271 0.0123 6.3302*** -0.0279 -3.3309*** 
8 0.0027 2.0092** -0.0124 -1.6210 0.0039 2.5428** -0.0073 -1.0060 0.0069 3.0755*** -0.0211 -2.7458*** 
9 -0.0005 -0.3539 -0.0129 -1.8583* 0.0012 0.7703 -0.0061 -0.9407 0.0064 4.1907*** -0.0146 -2.1558** 
10 -0.0005 -0.3520 -0.0135 -1.7920* 0.0001 0.0453 -0.0060 -0.8588 0.0009 0.5482 -0.0137 -1.8552* 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Figure 4.7: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the UK put covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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          Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
          The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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In conclusion, call and put warrants have negative price impact on the underlying 
securities on both the announcement and listing days. However, the effect is more 
pronounced for the announcement event. The arguments can be made to explain a decline 
in stock price once call warrants are introduced. Firstly, there usually are constraints on 
short selling in the stock market especially due to the recent concern raised by the Financial 
Services Authority in the UK over the short selling activities, Prosser (2008). Investors who 
could not employ short positions previously can now take advantage of negative 
information and easily trade in warrants.39 For example, if they expect the stock price to fall 
in the future, they can now purchase put warrants. In addition, an increased issue of call 
warrants can be seen as an expectation of a future fall in stock price. Secondly, due to the 
introduction of warrants, shifts of trading from the stock market to the warrants market may 
take place because warrant investment has lower transaction costs and high leverage. 
Thirdly, if shareholders believe that warrants introduction would work as a destabilizing 
factor for the underlying securities, they might also sell out their stocks. For put warrants, 
the negative price impact is explainable by the hedging activity of the issuer (selling the 
underlying securities in advance in order to protect themselves as an issuer of put warrants). 
 
The results from the delisting of warrants do not provide evidence of an opposite 
direction to the introduction effects as hypothesized by Detemple & Jorion (1990). For both 
call and put warrants, the findings are of negative price effects for the delisting event. This 
might be because of the different nature of the options and covered warrants. The selling of 
the underlying stocks into the market after the exercise of warrants by the holders as well as 
the unwinding position (selling stocks) by the issuers could be a reason for the negative 
underlying stock price effect on call warrants delisting. 
 
4.6.2 Volume effects  
 
This aspect of the research focuses on the trading volume of the underlying 
securities after the introduction and subsequent expiration of covered warrants. Abnormal 
                                                 
39 A synthetic short position consists of either buying a put warrant or writing a call warrant. This creates the 
similar pay off to a short position in the stock. 
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return patterns are often associated with abnormal trading volumes (Campbell et al. 
(1993)).  
 
Early US research on the impact of option trading suggested that there is no effect 
on the underlying securities trading volume. Whiteside et al. (1983) show no change in the 
average mean-adjusted daily volume over the study sample. There was no impact on the 
average number of stocks traded either before or after the moratorium. The moratorium was 
the period from mid-1977 until early 1980. The period was called by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in order to investigate the market impacts of option trading. 
Damodaran & Lim (1991) also found, on the whole, little change in market-adjusted 
trading volumes. However, later US research suggests an increase in trading volumes after 
option listing (Shastri, Sultan & Tandon (1996)). Long, Schinski & Officer (1994) find an 
increase in average trading volume for all firms due to option listing. The small and 
medium market value firms experience the most significant effects. With the increase in 
volume there is also a significant increase in the number of stock trades. The increase in 
volume is not only the result of larger trade size, but also more trading activity. The 
hypothesis that introducing an option increases investor interest in the underlying security 
is consistent with their finding. In addition, Kumar et al. (1998) find an increase in the 
market quality of the underlying asset (as measured by liquidity) after options are listed. 
They suggest that there is a positive effect on trading volume post option listing. Ho & Liu 
(1997) and Mayhew & Mihov (2000) also find increases in underlying volumes with option 
listing.  
 
Volume changes have also been examined in other markets. Gjerde & Sattem 
(1995) reveal that similar increases in trading volumes result from option listings on the 
Norwegian market. Chamberlain et al. (1993) however report no significant changes in 
trading volumes of the underlying stocks as a result of option listing in Canada. Kumar, 
Sarin & Shastri (1995) observe a decreasing trend in trading volumes of the stocks after the 
listing of index options in the Japanese market. Index options are comparable to options on 
individual equities but against a group of stocks traded on the basis of market-wide 
information, unlike individual stocks which are traded mostly on firm specific information. 
This suggests that there would be a smaller effect around the listing of index options than 
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around the listing of individual equity options although general trends can still be 
observed.40  
 
Covered warrants create new investment opportunity for investors with lower 
transaction costs. The fundamental idea underlying this discussion is market 
incompleteness. Warrant trading may make an incomplete market more complete. When 
the market is incomplete, the introduction of warrants may have a significant effect on the 
market for the underlying stocks. The availability of warrants can move trades away from 
the underlying stocks towards the warrants leading to a decrease in trading volumes of the 
underlying stocks. They may also induce more hedging related trades from issuers, 
especially in the absence of any similar contracts. An additional factor is the possible 
manipulation of the underlying price by the warrant issuers during issue in order to achieve 
greater premiums.  
 
There are a number of empirical studies concerning stock volumes around warrant 
trading. Chan & Wei (2001) observe a high level of stock trading activity in Hong Kong for 
5 days around the warrant announcement date. They also observe a sharp rise in volumes of 
the stocks with warrants during the last 5 minutes of the announcement day. Chen & Wu 
(2001) report positive abnormal underlying stock trading volume behaviour around the 
derivative warrants introduction day in the Hong Kong market. There appears to be a strong 
relationship between price effects and trading volume. Draper et al. (2001) also examine an 
increase in trading volume of the underlying security during warrant introduction in Hong 
Kong. They find evidence indicating different results for the volume impact between the 
first time and subsequent warrant introductions.41 When warrants are introduced for the 
first time there is no change in the market-adjusted trading volume which is consistent with 
the early empirical US researches. 
                                                 
40 For example, due to the hypothesis of a migration of trading activity from the underlying stock market to 
the options market, the decrease in trading volume under the listing of index options should be smaller than 
the decrease in trading volume under the listing of individual options which would not have any additional 
spurious effects from market-wide information. 
41 The first time warrant means the initial launch of each warrant into the market. 
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Table 4.9: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the UK call 
covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0064 0.1082 0.0064 0.1069 0.0168 0.2736 0.0168 0.2704 -0.0274 -0.3429 -0.0274 -0.3389 
-9 0.0635 0.8766 0.0699 0.9699 0.0982 1.3771 0.1150 1.5294 -0.1584 -2.0923** -0.1858 -2.0980** 
-8 -0.0603 -0.8767 0.0096 0.4060 -0.0638 -0.9285 0.0512 0.9082 -0.0516 -0.7432 -0.2374 -2.2377** 
-7 -0.0478 -0.7599 -0.0382 0.0351 -0.0462 -0.7575 0.0049 0.5553 -0.1056 -1.5983 -0.3431 -3.1332*** 
-6 0.0282 0.4351 -0.0100 0.3114 0.0178 0.2750 0.0228 0.6157 0.0653 1.1268 -0.2778 -2.1116** 
-5 -0.0703 -1.1982 -0.0803 -0.4204 -0.0747 -1.2391 -0.0520 -0.1089 -0.0201 -0.3452 -0.2979 -2.3375** 
-4 0.1163 1.9786** 0.0359 0.7644 0.1070 1.8088* 0.0550 0.9644 0.1402 2.3027** -0.1577 -0.8264 
-3 -0.0634 -0.9270 -0.0274 0.1253 -0.0571 -0.8158 -0.0020 0.3710 -0.1246 -1.8687* -0.2823 -1.8930* 
-2 0.0703 1.0940 0.0429 0.8556 0.0669 1.0456 0.0649 1.1316 0.1065 1.6824* -0.1757 -1.1140 
-1 -0.0780 -1.2072 -0.0351 0.0635 -0.0796 -1.2024 -0.0147 0.3074 -0.0753 -1.1179 -0.2511 -1.8661* 
0 -0.1197 -1.4317 -0.1548 -1.0694 -0.1432 -1.7076* -0.1579 -1.1106 -0.0205 -0.2488 -0.2716 -1.9664** 
1 -0.0005 -0.0087 -0.1553 -1.1789 0.0136 0.2257 -0.1443 -1.0898 -0.0932 -1.5507 -0.3648 -2.9002*** 
2 0.0256 0.3171 -0.1297 -0.8214 0.0487 0.5963 -0.0956 -0.5539 -0.0637 -0.7964 -0.4286 -2.9089*** 
3 0.0054 0.0571 -0.1243 -0.7901 -0.0356 -0.3766 -0.1312 -0.7873 0.1618 1.6932* -0.2668 -2.2660** 
4 0.0091 0.1558 -0.1152 -0.8911 0.0142 0.2463 -0.1169 -0.8742 -0.0021 -0.0375 -0.2689 -2.6590*** 
5 0.1812 2.6081*** 0.0660 0.6837 0.1692 2.4105** 0.0523 0.6548 0.2623 3.4832*** -0.0065 -0.1125 
6 -0.1448 -2.1975** -0.0788 -0.6092 -0.1727 -2.6132*** -0.1204 -0.9242 -0.0257 -0.3715 -0.0322 -0.3442 
7 -0.0664 -1.1937 -0.1451 -1.2894 -0.0446 -0.8011 -0.1650 -1.4571 -0.2026 -3.5628*** -0.2348 -2.1520** 
8 0.0830 1.1668 -0.0621 -0.4835 0.0724 1.0054 -0.0925 -0.7133 0.0985 1.3130 -0.1363 -1.3658 
9 0.0220 0.3003 -0.0402 -0.2600 0.0248 0.3443 -0.0677 -0.4383 0.0037 0.0545 -0.1326 -1.2060 
10 -0.0213 -0.2803 -0.0615 -0.5119 -0.0348 -0.4557 -0.1025 -0.8752 0.0231 0.3140 -0.1095 -1.2161 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.10: Abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the listing event of the UK call covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
  
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0574 0.7670 0.0574 0.7271 0.0550 0.7239 0.0550 0.6864 0.0208 0.2817 0.0208 0.2673 
-9 0.0260 0.3458 0.0834 0.8787 0.0260 0.3458 0.0810 0.8304 0.0218 0.3056 0.0427 0.4727 
-8 -0.0862 -1.6339 -0.0028 -0.0863 -0.0810 -1.5120 0.0000 -0.0556 -0.1095 -1.8455* -0.0669 -0.6576 
-7 0.0488 0.7014 0.0460 0.3981 0.0399 0.5829 0.0399 0.3318 0.0826 1.0943 0.0158 0.1347 
-6 -0.0867 -1.3217 -0.0406 -0.4912 -0.0791 -1.1919 -0.0392 -0.4858 -0.1211 -1.7170* -0.1053 -1.0897 
-5 -0.0375 -0.5649 -0.0781 -0.7698 -0.0622 -0.9036 -0.1014 -0.9466 0.0087 0.1134 -0.0966 -0.8932 
-4 0.1168 1.5120 0.0387 0.1751 0.1286 1.6643* 0.0272 0.0967 0.0987 1.1092 0.0021 -0.1348 
-3 -0.1373 -2.1063** -0.0986 -1.0009 -0.1362 -1.9935** -0.1089 -1.1246 -0.1675 -2.5311** -0.1654 -1.5839 
-2 -0.0081 -0.1124 -0.1067 -1.0209 -0.0400 -0.5481 -0.1489 -1.4384 0.0970 1.0754 -0.0684 -0.6243 
-1 -0.0113 -0.1287 -0.1180 -0.9847 -0.0048 -0.0563 -0.1537 -1.2762 -0.0206 -0.2095 -0.0890 -0.7708 
0 0.0342 0.4970 -0.0838 -1.0421 0.0191 0.2794 -0.1347 -1.6691* 0.0177 0.2328 -0.0714 -0.7830 
1 -0.1197 -1.6478 -0.2035 -1.7416* -0.1354 -1.8253* -0.2701 -2.2879** -0.0389 -0.5003 -0.1102 -0.8437 
2 0.0795 1.2731 -0.1239 -1.0027 0.0780 1.2575 -0.1921 -1.5626 0.0759 1.1010 -0.0344 -0.2580 
3 0.0187 0.2405 -0.1052 -1.0405 0.0140 0.1801 -0.1781 -1.7782* 0.0242 0.2705 -0.0102 -0.1105 
4 0.2337 3.0389*** 0.1285 1.1016 0.2394 3.0948*** 0.0614 0.5909 0.2130 2.1498** 0.2028 1.4317 
5 -0.0811 -1.0951 0.0475 0.4090 -0.1032 -1.4068 -0.0419 -0.2808 -0.0144 -0.1600 0.1884 1.2492 
6 -0.0997 -1.1787 -0.0522 -0.2747 -0.0972 -1.1549 -0.1391 -0.9996 -0.1425 -1.5953 0.0460 0.4899 
7 0.0274 0.4164 -0.0248 -0.0818 0.0408 0.6020 -0.0983 -0.7272 -0.0487 -0.6292 -0.0027 0.2032 
8 -0.0698 -1.0147 -0.0946 -0.6307 -0.0909 -1.3780 -0.1893 -1.4308 -0.0374 -0.4571 -0.0401 -0.0449 
9 0.0869 1.5574 -0.0077 0.0048 0.0876 1.5273 -0.1017 -0.7310 0.0892 1.3356 0.0490 0.4927 
10 0.0207 0.2407 0.0130 0.1610 0.0085 0.0965 -0.0932 -0.7124 0.1067 1.2913 0.1557 1.1939 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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This study tests whether the introduction (and expiration) of covered warrants 
affects the trading activity of the underlying stocks. Similar to the previous analysis of 
returns, it uses an event study methodology. This research involves three events, the 
announcement, listing and delisting events (for both call and put covered warrants). A 21-
day event window is employed. It consists of the event day (day0) plus 10 trading days 
before and after the event day. The estimation window is a 300-day period from day -310 to 
day-11. In order to calculate the normal trading volume that is used as the benchmark to 
generate abnormal trading volume, the three models (the market, market-adjusted, and 
mean-adjusted return models) are employed for each particular case. Daily trading volume 
data for each firm in the sample as well as for the FTSE100 index (representing market 
trading volume) are used. There are mixed results as to the impact on the underlying trading 
volume. Table 4.9 shows the abnormal trading volumes for the underlying stocks on the 
announcement of call covered warrants.42 Each model presents a mixture of results with 
insignificant rise and fall in the underlying abnormal trading volume. The results indicate 
no significant pattern associated with the underlying stock trading volume on the warrant 
announcement. In other words, the call covered warrant announcements have no effect on 
the underlying stock trading volume. Table 4.10 shows a rising trend in abnormal volume 
on the call covered warrant listing event, following by a decrease in abnormal volume the 
next day and an increase again the day after.43 The small positive abnormal volume on the 
listing date for all three models (market model, market-adjusted model, and mean-adjusted 
return model) may be explained by both hedging activities by the issuers, and shareholders 
who believe that warrant introduction is a destabilizing factor for the underlying securities 
(Kabir, 1999). Unfortunately, the volume results here are statistically insignificant and 
inconsistent with the previous results of a price effect on the listing of warrants. Hedging 
activities increase the price of the underlying stock before the announcement event. This 
suggests there should be an increase in the underlying trading volume. However, the 
warrant announcements provide no effect on volume as shown in Table 4.9. Moreover, the 
price starts falling on the announcement and subsequent days. This effect continues into the 
following listing event. A negative price effect around the listing (because of the end to 
hedging activities) should be followed by a decrease in volume which is in contrast to the 
                                                 
42 The graphs of abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event can be seen in 
Appendix 4.6. 
43 The graphs of abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for call event can be seen in Appendix4.7. 
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volume effect found here. However, the result is statistically insignificant as already 
mentioned. It can reasonably be concluded that both the call covered warrant 
announcements and listings have no significant volume effect on the underlying stocks.  
 
Table 4.11 summarizes the underlying volume effect for the announcement event 
for put warrants and reveals mixed results with falling abnormal volume around two days 
before the announcement date, an increase on the event date itself then falling back again a 
day later.44 The increase in abnormal volume (1% significance level) on the event date of 
the put announcement for all three models can be explained in the same way as in the case 
of call warrants - issuers hedging activities, and investors’ belief that warrants are a 
destabilizing factor for the underlying stocks. These volume results do not reveal any 
relationship with the previous price effects on the underlying stocks. In addition, Table 4.12 
reports mixed results for the underlying volume effect on the put warrants listing day.45 
There is a positive abnormal volume of 14.32% (10% significance level) from the market-
adjusted model, a non significant positive abnormal volume from the market model and a 
negative abnormal volume of 23.55% (10% significance level) from the mean-adjusted 
return model on the warrant listings. Therefore, the results under this analysis under the 
three models are inconclusive and provide no general pattern of the underlying volume 
effect. Overall, it appears there is an inconclusive volume effect from the put covered 
warrant announcements and listings. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Appendix 4.8 provides graphs for the abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put 
event. 
45 Appendix 4.9 provides graphs for the abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for put event. 
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Table 4.11: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the UK put 
covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.1410 3.1743*** 0.1410 3.1743*** 0.1693 3.5572*** 0.1693 3.5572*** 0.1447 3.1948*** 0.1447 3.1948*** 
-9 0.0043 0.0764 0.1453 2.7392*** 0.0196 0.3523 0.1889 3.3637*** -0.0449 -0.7425 0.0998 1.6089 
-8 0.1087 1.4368 0.2427 3.5163*** 0.0904 1.1867 0.2699 3.6276*** 0.2205 2.9848*** 0.2975 3.5345*** 
-7 0.0070 0.1274 0.2490 4.5782*** 0.0223 0.3960 0.2899 4.7807*** -0.0754 -1.3859 0.2299 3.1288*** 
-6 0.1483 2.5716** 0.3973 6.9481*** 0.1467 2.5198** 0.4366 7.5650*** 0.0059 0.0914 0.2358 3.9292*** 
-5 -0.1272 -2.0236** 0.2701 4.3286*** -0.1643 -2.5898*** 0.2722 4.4763*** -0.0023 -0.0342 0.2336 3.3022*** 
-4 -0.0217 -0.3485 0.2484 5.0368*** -0.0156 -0.2460 0.2567 5.2936*** 0.0872 1.3329 0.3208 4.6670*** 
-3 -0.0995 -1.5645 0.1489 2.1707** -0.1083 -1.6800* 0.1483 2.1955** -0.1319 -2.2115** 0.1889 2.5126** 
-2 0.0136 0.2756 0.1625 2.7684*** 0.0261 0.5184 0.1744 3.0223*** -0.0095 -0.1895 0.1794 2.9034*** 
-1 -0.0099 -0.2392 0.1526 2.5239** -0.0134 -0.3250 0.1610 2.7618*** -0.1802 -3.5087*** -0.0008 -0.0115 
0 0.2650 4.3184*** 0.4176 4.6625*** 0.2488 4.1069*** 0.4098 4.6592*** 0.4259 6.5082*** 0.4251 4.6401*** 
1 -0.1153 -1.9303* 0.3023 4.0627*** -0.0837 -1.3825 0.3261 4.3199*** -0.1273 -1.9389* 0.2979 3.4821*** 
2 0.0075 0.1206 0.3078 3.4758*** 0.0013 0.0216 0.3271 3.7728*** -0.0030 -0.0475 0.2957 2.9821*** 
3 0.0539 0.9592 0.3468 4.2469*** 0.0406 0.7113 0.3565 4.5107*** 0.1111 1.9210* 0.3762 3.9129*** 
4 -0.3855 -6.2457*** 0.0676 0.8219 -0.3933 -6.3258*** 0.0717 0.8390 -0.1727 -3.0148*** 0.2511 2.8087*** 
5 0.1738 4.5236*** 0.2414 2.8538*** 0.1376 3.5553*** 0.2094 2.5029** 0.2264 4.4342*** 0.4775 5.0435*** 
6 -0.1172 -2.0565** 0.1243 1.3492 -0.1334 -2.2920** 0.0760 0.8625 -0.0732 -1.3632 0.4043 4.2192*** 
7 0.0953 1.3569 0.2196 2.2318** 0.1253 1.8194* 0.2013 2.2061** 0.0102 0.1332 0.4144 3.4348*** 
8 -0.1982 -3.2600*** 0.0214 0.2368 -0.2023 -3.1906*** -0.0010 -0.0120 -0.1443 -2.7017*** 0.2702 2.6192*** 
9 0.0617 1.0974 0.0810 0.7757 0.0492 0.8645 0.0465 0.5045 0.0044 0.0794 0.2744 2.2597** 
10 0.0616 1.4596 0.1405 1.3320 0.0645 1.5007 0.1088 1.1503 0.0897 2.0543** 0.3609 3.0404*** 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.12: Abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the listing event of the UK put covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0903 1.0284 0.0903 1.0188 0.0759 0.8618 0.0759 0.8539 0.1054 1.1464 0.1054 1.1357
-9 0.0136 0.1762 0.1039 1.4614 0.0035 0.0430 0.0793 1.0254 -0.0721 -0.9486 0.0333 0.4120
-8 0.0010 0.0160 0.1048 1.3732 0.0135 0.2184 0.0928 1.1742 0.0125 0.1973 0.0458 0.6025
-7 -0.0705 -1.1909 0.0343 0.4210 -0.0778 -1.2990 0.0149 0.1672 -0.0538 -0.8505 -0.0080 -0.1208
-6 -0.0722 -1.1908 -0.0379 -0.4909 -0.0696 -1.1431 -0.0547 -0.6993 -0.0167 -0.2544 -0.0246 -0.3197
-5 0.0332 0.5632 -0.0047 -0.0817 0.0058 0.0999 -0.0489 -0.7108 0.1248 1.9706** 0.1002 1.1656
-4 0.0272 0.4553 0.0225 0.2500 0.0585 0.9885 0.0096 0.0988 -0.1754 -2.4064** -0.0752 -0.7671
-3 0.0303 0.5579 0.0529 0.5325 0.0711 1.3203 0.0807 0.8411 -0.0297 -0.4356 -0.1049 -1.0397
-2 -0.0074 -0.1506 0.0455 0.5189 -0.0223 -0.4590 0.0585 0.7402 0.0814 1.2942 -0.0235 -0.4908
-1 -0.2249 -5.2352*** -0.1794 -1.1817 -0.2292 -5.5678*** -0.1707 -1.0605 -0.2141 -3.7841*** -0.2376 -1.8779*
0 0.1035 1.2587 -0.0759 -0.3196 0.1432 1.8180* -0.0275 0.0246 -0.2355 -1.8854* -0.4732 -2.1532**
1 -0.1307 -1.9241* -0.2066 -1.3291 -0.1559 -2.3385** -0.1834 -1.1614 -0.0897 -1.2426 -0.5628 -2.8132***
2 -0.0954 -1.5933 -0.3020 -2.3218** -0.1305 -2.1980** -0.3139 -2.4339** 0.0048 0.0689 -0.5580 -3.0238***
3 0.1224 2.1455** -0.1796 -1.1343 0.1465 2.7049*** -0.1674 -1.0651 0.1114 1.4758 -0.4466 -2.1602**
4 -0.0072 -0.1574 -0.1868 -1.1151 0.0258 0.5843 -0.1416 -0.7604 -0.1454 -2.7559*** -0.5920 -2.7617***
5 -0.0365 -0.5096 -0.2234 -1.2977 -0.0419 -0.5741 -0.1835 -1.0488 -0.0540 -0.8005 -0.6460 -2.7401***
6 -0.2398 -3.1813*** -0.4632 -2.8643*** -0.2642 -3.3665*** -0.4477 -2.8825*** -0.1282 -1.9971** -0.7742 -3.2413***
7 0.2721 5.1820*** -0.1911 -0.9400 0.2493 4.5697*** -0.1983 -0.9654 0.2485 4.3524*** -0.5257 -2.0524**
8 -0.0287 -0.3999 -0.2198 -1.2789 -0.0038 -0.0517 -0.2021 -1.1715 -0.0870 -1.1708 -0.6127 -2.4311**
9 0.0623 1.2961 -0.1574 -0.9380 0.0620 1.2716 -0.1401 -0.7782 -0.0104 -0.1733 -0.6231 -2.3882**
10 -0.0247 -0.5221 -0.1821 -1.0221 -0.0264 -0.5559 -0.1665 -0.8947 -0.0391 -0.8161 -0.6622 -2.5312**
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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The effects of delisting the call covered warrants are presented in Table 4.13.46 
There are significant decreases in the underlying trading volume, 14.20% for the market 
model and 16.75% for the market-adjusted model. The mean-adjusted return model reports 
results in the opposite direction. The evidence does not provide any uniform pattern as to 
the underlying volume effect on the call covered warrant delisting. In other words, the call 
covered warrant delisting provides inconclusive or no general impact on the underlying 
stock trading volume. This study further separates the call warrants into two cases, in-the-
money (Table 4.14, Appendix 4.11) and out-of-the-money (Table 4.15, Appendix 4.12) call 
warrants. Table 4.14 shows insignificant and no general pattern of results for the underlying 
abnormal trading volume for in-the-money call warrants delisting. Thus, the impact is 
inconclusive. Table 4.15 presents significant negative abnormal trading volumes on out-of-
the-money call warrants delisting days for both the market and market-adjusted models. 
Though not significant, the mean-adjusted return model also provides negative abnormal 
trading volumes on the delisting date. These results are more likely explained by other 
information effects rather than the delisting event itself. If the warrants are out-of-the-
money, there should not be any effect on that particular day since early unwinding by the 
issuers will take place. In summary, even taking into consideration the two separate cases 
for in/out-of-the-money call warrants the results for the delisting event on the underlying 
trading volume of the call warrants is inconclusive.  
 
Table 4.16 and Appendix 4.13 report the results for abnormal trading volume on the 
delisting of put covered warrants. There are small increases in abnormal volume for all 
three models, but they are statistically insignificant. Thus, there are no significant effects on 
underlying stock volume as a consequence of the delisting of put warrants. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 This table is also present in graphs, Appendix 4.10. 
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Table 4.13: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for call event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the UK call covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0280 0.4527 0.0280 0.4527 0.0491 0.7867 0.0491 0.7867 -0.0472 -0.7336 -0.0472 -0.7336 
-9 -0.0340 -0.4685 -0.0060 -0.0642 -0.0187 -0.2655 0.0304 0.3363 -0.1433 -2.0221** -0.1905 -2.0461** 
-8 0.0422 0.4768 0.0362 0.4689 0.0267 0.3119 0.0571 0.7377 0.1374 1.4379 -0.0531 -0.6849 
-7 0.0462 0.6020 0.0824 0.8762 0.0277 0.3570 0.0848 0.8946 0.1454 1.7626* 0.0923 0.9673 
-6 -0.1256 -1.8646* -0.0432 -0.5790 -0.1556 -2.4135** -0.0707 -0.9322 -0.0156 -0.2114 0.0767 1.0115 
-5 -0.0372 -0.5286 -0.0793 -1.0653 0.0241 0.3713 -0.0473 -0.6590 -0.3207 -4.4308*** -0.2348 -3.2594*** 
-4 0.0644 0.9898 -0.0168 -0.2046 0.0480 0.7228 -0.0007 -0.0086 0.1415 2.0567** -0.0974 -1.1951 
-3 0.0300 0.3391 0.0124 0.1259 -0.0469 -0.5596 -0.0463 -0.4473 0.4063 4.7051*** 0.2973 2.9436*** 
-2 -0.0943 -1.0697 -0.0820 -0.8389 -0.0883 -1.0051 -0.1345 -1.2374 -0.1160 -1.2414 0.1813 1.6402 
-1 0.1388 1.7169* 0.0568 0.6728 0.1464 1.7907* 0.0118 0.1306 0.0867 1.0674 0.2680 2.6776*** 
0 -0.1420 -1.8556* -0.0851 -1.0506 -0.1675 -2.1569** -0.1557 -1.7494* 0.0315 1.6933* 0.2995 3.0435*** 
1 -0.0108 -0.1698 -0.0960 -1.0684 0.0539 0.9497 -0.1017 -1.1140 -0.3745 -4.6954*** -0.0750 -0.8563 
2 0.0131 0.1912 -0.0829 -0.9495 -0.0109 -0.1651 -0.1127 -1.2331 0.1552 2.3080** 0.0802 0.8996 
3 0.2195 3.6118*** 0.1366 1.8310* 0.1931 3.1262*** 0.0804 0.9902 0.3076 4.0721*** 0.3878 4.0317*** 
4 -0.0588 -0.7391 0.0778 0.9688 -0.0672 -0.8346 0.0132 0.1489 0.0011 0.0133 0.3889 4.1367*** 
5 0.0237 0.3674 0.1015 1.5609 0.0651 0.9742 0.0782 1.2095 -0.2463 -3.3198*** 0.1426 2.0273** 
6 -0.0120 -0.1890 0.0902 1.1064 -0.0697 -1.1206 0.0126 0.1507 0.2709 4.3496*** 0.3980 4.4814*** 
7 0.0093 0.0972 0.0989 1.0776 0.0209 0.2194 0.0322 0.3288 -0.0507 -0.5307 0.3502 3.4354*** 
8 -0.0556 -0.8441 0.0449 0.6551 -0.0760 -1.1520 -0.0416 -0.5433 0.0538 0.8206 0.4025 4.7284*** 
9 -0.0612 -1.0645 -0.0163 -0.1914 -0.0322 -0.5596 -0.0738 -0.7930 -0.2105 -3.7273*** 0.1920 1.9717** 
10 0.1449 1.9642** 0.1287 1.4595 0.1289 1.7577* 0.0552 0.6142 0.2468 3.3544*** 0.4388 5.0056*** 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.14: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 25 UK in-the-
money call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.1027 1.6076 0.1027 1.6076 0.1291 2.0519** 0.1291 2.0519** 0.0159 0.2361 0.0159 0.2361 
-9 -0.0264 -0.2926 0.0763 0.6637 -0.0082 -0.0938 0.1209 1.0972 -0.1424 -1.6321 -0.1265 -1.1230 
-8 0.0078 0.0720 0.0841 0.8517 -0.0113 -0.1085 0.1096 1.1122 0.1297 1.1487 0.0032 0.0324 
-7 0.0925 1.0873 0.1766 1.5955 0.0706 0.8282 0.1802 1.6170 0.1699 1.8915* 0.1731 1.5422 
-6 -0.1393 -1.6191 0.0373 0.4555 -0.1766 -2.1385** 0.0036 0.0439 -0.0216 -0.2311 0.1515 1.7969* 
-5 -0.1145 -1.3640 -0.0728 -0.8780 -0.0389 -0.5100 -0.0337 -0.4312 -0.4019 -4.5142*** -0.2349 -2.9079*** 
-4 0.0894 1.1206 0.0131 0.1376 0.0694 0.8511 0.0330 0.3557 0.1559 1.8353* -0.0850 -0.8912 
-3 0.0927 0.8293 0.1022 0.9151 -0.0019 -0.0185 0.0311 0.2661 0.4745 4.3847*** 0.3712 3.2240*** 
-2 -0.1092 -0.9394 -0.0070 -0.0632 -0.1021 -0.8780 -0.0710 -0.5686 -0.1116 -0.9185 0.2596 2.0730** 
-1 0.0555 0.9011 0.0485 0.5669 0.0641 1.0090 -0.0069 -0.0726 0.0216 0.3606 0.2812 2.8227*** 
0 -0.0760 -0.8432 -0.0275 -0.2843 -0.1059 -1.1517 -0.1128 -1.0523 0.0863 0.9000 0.3675 3.2384*** 
1 -0.0588 -0.8003 -0.0863 -0.8365 0.0196 0.2965 -0.0932 -0.9022 -0.4459 -4.9727*** -0.0784 -0.7889 
2 0.0653 0.7552 -0.0210 -0.2296 0.0366 0.4355 -0.0566 -0.5960 0.2070 2.4107** 0.1286 1.3630 
3 0.2116 3.1422*** 0.1906 2.3234** 0.1782 2.5185** 0.1216 1.3283 0.3269 4.3784*** 0.4555 4.3265*** 
4 -0.0538 -0.5526 0.1369 1.6677* -0.0634 -0.6496 0.0582 0.6454 -0.0095 -0.0968 0.4460 4.5706*** 
5 0.0226 0.2768 0.1594 2.1861** 0.0721 0.8612 0.1302 1.8631* -0.2658 -2.9806*** 0.1802 2.1763** 
6 -0.0345 -0.4281 0.1276 1.3461 -0.1060 -1.3519 0.0324 0.3418 0.2418 3.0658*** 0.4034 3.8247*** 
7 0.0590 0.4853 0.1821 1.8357* 0.0732 0.6035 0.1000 0.9627 0.0064 0.0527 0.4093 3.5474*** 
8 -0.1184 -1.8442* 0.0683 0.9856 -0.1433 -2.2067** -0.0378 -0.4829 -0.0089 -0.1408 0.4008 4.3476*** 
9 -0.0399 -0.5462 0.0284 0.3008 -0.0045 -0.0615 -0.0423 -0.4069 -0.1976 -2.7746*** 0.2032 1.7899* 
10 0.1934 2.1332** 0.2219 2.1701** 0.1744 1.9308* 0.1322 1.2818 0.2894 3.2001*** 0.4926 4.7496*** 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.15: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for 11 out-of-the-money call warrants 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 11 UK out-of-the-
money call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 -0.1877 -1.3747 -0.1877 -1.3747 -0.1819 -1.2935 -0.1819 -1.2935 -0.2294 -1.5478 -0.2294 -1.5478 
-9 -0.0561 -0.4803 -0.2438 -1.9010* -0.0490 -0.4349 -0.2309 -1.9373* -0.1459 -1.2209 -0.3753 -2.4785** 
-8 0.1416 0.9577 -0.1022 -1.2055 0.1364 0.9374 -0.0946 -1.0932 0.1595 0.8447 -0.2158 -2.4444** 
-7 -0.0875 -0.5142 -0.1898 -1.2500 -0.0961 -0.5414 -0.1907 -1.2377 0.0746 0.3787 -0.1412 -0.8517 
-6 -0.0859 -0.9681 -0.2757 -1.8478* -0.0949 -1.1765 -0.2856 -1.7939* 0.0018 0.0178 -0.1394 -0.9181 
-5 0.1776 1.7362* -0.0981 -0.5715 0.1989 1.8173* -0.0866 -0.5022 -0.0951 -1.1632 -0.2344 -1.4309 
-4 -0.0050 -0.0457 -0.1030 -0.6220 -0.0114 -0.1013 -0.0980 -0.5727 0.1013 0.8863 -0.1332 -0.8044 
-3 -0.1441 -1.3090 -0.2472 -1.3051 -0.1719 -1.3606 -0.2699 -1.2738 0.2168 1.9779** 0.0836 0.4121 
-2 -0.0513 -0.6531 -0.2985 -1.5053 -0.0483 -0.6751 -0.3182 -1.4363 -0.1287 -1.2278 -0.0451 -0.1983 
-1 0.3794 1.4995 0.0810 0.3557 0.3841 1.5124 0.0659 0.2850 0.2748 1.0332 0.2298 0.8351 
0 -0.3326 -2.5287** -0.2516 -1.8091* -0.3453 -2.5761** -0.2794 -1.7856* -0.1268 -0.9228 0.1030 0.5334 
1 0.1278 1.0401 -0.1238 -0.6432 0.1531 1.3936 -0.1263 -0.6213 -0.1680 -1.0552 -0.0650 -0.3358 
2 -0.1380 -1.8227* -0.2618 -1.2308 -0.1481 -1.9351* -0.2745 -1.2038 0.0056 0.0843 -0.0594 -0.2716 
3 0.2421 1.7125* -0.0196 -0.1193 0.2360 1.7828* -0.0385 -0.2188 0.2518 1.2079 0.1924 0.8925 
4 -0.0734 -0.5304 -0.0930 -0.4606 -0.0783 -0.5375 -0.1168 -0.5061 0.0316 0.2086 0.2240 0.9504 
5 0.0270 0.2879 -0.0660 -0.5049 0.0448 0.4390 -0.0719 -0.4933 -0.1899 -1.3911 0.0341 0.2544 
6 0.0481 0.5484 -0.0179 -0.1092 0.0272 0.3160 -0.0447 -0.2446 0.3484 3.9884*** 0.3825 2.2118** 
7 -0.1234 -0.9884 -0.1413 -0.6996 -0.1187 -0.9652 -0.1634 -0.6957 -0.2031 -1.6867* 0.1794 0.8307 
8 0.1187 0.6998 -0.0226 -0.1232 0.1108 0.6700 -0.0526 -0.2579 0.2280 1.3374 0.4074 1.9640** 
9 -0.1229 -1.5953 -0.1455 -0.7617 -0.1122 -1.4451 -0.1647 -0.7834 -0.2479 -3.0265*** 0.1595 0.7963 
10 0.0048 0.0433 -0.1406 -0.9511 -0.0026 -0.0238 -0.1674 -0.9841 0.1237 1.0817 0.2832 1.7630* 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Table 4.16: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the UK put covered 
warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
 Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.1636 2.8608*** 0.1636 2.8608*** 0.1942 3.5560*** 0.1942 3.5560*** 0.0920 1.5494 0.0920 1.5494 
-9 -0.1948 -4.2581*** -0.0312 -0.4530 -0.1603 -3.4435*** 0.0339 0.5018 -0.3008 -6.5174*** -0.2088 -2.9879*** 
-8 0.1222 1.8475* 0.0910 1.2668 0.0779 1.1948 0.1118 1.5821 0.2681 4.0648*** 0.0593 0.8408 
-7 -0.0683 -1.4454 0.0227 0.3227 -0.0786 -1.6684* 0.0332 0.4740 -0.0429 -0.8840 0.0163 0.2360 
-6 -0.0557 -1.0887 -0.0330 -0.5190 -0.0832 -1.6478 -0.0500 -0.8122 -0.0112 -0.1943 0.0052 0.0706 
-5 0.0576 0.7130 0.0087 0.1020 0.1731 2.2436** 0.0754 0.9033 -0.2556 -3.3128*** -0.1799 -2.1213** 
-4 -0.0450 -0.7030 -0.0239 -0.2948 -0.0647 -1.0155 0.0285 0.3571 0.0188 0.2951 -0.1663 -2.0085** 
-3 0.1175 1.3339 0.0612 0.7790 -0.0251 -0.3090 0.0104 0.1365 0.5243 6.4769*** 0.2133 2.3111** 
-2 -0.1999 -2.6549*** -0.1388 -1.6213 -0.2110 -2.7916*** -0.2007 -2.3378** -0.1423 -1.8527* 0.0711 0.7450 
-1 0.0837 1.8524* -0.0551 -0.7284 0.0784 1.7879* -0.1222 -1.6364 0.1222 2.6257*** 0.1933 2.3915** 
0 0.0336 0.5732 -0.0215 -0.3018 0.0120 0.2037 -0.1103 -1.5540 0.0713 1.1116 0.2646 2.9257*** 
1 -0.0808 -1.5795 -0.1023 -1.1679 0.0331 0.6344 -0.0771 -0.9111 -0.4088 -7.7553*** -0.1443 -1.5472 
2 0.0527 1.6239 -0.0496 -0.5518 0.0110 0.3418 -0.0662 -0.7563 0.1921 5.9603*** 0.0478 0.4848 
3 -0.0223 -0.3672 -0.0719 -0.9074 -0.0721 -1.1878 -0.1383 -1.7627* 0.1265 2.1029** 0.1743 1.8435* 
4 0.1077 1.3515 0.0359 0.4347 0.0963 1.2237 -0.0420 -0.5103 0.1634 1.9948** 0.3377 3.8922*** 
5 0.0527 0.7901 0.0885 1.1214 0.1342 2.0542** 0.0922 1.1576 -0.1880 -3.0316*** 0.1497 1.8192* 
6 0.1429 2.4004** 0.1920 2.3050** 0.0496 0.8580 0.1281 1.5666 0.4121 7.1261*** 0.4482 4.6407*** 
7 -0.3659 -4.8698*** -0.0729 -0.9449 -0.3483 -4.6189*** -0.1241 -1.6730* -0.4058 -5.3675*** 0.1543 1.8352* 
8 0.0469 0.7838 -0.0260 -0.2735 0.0143 0.2402 -0.1098 -1.2056 0.1568 2.6257*** 0.3112 2.9988*** 
9 -0.0278 -0.5819 -0.0537 -0.5622 0.0231 0.5027 -0.0866 -0.9256 -0.1760 -3.7480*** 0.1352 1.3313 
10 0.1934 3.9090*** 0.1397 1.4247 0.1690 3.3953*** 0.0824 0.8174 0.2768 5.6063*** 0.4121 3.8911*** 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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This study also divides the sample of call and put covered warrants based on the 
listing date (day0) into two categories, the smallest and largest warrant issue size to total 
company outstanding shares.47 Both warrant issue size and total company outstanding 
shares come from market value (MV) data of Datastream.48 The samples are separate using: 
 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
 
The samples of each call and put covered warrant case are divided into three equal groups 
smallest, middle and largest groups. The small and large groups are used for analysis. I test 
whether the size of warrant issue compared to the underlying security issue has any impact 
on abnormal trading volume around the announcement event for call or put case. Table 4.17 
provides a summary of the underlying securities that have been separated into the two 
categories. For the call warrants, Figure 4.8 reveals very small and insignificant abnormal 
volume differences between the small and large sample groups.49 Both cases do not provide 
any observable trend/pattern of the effects and do not deviate very much from each other. 
For put warrant case, Figure 4.9 reports small differences in abnormal volume between the 
small and large sample groups.50 Thus, taking size (market value) of warrants into 
consideration does not seem to provide any clearer explanation of abnormal trading volume 
around the announcement event for either call or put cases.   
 
 
                                                 
47 The listing date is used as a division factor because the market value (MV) data of warrant first available on 
the listing day. 
48 According to Datastream’s definition, market value (MV) means the current market value of the issue, that 
is, the current market price multiplied by the amount currently in issue. MV is displayed in millions of units 
of local currency. 
49 Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event of each small and large group can 
be seen in appendix 4.14 and appendix 4.15 respectively.  
50 Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put event of each small and large group can 
be seen in appendix 4.16 and appendix 4.17 respectively. 
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Table 4.17: Name of the underlying securities for the small and large groups under both call and put cases 
 
The table presents the name of the underlying securities of both the UK call and the UK put covered warrants which are separated by the market values.  
 
Name of the underlying securities 
Call warrants effect Put warrants effect 
Smallest largest Smallest largest 
BP ANGLO AMERICAN HSBC HDG.  MAN GROUP  
GLAXOSMITHKLINE SMITHS GROUP BHP BILLITON  SHIRE  
VODAFONE GROUP WPP GROUP BHP BILLITON  ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP.  
ASTRAZENECA BT GROUP HBOS  GLAXOSMITHKLINE  
BARCLAYS BT GROUP ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B  BG GROUP  
HBOS WILLIAM HILL BHP BILLITON  BARCLAYS  
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. SAINSBURY HBOS  GLAXOSMITHKLINE  
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP ASTRAZENECA  CAIRN ENERGY  
GLAXOSMITHKLINE BAE SYSTEMS ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B  ARM HOLDINGS  
BP BRITISH LAND ANGLO AMERICAN  MARKS & SPENCER GROUP  
VODAFONE GROUP CORUS GROUP PRUDENTIAL  ARM HOLDINGS  
BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP CABLE & WIRELESS PRUDENTIAL  ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP.  
VODAFONE GROUP LAND SECURITIES ASTRAZENECA  ASTRAZENECA  
VODAFONE GROUP BRITISH AIRWAYS STANDARD CHARTERED  REUTERS GROUP  
GLAXOSMITHKLINE MAN GROUP BP  ASTRAZENECA  
VODAFONE GROUP ANTOFAGASTA BHP BILLITON  ANGLO AMERICAN  
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. ANTOFAGASTA ANGLO AMERICAN  RIO TINTO  
BT GROUP PARTY GAMING VODAFONE GROUP  LLOYDS BRITISH 
BP QINETIQ GROUP STANDARD CHARTERED  LLOYDS BRITISH   
         
                             Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
                                              The small and large groups are categorized by the equation: Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
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Figure 4.8: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event considering the warrant issue size (the difference 
between the small and large groups) 
 
The below presents the differences between the small and large groups’ abnormal volume (AV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the 
UK call covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
 
                        
Market Model (the difference between small 
and large groups)
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       Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
                   The small and large groups are categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
Market Model 
 Day AV 
-10 0.0838 
-9 -0.2422 
-8 -0.0192 
-7 0.1792 
-6 0.0528 
-5 -0.0300 
-4 -0.0049 
-3 -0.0292 
-2 -0.1406 
-1 0.1929 
0 -0.0751 
1 0.0649 
2 -0.0531 
3 -0.0997 
4 -0.0689 
5 -0.0652 
6 0.1611 
7 0.0480 
8 -0.1968 
9 0.0462 
10 0.1062 
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Figure 4.9: Abnormal trading volume around the announcement event for put event considering the warrant issue size (the difference 
between the small and large groups) 
 
The below presents the differences between the small and large groups’ abnormal volume (AV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event of the 
UK put covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
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        Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
                     The small and large groups are categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
Market Model 
Day   AV 
-10 -0.0180 
-9 -0.1959 
-8 0.2093 
-7 0.2897 
-6 -0.1884 
-5 -0.1272 
-4 -0.1865 
-3 0.0695 
-2 0.0999 
-1 -0.0991 
0 -0.0594 
1 -0.0494 
2 -0.1602 
3 0.0219 
4 0.3646 
5 0.1960 
6 0.0338 
7 0.0516 
8 -0.4446 
9 0.2651 
10 0.0347 
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In conclusion, covered warrant introduction and delisting has no impact on the 
underlying securities trading volumes in the UK market. No relationship between abnormal 
return patterns and abnormal trading volumes is revealed. The evidence from this study 
supports the conclusion of no change in trading volume, consistent with the early empirical 
US research, the Canadian research of Chamberlain et al. (1993), and the first time 
introduction effect for the Hong Kong market (Draper et al., 2001). A possible cause of the 
results could come from the small warrant issue size in various cases. To examine this 
possibility, the subsamples of the smallest and largest warrant issue size to total company 
outstanding shares are formed. This additional examination confirms the no impact result of 
underlying securities trading volumes due to covered warrant trading activities. 
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
 
Chapter 4 empirically examines the impact of announcement, listing and expiration 
of covered warrants on both the price and trading volume of the underlying stocks for the 
UK market. It provides supporting evidence for Hypothesis 4.1 but against Hypothesis 4.4, 
given that negative price impact on the underlying securities is shown for both call and put 
covered warrants announcement and listing. The impact is rather more pronounced for the 
announcement case. The three major supporting reasons for call warrants are suggested in 
my study are as following. Due to the rising concern of the Financial Services Authority in 
the UK over the short selling (Prosser (2008)), the relaxation of short-sale constraints by 
alternatively trading opportunities on covered warrants lead to faster and more efficient 
negative information dissemination to the underlying market.51 Moreover, due to the lower 
transaction cost and higher leverage introduced by the covered warrants market, investors 
are likely to move their trading from the underlying stock market to this new warrants 
market. Another reason is that because there seems to be a belief that covered warrant 
introduction acts as a destabilizing factor to the underlying stocks. All these reasons would 
definitely signal negatively to the stock market and could lead to a reduction in stocks 
prices. However, a possible explanation for put warrants is the investment bank (issuer) 
                                                 
51 A short position in stock can be replicated by either buying a put warrant or writing a call warrant. 
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sells stocks short in order to hedge the put warrants which leads to negative price impact on 
the underlying stocks.  
   
This study also reports negative price impacts of the delisting event for both call and 
put covered warrants. This supports Hypothesis 4.2 but is in total opposition to Hypothesis 
4.3. Possible explanations for a negative price effect associated with call warrants delisting 
are the sales of acquired stock by the holders after call warrant expiration, and the 
unwinding of positions by selling stocks when the call warrants are not exercised.52 The 
evidence for reduction in the price of the underlying due to put warrants delisting might 
suggest that the stock price has started to fall back to the normal level after a sharp rise 
from early unwinding of put warrants. However, the explanation for put warrants effects is 
not very solid and future work could be done on this particular area.  
 
 The analyses show outcomes against Hypothesis 4.5 and report no significant 
changes or impacts observed on the underlying securities trading volume from the UK call 
and put covered warrants announcement, listing and expiration. In addition, the subsamples 
of the smallest and largest warrant issue size to total company outstanding shares are 
formed and analysed which confirm the no volume effect of underlying securities upon 
covered warrant trading activities. There is no relationship between the price effect and the 
volume effect found in this study. Therefore, there are still room for future research to be 
developed regarding this area. 
  
 
                                                 
52 Even though, there is no significant price effect on the underlying securities due to the call covered 
warrants under the out-of-the-money case. The negative securities price effect is only reported in the case of 
in-the-money call covered warrants. 
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Chapter 5 : Stock return volatility and covered warrants trading  
5.1 Introduction 
 
There are a variety of models for valuing derivatives. Among those the most well 
known is the classic Black-Scholes option pricing model. They treat derivatives as 
redundant securities which can be synthesized by investors using combinations of other 
existing financial instruments under the assumption of the perfect market. If this 
assumption is true then there should be no effects on the derivatives trading on the 
underlying securities. However, since the real world is never perfect, there may be 
relationships between derivatives and underlying stocks arising from incomplete or 
imperfect capital markets. Derivatives offer investors the potential for return enhancement 
and enable risk control. Some previous studies such as Ross (1976), Arditti & John (1980) 
and John (1984) show that market completion is enhanced by the trading of options. The 
trading activities offer investors a greater span of risk-return choices which can then result 
in changes in the existing demand and supply as well as in the price behaviour of the 
underlying securities.  
  
5.1.1 Background 
 
Derivatives trading may reveal information about the future trading intentions of 
investors. As a result of better information becoming available, stocks may become less 
volatile. This decrease in volatility from the introduction of derivatives might be due to the 
increase in trading volume of the underlying stocks due to higher interest from institutional 
investors, greater media coverage, more analysts’ recommendations, and hedging activities 
by market makers. Early papers like Ma & Roa (1988) and Damodaran & Lim (1991) 
found a significant decline in average variance following option listing. However, of little 
or no variance change is reported in Whiteside, Dukes & Dunne (1983). 
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Derivatives trading can also increase stock return volatility. The more attractive 
option trading is, the more possible a decrease in underlying stocks trading volume can 
occur leading to increased price volatility. Skinner (1989) mentions a case involving 
Golden Nugget Inc. who took a law suit against the American Stock Exchange (AME). It 
claimed that options trading had created downside effects to its reputation, goodwill and 
underlying stock value. Though, the suit was later dismissed. Fedenia & Grammatikos 
(1992) show that market-adjusted return variance increased due to option listings on 
NASDAQ stocks.  
 
5.1.2 Motivation  
  
The recent financial crisis and bankruptcies has brought interest back to the 
regulation of derivatives markets. One question that is popular is how derivatives trading 
affect the volatility of the related underlying market. Most of the early studies concerned 
with the volatility effects on the underlying securities were conducted on US options 
trading. They seem to be conclusive in the outcome that volatility of the underlying is 
reduced after the options introduction.(see the US survey of Damodaran & Subramanyam 
(1992)) However, more recent research conducted both in and outside of the US has been 
less conclusive. This might be because of the more complicated new financial innovations 
introduced recently in many markets. One of them is of course the covered warrant. There 
has not been much research undertaken to test the impact of covered warrants trading, 
especially in the UK. Moreover, the empirical evidence on covered warrants is still 
inconclusive. It is interesting to see how covered warrants might effect underlying stocks in 
the UK market. 
 
The next section of this chapter reviews of the literature on the underlying volatility 
effects related to derivatives trading. This is followed in section 5.3 by a discussion of the 
development of research hypotheses concerning volatility. A brief discussion of the data 
and methodology used in the tests is presented in section 5.4 and section 5.5 respectively. 
The empirical results of the price volatility tests are reported in Section 5.6. The final 
section of the chapter provides a summary.    
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5.2 Review of Literature  
5.2.1 Empirical evidence on Volatility 
 
There are many studies on the impact of derivatives introduction on stock risk. The 
findings of these early studies especially in the US market seemed conclusive and 
suggested a decline in volatility after derivative listing. More recent studies provided less 
conclusive outcomes. The earliest research on this area was carried out by Hayes & 
Tennenbaum (1979). Their method was to compare weekly proportional stock price 
changes which are the average percentage change between time periods for the two groups. 
The results show a higher decrease in the optioned versus the non-optioned stocks’ groups 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The studies by Conrad (1989), Skinner 
(1989) and Bansel, Pruitt & Wei (1989) also find a similar finding of a reduction in 
variance of the underlying securities after option listing. However, they find no change in a 
security’s systematic risk (beta) after listing. A similar result of volatility decline is also 
found in other markets beside the US such as Watt, Yadav & Draper (1992) study of the 
UK, Sahlastrom (2001) study using Finnish data, and Kumar, Sarin & Shastri (1995) study 
using Japanese data. These outcomes can be explained by the introduction of options 
markets enabling a move toward a complete market, and better information discovery 
which ultimately lead to improved underlying securities price efficiency. More recent US 
studies are less conclusive. Freund, McCann & Webb (1994), Long, Schinski & Officer 
(1994) and Bollen (1998) all report no significant effect of stock return volatility from 
recent US options introduction. A report at modestly higher betas and total variances for 
stocks in the S&P 500 index after the futures index listing can be seen in Damodaran 
(1990).  
 
 For covered warrants trading, the impact on the underlying volatility is still 
inconclusive. Hernandez-Trillo (1999) bases his study on the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(MSE). The results suggest that covered warrants introduction did not reduce the security 
return volatilities even before the Mexican financial crisis of 1994. No significant effect on 
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the underlying security return volatility following covered warrant introduction is presented 
by Draper, Mak & Tang (2001) for the Hong Kong market. Aitken & Segara (2005) 
however show that after covered warrant listing on the Australian market, a significant 
increase in underlying stock volatility is follow.  
 
5.3 Research hypotheses 
The following research hypotheses are fully developed from the literature regarding 
the rejection of the efficient market theory and the evidence of anomalies in the stock 
market. Please refer back to section 4.1.1 for the detail discussion of the area.  
5.3.1 Volatility hypotheses 
 
Derivatives introduction can result in an increase in risk-adjustment efficiency 
across securities, a higher demand for the underlying stock and consequently a decline in 
stock price volatility. Detemple & Selden (1991) support this claim using a general 
equilibrium model of the interaction between the primary stock and option markets. Later 
work by Sahlastrom (2001) also suggests a decrease in the underlying stock volatility from 
option listing. Skinner (1989) however, suggests that option exchanges and regulators are 
more likely to be convinced to list options on large and very risky stocks because listing on 
these type of stocks generates higher premiums. Ma & Rao (1988) show evidence of stable 
stocks become more volatile post-options listing because of the increased speculation in the 
derivative market by informed traders. Mayhew & Mihov (2000) find that the volatility of 
the underlying stock is increased from the introduction of option trading activity. The 
evidence generated from options trading is relevant to warrants trading due to many 
similarities in their characteristics. More favourable warrant premiums are likely to be 
secured when the underlying stocks are highly volatile given the profit incentives of issuers 
and capacity to time when to issue the covered warrants. This view is supported by a more 
recent study by Aitken & Segara (2005) based on derivative warrants trading. The findings 
suggest an increase in the underlying stock volatility after the warrant listings. They also 
point out that derivative instruments encourage speculation in the underlying instruments 
and indicate that warrant issuers appear to have the ability to time periods of increased 
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speculation in the underlying stock, enabling them to achieve the benefit of higher 
premiums. To test how the covered warrant introduction effect on the underlying stock 
variance, I test the empirical hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 5.1: There should be an increase in the underlying stock return volatility 
following both call and put covered warrants announcement and listing.   
   
I also test the underlying volatility effect from covered warrants expiration on both 
put and call features. This may provide additional supporting evidence of the usefulness of 
having covered warrants trading in the UK market. 
 
Hypothesis 5.2: There should be significant changes in the volatility of the underlying 
securities return during both call and put covered warrants expiration. 
 
5.4 Data/Sample construction 
5.4.1 Data sources and description 
 
The covered warrants data used in this research are warrants listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) from 26th July 2004 to 15th December 2006 available on Datastream 
(DS) online database. Initially, this study intended to cover the period from 2002, the 
beginning of the formal trade of covered warrants in LSE. However, due to unavailability 
of the data, the period under study here has to start from 2004. The detail explanation on 
the criteria used to exclude observations from the sample is similar to Chapter 4 since this is 
the same data set which employed previously in the Chapter except for the data of 
analyzing call effect which had included 13 non-UK call covered warrants into the 
sampling group.53 The final samples can be seen as the followings. 
 
                                                 
53 To be specific, this is provided in the previous section 4.4.1 (Data sources and description). 
    The underlying securities of these non-UK call covered warrants include ALTRIA GP, MERCK, TOYOTA 
MOTOR, CISCO SYSTEMS, DELL, CONOCOPHILLIPS, CHEVRON, ABBOTT LABS, WALT DISNEY 
and INTEL.  
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For the case of the warrants announcement analysis, I divided into two parts. One is 
for call warrants effect, I employed 55 warrants which have only call warrants issued on the 
underlying stocks. Another is for put warrants effect, I had to use 58 warrants which have 
both call and put warrants issue on the same of each underlying stock because of the small 
sample of put only data.  
 
For the listing effect of warrants, I also separated into two parts which are call and 
put warrants investigations. Based on the listing dates’ data, 52 call only warrants are used 
for call effect investigation and 54 warrants with both call and put features on each 
underlying securities are used for put effect investigation.  
 
For the warrants delisting effect, both call and put warrants effect are also 
examined. Regarding to the availability of the delisting dates’ data, 48 call only warrants 
are tested under call analysis. The analysis examined further to see whether moneyness of 
the warrants would influence the results, thus the sample divided into 31 in-the-money and 
17 out-of-the-money call warrants. For the put effect, 58 warrants which have both call and 
put on the same underlying are employed. However, due to the small sample size of put 
only data, the analysis cannot be done further to separate the moneyness factor influence.  
 
5.4.2 Data construction 
 
The volatility of trading estimation of the underlying securities 
 
Stock returns are collected from Datastream. The natural logarithmic return for each 
underlying stock is used in order to calculate volatility (variance) for the sample period 
before and after the event day.  
 
The standard deviation ( S ) of a set of N number 1X , 2X ,…, NX  is defined by 
( )2
1
1
N
j
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=
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The variance of a set of data is defined as the square of the standard deviation and is 
given by 2S  of the standard deviation presented above.  
 
5.5 Methodology 
 
To test for any significant changes in the volatility of the underlying securities 
during the listing, announcement, and delisting of the UK covered warrants, we employ the 
following methodology: 
 
5.5.1 Parametric test 
 
A variance ratio test 
 
Variance ratio is a measure of the randomness of a return series. F is the ratio of 
variances. Fisher-Snedecor F-distributed test statistic is used to compare two variances 
based on independent samples from two normally distributed populations. The size of these 
two samples (size n1 and size n2) is reflected in two degrees of freedom. Degrees of 
freedom are n1-1 and n2-1 corresponding to the numerator (largest sample) and 
denominator of the sample variances. F-distribution is right-skewed and is truncated at zero 
on the left-hand side. The rejection region is in the right-side tail of the distribution as long 
as the F-statistic is computed with the largest sample variance in the numerator.      
 
( )
2
b
2
a
A variance ratio VR  = 
S
S
 
  
    where       2bS  = variance before the event 
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                     2aS =variance after the event 
 
 The F-test is then used to determine whether or not the variance 2bS  is significantly 
larger than 2aS . In practice, the sample with the larger variance is chosen as sample 1 or in 
this case sample period before the event.  
 
A variance ratio test is used in this study to examine the effects on the volatility of 
the underlying stocks of both call and put covered warrants on their announcement, listing, 
and delisting events. The variance ratio is defined as the variance after the event divided by 
the variance before the event. This study compares the volatility of each stock for the 60 
days before and after the event.  
 
5.5.2 Nonparametric test 
 
Since the assumption of normally distributed data may not be correct, and to check 
the robustness of results based on parametric tests, nonparametric tests of the data are 
introduced. Nonparametric tests do not require specific assumptions concerning the 
distribution of data. The common tests used for event studies are the sign test and the rank 
test:    
 
The sign test 
 
The sign test uses the positive and negative signs of data rather than quantitative 
measures of the data. It is suitable for the case of two related samples in order to test 
whether two conditions are different. That the variable under consideration has a 
continuous distribution is the only assumption of this test. 
 
The basis of the test is that under the null hypothesis ( 0H ) it is equally probable that 
the two conditions will be positive or negative. Another way of stating 0H  is: the median 
difference is zero. If too few differences of one sign occur, 0H  is then rejected.  
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The procedure for determining the probability associated with the occurrence under 
0H  of a value as extreme as the observed value of x  (the number of fewer sign) depends 
on the size of N  which is the numbers of pairs whose differences show a sign. If 25N ≤ , 
the table of probabilities associated with values as small as observed values of x  in the 
binomial test can be employed .54 If 25N > , the table of probabilities associated with 
values as extreme as observed values of z  on the normal distribution is employed.55 The 
value of z must be computed using the formula: 
 
( ) 12
1
2
0.5x N
z
N
± −
=            
where x = the number of fewer sign 
0.5x +  is used when 1
2
x N<  and 
0.5x −  is used when 1
2
x N>  
 
If the probability ( p ) yielded by the test is equal to or less than the significance level (α ), 
reject 0H . 
 
In this study, the null hypothesis ( 0H ) is that the median of the variance ratio is one. 
If there is a significant difference in volatility of the underlying stocks for the period before 
and after the warrants event 0H  is rejected. The variance of each stock for 60 days before 
and after the event is used to compute the variance ratio. The events for this study are 
announcement, listing, and delisting events. The information used here is relates to the 
direction of the variance ratios. The test is used to check the robustness of results based on 
the previous variance ratio test (parametric test). 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Table D of the appendix of Siegel (1956) shows the one-tailed  probability. Therefore, double the value of 
probability shown in the table is needed for a two-tailed test.  
55 Table A of the appendix of Siegel (1956) shows the one-tailed  probability. Therefore, double the value of 
probability shown in the table is needed for a two-tailed test.  
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The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
 
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test is used to test whether the two 
conditions of two related samples are different. This is similar to using the sign test. 
However, the Wilcoxon test is a more powerful test because it uses information on both the 
direction (positive and negative signs) and the relative magnitude of the differences within 
each pair whereas the sign test uses only information of the direction of the differences 
within each pair.56 If either the sum of the ranks for the negative differences or the sum of 
the ranks of the positive differences is too small, reject 0H . 
 
Under the Wilcoxon test, the method for determining the significance of the 
observed value of T  depends on the size of N  (the total number of pairs whose differences 
having a sign (positive and negative signs)).57 If 25N ≤ , the table of critical values of T in 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test is used.58 0H  is rejected when observed 
value of T  is equal to or less than the given critical T value in the table at that level of 
significance. If 25N > , the value of z must be computed using the formula: 
 
( )
( )( )
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The associated probability under 0H  is determined.
59 0H  is rejected when the probability 
obtained from the test is equal to or less than the interested significance level (α ). 
 
                                                 
56 All the relative magnitude of differences are ranked without regard to the sign and affix the sign of the 
difference (positive or negative) to each rank afterward.  
57 T is defined as the smaller of the sums of the like-signed ranks, either the sum of the positive ranks or the 
sum of the negative ranks, whichever sum is smaller. It is the statistic on which the Wilcoxon test is based. 
58 Table G of the appendix of Siegel (1956) 
 
59 Table A of the appendix of Siegel (1956) which shows the one-tailed  probability. Therefore, double the 
value of probability shown in the table is needed for a two-tailed test.  
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The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test is employed in this study to capture 
both the direction of the differences like the sign test and the magnitude of the differences. 
The null hypothesis under this test is similar to the one use in the sign test. 
( ( )0H median VR=  where VR  is variance ratio) The 60 day period before and after the 
event are also used to calculate variance ratios. The test is used to cover all three events of 
announcement/listing/delisting of call and put covered warrants. The test is used to check 
the robustness of parametric test as well as the accuracy of the sign test after considering 
the magnitude of the data.  
 
5.6 Empirical Results 
 
5.6.1 Volatility impacts on the underlying 
 
The introduction of covered warrants may be expected to affect the underlying stock 
return volatility. The early US empirical evidence looking at the effects of option listing on 
the variance of underlying assets suggests a decrease in volatility after the listing. 
Damodaran & Subrahmanyam (1992) provide a good summary of these studies. In addition, 
Detemple & Jorion (1990) report a significant decrease in the volatility of the optioned 
stock after the listing date and also show that these effects appear to be weaker in recent 
periods. St. Pierre (1998) observes a decrease in unconditional variance and no change in 
conditional variance resulting from option listing. Haddad & Voorheis (1991) show stock 
price variability declines upon the introduction of option trading. The reason for this 
decline may be because investors view initial option trading as having a stabilizing 
influence on share price. Thus there are a greater number of investor participants and 
interest in the underlying securities following initial option trading. Aside from this, they 
find option introduction has no impact on systematic risk (beta). Niendorf & Peterson 
(1996) decompose transaction variance into three component  parts : the bid-ask spread, 
return autocorrelation, and intrinsic variance. They claim that by studying the effects of 
option listing on the components of variance rather than on total variance, the potentially 
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confounding effect of net variance change is eliminated and the total transaction return 
variance following option listing is not significantly different from zero. However, Long et 
al. (1994) show that no significant changes were found in either the firms’ betas or variance 
following initial option listing on underlying OTC stocks. Thus there was no significant 
impact on the price volatility of the underlying security on introduction of an option. 
Moreover, Bollen (1998) suggests that option listing does not have a significant effect on 
stock return volatility because the average change in stock return variance in the control 
group is not statistically different from the average change for the optioned stocks. Mayhew 
& Mihov (2000) report that the underlying stock volatility increases with option listing 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that stock exchanges choose to issue options on 
stocks that they anticipate will experience an increase in volatility. In short, the results of 
more recent US studies are less conclusive. Beside studies of US markets, the volatility 
effect has also been tested in other option markets across the world. Watt et al. (1992) 
investigate changes in volatility in the UK. They show results consistent with the early US 
studies indicating that there is a significant reduction in total variance, especially for high 
risk stocks, after option listing. They also report that option trading results in a significant 
reduction in unsystematic risk but no significant effect on the beta of the underlying stocks. 
Kumar et al. (1995) indicates a decline in stock volatility as a result of options trading in 
Japan. There is evidence of a reduction in the volatility of stocks contained in the Nikkei 
225 Index after index options listing. Chaudhury & Elfakhani (1997) examine the volatility 
effect of Canadian put options introduction on the underlying stocks. They find a decrease 
in variance as well as a decrease in beta risk following the listing of put options. Sahlstrom 
(2001) suggests the underlying stocks have lower volatility after option listing on the Finish 
market.  
 
For covered warrants, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. The volatility increase 
for the underlying stocks post-warrant listing on the Australian Stock Exchange is 
discussed in Aitken & Segara (2005). Hernandez-Trillo (1999) investigating Mexican 
warrant introductions, find that they do not have any significant effect on stock return 
variances. This results hold even before the well-known Mexican financial crisis of 1994. 
Draper et al. (2001) also report no impact on return volatility of the underlying security 
after covered warrant introductions in Hong Kong market. 
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In this study, the return volatility effect of the underlying stock is examined during 
three events, the announcement, listing and delisting of the covered warrants on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). The method is to compare the volatility of each stock for the 60 
days on either side of the event using variance ratio tests (both parametric and 
nonparametric tests). The robustness has been checked with different days of historical 
volatility i.e. 30 and 90 days where the results were not qualitatively different. Therefore, 
only the results of 60 day-period was chosen to be reported in this study. 
 
Table 5.1 provides the variance ratio tests around the covered warrants 
announcement days. The variance ratio is defined as variance after the event divided by 
variance before the event. Comparisons of estimates of volatility calculated before and after 
the announcement date of both call and put covered warrants are presented in Panel A of 
Table 5.1. The announcement of the issue of covered call warrants increases volatility for 
two-third of the sample, and in around 60% of these cases the change is significant. Similar 
results are reported for put warrants; there is an increase in volatility after the warrant 
announcement for nearly two-third of the sample and for these cases, more than 70% 
represents a significant increase in volatility. However, these results provide a sizable 
percentage of no increase in volatility after the announcement under both call and put 
warrants. To provide a clearer picture of the results, this study also uses nonparametric tests 
(the sign test and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test). Under the null hypothesis, the median of 
variance ratio is one. The median ratio (median VR), in Panel B of Table 5.1, indicates that 
the volatility increases 18.7% for the call case and 27.4% increase for the put case after the 
announcement of warrant issue. These results are significant at a 5% level for the sign test 
and at a 1% level for the Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Thus, the null hypothesis of no 
change in volatility surrounding warrants announcement can be rejected. There is a 
pronounced increase in underlying volatility after the announcement of warrants. 
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Table 5.1: Volatility test around announcement days 
 
Panel A. Variance ratio F-test of Volatility around announcement days 
 
 Announcement Day 
  Call case Put case 
 Variance b>Variance a = 18 Variance b<Variance a = 37 Variance b>Variance a = 20 Variance b<Variance a = 38 
Significance Level Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a 
1% 1 14 0 14 
5% 5 4 2 6 
10% 1 4 2 8 
Below 10% 11 15 16 10 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            Numbers represent numbers of observations: 55 in total call case sample and 58 in total put case sample. 
            Variance a = Variance after event 
            Variance b = Variance before event 
 
Panel B. Variance ratio Sign Test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Volatility around announcement days 
 
 Announcement Day 
  Call case Put case 
Mean VR
(a)
 1.394 1.514 
Median VR 1.187 1.274 
No. of VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 37 38 
No. of VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 18 20 
Sign Test(two-tailed)
(b)
:  z-statistic -2.427 -2.232 
                                          p-value 0.015 0.026 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -3.444 -4.224 
                                                                            p-value 0.001 0.000 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
(a) Variance after eventVariance ratio (VR)= 
Variance before event
 
(b) Based on No. of  VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 
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Table 5.2: Volatility test around listing days 
 
Panel A. Variance ratio F-test of Volatility around listing days 
 
 Listing Day 
  Call case Put case 
 Variance b>Variance a = 13 Variance b<Variance a = 39 Variance b>Variance a = 20 Variance b<Variance a = 34 
Significance Level Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a 
1% 1 14 2 14 
5% 2 4 0 4 
10% 2 4 4 3 
Below 10% 8 17 14 13 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            Numbers represent numbers of observations: 52 in total call case sample and 54 in total put case sample. 
            Variance a = Variance after event 
            Variance b = Variance before event 
 
Panel B. Variance ratio Sign Test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Volatility around listing days 
 
 Listing Day 
  Call case Put case 
Mean VR
(a)
 1.520 1.394 
Median VR 1.268 1.247 
No. of VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 39 34 
No. of VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 13 20 
Sign Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -3.467 -1.769 
                                           p-value 0.001 0.077 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -4.162 -3.647 
                                                                            p-value 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
(a) Variance after eventVariance ratio (VR)= 
Variance before event
 
(b) Based on No. of  VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 
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      The volatility tests around listing days are reported in Table 5.2. Listing days of 
covered warrants are followed by a rise in volatility, evidence consistent with the previous 
announcement days’ results. Panel A of Table 5.2, indicates that three quarters of all 
underlying stocks of call warrants show increasing volatility after the listing event and of 
these 56% of cases are significant. For put warrants, two-third of the sample indicates a rise 
in volatility after the warrant listing and more than 60% have a significant effect. This study 
also provides nonparametric test results. Under the null hypothesis, the median of the 
variance ratio is one. The median ratio (median VR), in Panel B of Table 5.2, shows an 
increase in underlying stocks’ variance ratio of 26.8% for call and 24.7% for put warrants. 
Both the sign test and the Wilcoxon signed ranks test indicate a significant change at a 1 % 
level. The exception is the sign test of the put that is significant at a 10% significance level.  
 
In contrast, the delisting event indicates a significant decrease in the volatility of the 
underlying stocks. Panel A of table 5.3 shows that two-third of the call sample has reduced 
volatility after the delisting and around 59% of this change is significant. In addition, the 
put sample also indicates a decrease in the volatility after delisting for slightly more than 
half of the whole sample. For 47% of cases the changes are significant. The additional 
results from nonparametric tests are presented in Panel B of Table 5.3. Under the null 
hypothesis, the median of variance ratio is one. The results are presented through the 
median ratio (median VR). For the case of call warrants, a 20% decrease in variance ratio is 
presented at the 5% significance level after delisting for both the sign test and the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test. Put warrants also indicate a decline in volatility after the delisting, 
although there is no evidence of any significant changes. However, the mean ratio presents 
a contradictory result. For call and put cases, all variance ratios are added and then divided 
by the number of underlying stocks. According to the null hypothesis of no changes in 
volatility, the mean ratio (mean VR) for all stocks should equal one. If the null hypothesis 
is being rejected, there is an indication of a change in volatility. However, this research 
does not focus on the mean ratio results because of the outliers in the data which tend to 
have positive bias. This can lead to a misinterpretation of the direction of the volatility.  
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Table 5.3: Volatility test around delisting days 
 
Panel A. Variance ratio F-test of Volatility around delisting days 
 
 Delisting Day 
  Call case Put case 
 Variance b>Variance a = 32 Variance b<Variance a = 16 Variance b>Variance a = 30 Variance b<Variance a = 28 
Significance Level Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a 
1% 6 4 4 8 
5% 7 1 6 4 
10% 6 0 4 4 
Below 10% 13 11 16 12 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            Numbers represent numbers of observations: 48 in total call case sample and 58 in total put case sample. 
            Variance a = Variance after event 
            Variance b = Variance before event 
 
Panel B. Variance ratio Sign Test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Volatility around delisting days 
 
 Delisting Day 
  Call case Put case 
Mean VR
(a)
 1.044 1.188 
Median VR 0.802 0.966 
No. of VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 16 28 
No. of VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 32 30 
Sign Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -2.165 -0.131 
                                           p-value 0.030 0.896 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -2.174 -1.289 
                                                                            p-value 0.030 0.197 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
(a) Variance after eventVariance ratio (VR)= 
Variance before event
 
(b) Based on No. of  VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 
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Table 5.4: Volatility test around delisting days (In/Out-of-the-money Call case) 
 
Panel A. Variance ratio F-test of Volatility around delisting days (In/Out-of-the-money Call case) 
 Delisting Day(Call case) 
  In-the-money Out-of-the-money 
 Variance b>Variance a = 21 Variance b<Variance a = 10 Variance b>Variance a = 11 Variance b<Variance a = 6 
Significance Level Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a Variance b>Variance a Variance b<Variance a 
1% 6 2 1 2 
5% 2 0 5 1 
10% 3 0 2 0 
Below 10% 10 8 3 3 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            Numbers represent numbers of observations: 31 in total in-the-money call case sample and 17 in total out-of-the-money call case sample. 
            Variance a = Variance after event 
            Variance b = Variance before event 
 
Panel B. Variance ratio Sign Test and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Volatility around delisting days (In/Out-of-the-money Call 
case) 
 Delisting Day(Call case) 
  In-the-money Out-of-the-money 
Mean VR
(a)
 0.904 1.291 
Median VR 0.806 0.772 
No. of VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 10 6 
No. of VR<1(No. of firms for which variance decrease) 21 11 
Sign Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -1.796        -    
(c)
 
                                           p-value 0.072     0.332
(c)
 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test(two-tailed)
 (b)
:  z-statistic -2.175 -0.781 
                                                                            p-value 0.030 0.435 
Notes: The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
(a) Variance after eventVariance ratio (VR)= 
Variance before event
 
(b) Based on No. of  VR>1(No. of firms for which variance increase) 
(c) Binomial distribution used 
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      This research extends the call warrant delisting analysis into in-the-money and out-
of-the-money cases. Panel A of table 5.4 shows a decrease in volatility for two-third of the 
sample after the delisting, for the underlying securities of both in and out-of-the-money call 
warrants. These results are supported in Panel B of table 5.4 (the median ratio; median VR) 
which indicates approximately 20% significance decrease in variance ratio after the 
delisting for the in-the-money call warrants using both the sign test and the Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test. Although there is no significance result for out-of-the-money call 
warrants, a decrease in the underlying volatility after the delisting is found.  
 
In summary, the evidence indicates a clear effect on the underlying securities’ 
volatility. The results from both call and put covered warrants suggest, on average, that 
warrant announcements increase stocks volatility. This supports the increase in stock 
volatility following the listing of warrants. The result here is in line with the hypothesis that 
stock exchanges choose to allow the issuance of warrants mostly on stocks which they 
expect to show an increase in volatility.60 A more favourable warrant premium will be 
secured during a time when the underlying security is expected to be more volatile. This 
increase in volatility links with a decline in the underlying security value. The evidence has 
already been presented in the earlier results of the negative impact on the underlying 
securities’ price (value) during warrant introductions. The additional suggestion by Ma & 
Roa (1988) indicates that stable stocks become more volatile after listing because of the 
increased speculation in the derivatives market from informed traders. This has been 
claimed mostly by market observers and policy makers.61 An opposite effect is reported 
during the delisting event. The delisting of warrants significantly decreases the volatility of 
the underlying stocks.  
 
                                                 
60 This idea is purposed by Mayhew & Mihov (2000) on options listing. However, the endogeneity of the 
option listing decision is applicable to warrant listings. 
61Skinner (1989) supported this controversy. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
 
There has been a long, inconclusive debate over the economic impacts on the 
underlying assets from derivatives trading, especially the concerns about the magnitude of 
risk these new innovative products would generate into the underlying existing markets. 
Many previous studies have been conducted on the impact of option trading but few have 
touched on covered warrants trading. This study attempts to add more empirical evidence 
and Chapter 5 examines empirically whether trading of covered warrants has an impact on 
the volatility of underlying stocks listed in the UK. 
 
The findings support our Hypothesis 5.1 which indicate an increase in volatility of 
the underlying stocks due to covered warrants announcement and listing. This evidence 
holds true for both call and put conditions of warrant trading upon announcement. 
Moreover, the listing event generated similar results and shows the rise in the underlying 
stock volatility for both call and put warrants cases. There are four major reasons 
supporting these increases in stocks volatility effects. Firstly, the issuance of warrants is 
usually allowed by the stock exchanges on which the underlying stocks are expected to see 
an increasing sign. This is the case apply to most covered warrants trading within the UK 
market. Secondly, the profit motive of warrants issuers and their abilities to time when 
stock is expected to be volatile to issue warrants for the highest possible premiums. 
Thirdly, covered warrant instruments lead to an increase in the underlying instruments 
speculation. Lastly, the increased speculation in the derivatives market generally comes 
from informed trader resulting in stable underlying stocks become more volatile. Moreover, 
the results can also be related back to the findings in Chapter 4 because when there was the 
decrease in the underlying security price due to the announcement and listing of both call 
and put covered warrants, investors and speculators may react which could lead to an 
increase in the trading volatility of the underlying securities as presented in this Chapter 5.   
 
These results of an increase in stocks’ volatility after the introduction of covered 
warrants in the UK are in contrast to earlier U.S. results on the effect of option listing on 
the underlying security. They suggest that options listing on individual stocks leads to a 
reduction in the volatility of these stocks. However, the result is consistent with the study 
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on derivative warrants by Aitken & Segara (2005) of the Australian market in which they 
also report an increase in the stock volatility due the warrants listing, similar to my finding 
here. 62 
 
The analyses in this study are carried out further to test the impact of the underlying 
stocks during the expiration of the UK covered warrants. The results support Hypothesis 
5.2 which states that there are significant changes in the stock volatility as a consequence 
from the warrants expiration. This impact shows a decreasing stock volatility. If my reason 
given in Chapter 4 regarding the belief of covered warrant introduction acts as a 
destabilizing factor to the underlying stock stays valid, the expiration of warrant should 
bring the underlying market back toward stabilization stage. Therefore, this would lead to a 
reduction in the underlying stock volatility as shown here in the result of this Chapter 5.  
 
                                                 
62 The term “derivative warrants” is used interchangeable with “covered warrants” especially in Hong Kong 
and Australia, etc. 
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Chapter 6 : Covered Warrants Valuation with default risk 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been traditionally implicitly assumed that covered warrants have no default 
risk. However, this section gives background evidence on how default risk could possibly 
be related directly with this financial product. Both fraudulent traders and the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis of the UK financial institutions, major issuers of covered 
warrants, may substantially shape the way the product is originally priced. Moreover, the 
motivation to conduct this research is summarized towards the end of this section 6.1.  
 
6.1.1 Major evidence of Default risk in financial institutions in the UK  
 
The Fraudulent trader 
 
Barings Bank 
 
Barings Bank had a long established history and had been the oldest merchant bank 
in London until its collapse in 1995, after one of the bank's employees, Nick Leeson’s 
fraudulent trading. He speculated primarily on futures contracts and accumulated losses of 
£827 million ($1.4 billion) from speculating over a period of three years while he was a 
Singapore-based management employee of Barings Bank. The reason he could manage to 
carry out the transactions was through the manipulation of records, which hid his 
wrongdoing until February 1995. The total losses were twice the bank’s available trading 
capital. As soon as the losses were disclosed, the bank was forced to default on its accounts.  
 
The Barings Bank collapse (costing another £100 million) was dramatic. Employees 
around the world not only did not receive their bonuses, but also lost their jobs. It became a 
pivotal turning point in banking history, and a classic example of accounting fraud. In 
addition, the fraud led to a huge reappraisal of the control systems within banks and 
financial institutions around the world. 
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The subprime mortgage crisis 
 
The practice of giving loans to borrowers who lack the credit-worthiness required to 
pay the best market interest rates (perhaps due to their deficient credit history or inability to 
prove that they have enough income to meet the periodic payments on the loan they apply 
for) is called subprime lending (B-paper, near-prime, or second chance lending). The term 
“subprime” refers to the credit-worthiness of the borrower, and does not refer to the interest 
rate on the loan itself. Subprime lending includes a number of credit intruments such as 
subprime mortgages, subprime credit cards, subprime car loans, etc. This lending is risky 
by nature for both creditors and debtors, because a mixture of high interest rates (due to the 
increased risk), poor credit history, and murky financial situations may be associated with 
subprime borrowers.   
 
 Subprime lending has generated some controversy. Supporters of such lending say 
that subprime lending generates sources of credit for people who otherwise would not be 
qualified for it, thus helping to “complete” the market for credit. This helps generate more 
trading activities within the credit market. Borrowers are also often told that accepting 
subprime credit, often at high interest rates (particularly in the case of credit cards), will 
assist them in rebuilding their credit worthiness. There have been allegations by critics that 
lenders have acted as so called “predatory lenders”, taking advantage of borrowers and 
deliberately lending to people who could never pay back their loans, charging naïve 
borrowers outrageous fees and sky-high interest rates. Such lenders may tell the borrowers 
that the borrowers’ credit scores are worse than they actually are and therefore are able to 
charge much higher interest rates than justified by the borrowers’ real credit scores. The 
result may often be bankruptcy, seizure of collateral, and foreclosure.  
 
The subprime mortgage crisis started in the United States in late 2006 with a very 
large rise in home foreclosures and became a world financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. The 
effects of the crisis seem likely to continue to be felt for a period of time. This phenomenon 
has been depicted as a financial contagion which has led to restrictions on the availability 
of credit in global financial markets, and government interventions to save troubled banks. 
The crisis began with the bursting of the housing bubble in the US and high default rates on 
subprime and other adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) made to higher-risk borrowers. 
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Reduced credit history requirements, loan incentives and a long-term house price boom 
persuaded people to borrow via mortgages in the hope of cheaper refinancing later. 
Additionally, some lenders were willing to lend more than 100% of the value of the 
property being purchased. However, when housing prices began to drop in 2006-2007 in 
the U.S., refinancing became increasingly difficult. According to RealtyTrac (2008b), the 
U.S. housing properties subject to foreclosure in 2007 were up approximately 75% 
compared to 2006. Hundreds of thousands of borrowers have defaulted and many major 
American subprime lenders have filed for bankruptcy. 
 
Figure 6.1: U.S. Household Properties with Foreclosure Activity – 2007 
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Source Data: RealtyTrac(2008a) 
 
Not only have first line mortgage lenders who retained the credit risk of borrows’ 
default payments been affected, but other investors have also been affected by the subprime 
mortgage crisis. This is because of a well known feature of financial engineering, 
securitization. Risks related to the inability of homeowners to make mortgage payments 
have been transferred to third-party investors via securitized pools of mortgages such as 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). Therefore, 
the fall in value of underlying mortgage assets has lead to significant losses faced by 
individual, corporate and institutional investors holding these MBS and CDO.  
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Northern Rock (NRK) 
 
On 31 March Northern Rock bank released its annual report for 2007, showing a 
loss of £167 million. In addition, on 14 September 2007, the bank, which was the UK’s 
fifth largest mortgage provider, had to seek an emergency bail-out from the Bank of 
England as a consequence of effects in international credit markets attributed to the 
subprime lending crisis (Durrant, 2007). Moreover, the tight balance sheets and uncertainty 
over the future of what remains of its business led to difficulties in finding buyers (Reuters, 
2007) and the bank was nationalized on 22 February 2008 after two unsuccessful takeover 
bids by the Virgin Group and the in-house management consortium, as neither of them 
were able to offer sufficient value for money to the taxpayers (BBC, 2008a).  
 
Northern Rock historically always had sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but 
after the US subprime crisis, institutional lenders became nervous about lending to 
mortgage banks. This led to liquidity problems. Northern Rock is not the only British bank 
to have called on the Bank of England for financial aid since the subprime crisis began. 
However, it is the only one which has had emergency financial support from the Tripartite 
Authority (The Bank of England, The FSA and HM Treasury).     
 
The fraudulent trader & the subprime mortgage crisis 
 
Société Générale (SocGen, SG) 
 
Société Générale is one of the oldest banks in France and a major European 
financial services company. It also maintains extensive activities in others parts of the 
world. The bank can be considered a major player within the UK financial market.  
 
Société Générale stunned investors on 24 January 2008 (BBC, 2008b) when it 
announced £1.5 billion ($3 billion) write-downs from failed investments in collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) and bond insurers in the United States. This was due to the 
meltdown in America’s subprime market. In addition, it has seemingly uncovered a £3.8 
billion ($7.6 billion) fraud by a Paris-based futures trader (Jérôme Kerviel, a junior 
employee) who has since been suspended. This loss apparently due to fraud is the largest 
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such loss in history, and considerably larger than the transactions by Nick Leeson that 
brought down Barings Bank. The total announced lost of Société Générale added up to £5.3 
billion ($10.6 billion). Two credit rating agencies downgraded the bank’s long term debt 
ratings on that day, from AA to AA- (Fitch); and from Aa1 to Aa2 (Moody’s) (Generale, 
2008). The following day, the bank announced it would immediately seek €5.5 billion in 
financing.  
 
Losses have affected banking around the globe, the UK being unexceptional. The 
reputation of the British banking industry has been harmed by the recent subprime crisis, 
but this has not only affected the banking industry in the UK. There are reported losses 
from major banks and other financial institutions around the world of approximately U.S. 
$1 Trillion (as of Dec 2008), due to the subprime crisis and it has been predicted that the 
amount will continue to grow.  
 
6.1.2 Summary 
 
The “impossible” is always possible within the financial world. History seems to 
repeat itself sporadically, as in the case of the rogue trader of Barings Bank and possibly 
also for Société Générale. This indicates the difficulties of controlling large financial 
institutions. Moreover, default risk has risen and this seems likely to lead to greater 
volatility. An example is the subprime problem and a failure of banks’ risk management 
systems to appreciate that the new "structured finance vehicles" that they used to offload 
their risky subprime investments may have liquidity problems in difficult market 
conditions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also emphasizes that financial sector 
supervision and regulation lag behind the rapid innovation and shifts in business models, 
leaving scope for excessive risk-taking. 
 
Therefore, the soaring degree of leverage and volatility in the financial system could 
be major supporting evidence for why default risk is not necessarily due to negligence 
alone, and should be taken into account when valuing any investment (such as covered 
warrants in this study). 
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6.1.3 Motivation  
 
There are no guarantees on covered warrant trading provided by the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), no perfect hedge (for dynamic trading) by warrant issuer because of 
market imperfections, and the recent financial distress caused by the subprime crisis as well 
as the exceptional fraud at Société Générale (SG) make the possibility of default a relevant 
factor to be considered in the warrant-pricing model.63 The recent write down/loss due to 
the crisis incurred by the investment bank along with downgrade in its credit rating, are also 
supporting evidence of the important of default risk. This suggests that the issuer’s credit 
risk should be taken into consideration when evaluating UK covered warrants. The Black-
Scholes (1973) option-pricing model may not be adequate since it does not include a 
default risk factor. However, Johnson & Stulz (1987) introduced a Vulnerable option model 
which takes default risk into account. This model was later modified by Klein (1996) and 
can be used to value UK covered warrants although data limitation make it hard to apply.    
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 explores the 
background literature of the pricing model and bankruptcy costs determination. Section 6.3 
develops research hypotheses and gives some background motivation. Section 6.4 discusses 
data sources and description. It also shows how samples have been constructed. Section 6.5 
explains valuation models employed in the study. The analyses of results are presented in 
Section 6.6 while Section 6.7 offers some concluding discussion.  
 
6.2 Review of Literature 
6.2.1 Background literature: Pricing model with credit risk 
 
Regarding to the credit risk in options, Johnson & Stulz (1987) was the first 
research conducted on this area. They examine the effect of credit risk under the 
assumption of stochastic processes for the assets value of the option issuer and the assets 
                                                 
63 Société Générale is the major issuer in the UK’s covered warrant market. 
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value of the option underlying. They also assume that the option holder receives all the 
assets of the counterparty writing an option if the writer is unable to meet with the promised 
payment. Hull & White (1995) extend John & Stulz model to estimate the impact of credit 
risk where equal ranking claim (bonds that issued by the counterparty) can exist. Thus, 
option holders are assumed to receive only a proportion of its no-default claims when 
counterparty is unable to deliver a promised payment. Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) provide 
another approach for pricing derivative securities concerning credit risk. This approach 
assumes stochastic term structures of risky debt and default free interest rates. The risk-
neutral valuation procedure can then be derived by applying arbitrage-free dynamics given 
these two term structures. Klein (1996) extends Hull & White (1995) and Jarrow & 
Turnbull (1995) by relaxing the assumption of independence between the assets of the 
counterparty and the asset underlying the option, and by specifying a payout ratio which is 
explicitly related to the value of the assets of the counterparty (a proportional recovery of 
nominal claims of option in default). The model reveals the effect of credit risk on Black-
Scholes options values as being much less for positive correlation between the assets of the 
counterparty and the asset underlying the option in comparison to when this correlation is 
negative, therefore supporting the finding that the price of an option is greater than in 
Johnson & Stulz (1987) which understated the real option value especially for the positive 
correlation case. The results are also compared to Hull & White (1995). The effect of credit 
risk calculated using the model is generally less than that reported by Hull & White (1995) 
for European options, and is similar to their calculations for American options. This 
difference is due to the relatively higher payout ratio assumed which allows the possibility 
of the assets of the counterparty to be recovered subsequent to default before the option 
maturity date.  
 
6.2.2 Background literature: Bankruptcy costs 
 
Bankruptcy occurs when the debt obligations of a firm cannot be met. This results 
in a transfer of ownership and a formal reorganization of the firm’s capital structure. The 
costs associated with this activity are called bankruptcy costs which can be categorized as 
direct and indirect. In other words, they are the deadweight economic costs of a firm going 
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bankrupt. Direct bankruptcy costs include reorganization costs, legal, accounting, filing, 
and other professional fees. These costs are naturally easier to measure than indirect costs 
of bankruptcy which include the lost sales as a result of customer concerns over future 
operating difficulties, declining margins due to an increase in input costs from suppliers, 
loss of key personnel, and loss of management effort(Cays (2001)).  
 
The early discussion of bankruptcy costs related to corporate financing policy can 
be seen in Modigliani & Miller (1958; 1963). They claim that if interest payments are tax 
deductible and debt is default free, firms will use their debt financing to the maximum. This 
has also been discussed in some other literature (Higgins & Schall (1975), Horne (1977) 
and Haugen & Senbet (1978)) where it is stated that bankruptcy costs do not exist in a 
perfect and frictionless capital market where there are a variety of participants who are 
assumed to be rational in their behaviour. However, Robichek & Myers (1966) suggest that 
there are bankruptcy costs which may offset the tax benefits of debt financing when 
considering firms’ capital structure policy. There are also other papers supporting the 
relaxation of the no bankruptcy cost assumption; for example Kraus & Litzenberger (1973), 
Scott (1976) and Kim (1978) have formally develop models that include bankruptcy costs 
under the concept managers maximise firm value by increasing debt financing to the level 
where the present value of marginal tax benefits equals the present value of marginal future 
bankruptcy costs.64 
 
6.3 Research hypotheses 
6.3.1 Pricing hypotheses 
 
The only published empirical study related to UK company warrant pricing to date 
is Gemmill & Thomas (1997). This deals explicitly with Investment Trust warrants and is 
of limited applicability to the wider covered warrant market. There is not yet any study on 
the pricing of UK covered warrants and only a very limited amount of research on their 
pricing generally. Chen (2003) considers the credit risk of the covered warrant issuer when 
                                                 
64 Moreover, the debate concerning whether bankruptcy costs are either high or low can be seen in Warner 
(1977), Haugen & Senbet (1978), etc. 
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evaluating pricing within the Taiwan market. Relevant studies of derivative pricing 
(particularly options) which involve the issuer’s default risk are Johnson & Stulz (1987), 
Hull & White (1995),  Jarrow & Turnbull (1995) and Klein (1996). They suggest that the 
counterparty credit risk has become an important factor in pricing options because of the 
fast-growing over-the-counter market. This non-exchange-traded market generally involves 
issuers with limited assets and thus subject to default risk (unable to make payments at the 
expiration date of option). The reason for taking default risks into account in a study of UK 
covered warrants arises from concern as to the issuers’ credit worthiness particularly due to 
traders’ fraudulent action and the subprime problem in the market, as well as the difficulties 
of hedging (for dynamic trading) by warrant issuers due to market imperfections.  
 
Hypothesis 6.1: There should be differences among Vulnerable warrant price (VP), Black-
Scholes price (BS) and warrant market price of UK’s covered warrant. 
 
Hypothesis 6.2: There should be a consistency of results no matter various bankruptcy 
costs for Vulnerable warrant price (VP) calculation are employed.  
 
Chen (2003) applies Klein’s (1996) Vulnerable option pricing model to price 23 
plain vanilla covered warrants in the Taiwan market over the period August 1997 to 
December 2000.65 There are two main motivations to adapt this model to Taiwan warrant 
data. Firstly, the Taiwan market provides no margin settlement mechanism for existing 
covered warrants, therefore, the credit risk of the warrant issuer should be taken into 
account when evaluating a covered warrant price. Secondly, perfect hedging is not practical 
because of market imperfections, and thus the warrant issuer cannot perfectly hedge its 
exposure on the spot market. In addition, warrant issuers not only face underwriting risk, 
but also other operating and financial risks. Hence, the issuer’s credit risk must be 
considered in warrant pricing. Chen (2003) compares the Vulnerable warrant price with 
‘theoretical’ Black-Scholes (1973) values and warrant market values. The results show the 
daily price of each Vulnerable warrant is consistently lower than Black-Scholes price 
during its lifetime. However, the differences between the two warrant values are not 
significant. For example, Yuan Ta-China Develop Mar. 99 has zero mean in the difference, 
                                                 
65 An outline of Klein’s Vulnerable option model is presented in the “methodology” section of this chapter, 
section 6.5. 
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Tah Hsin-CMC Magnetics Corp. Jul. 99 has a negative 0.0022% difference in means. It 
appears that the default risks utilized in calculating the warrant pricing model do not have a 
significant influence on price. There is also evidence that the average daily theoretical 
values of all Vulnerable warrants are lower than their market prices. The paper concludes 
that the market prices of Taiwan covered warrants are possibly overvalued. Each warrant 
lifetime is divided into in-the-money, at-the-money and out-of-the-money and further study 
examines the differences between Vulnerable warrant and Black-Scholes values. The 
Vulnerable warrant value is lower than the Black-Scholes value, and this difference is 
larger in magnitude for in-the-money warrants than that for out-of-the-money warrants. The 
given reason is that investors face default risk of the issuers only when the Vulnerable 
warrant is in-the-money. When a warrant is out-of-the-money the current exercise value is 
zero. Hence, it is not necessary to consider the credit risk. This given explanation by Chen 
(2003) could possibly be argued because when the warrant is out-of-the-money, its exercise 
value is indeed zero, but its price is still positive because of the possibility that its exercise 
value will be positive at some time in the future, and true value of this could still be 
subjected to the creditworthiness of the issuer. Nevertheless, in-the-money warrant should 
still be involved with higher credit risk in comparison to out-of-the-money warrant. Thus, 
my next hypothesis is built upon this belief. 
 
Hypothesis 6.3: The Vulnerable warrant price (VP) should be less than warrant market 
price of UK covered warrant for in-the-money than out-of-the-money cases due to higher 
default risk associated with in-the-money warrant.  
 
6.3.2 Event Study hypotheses 
 
 This study calculates warrant price based on the Black-Scholes (1973) model as 
well as Klein’s (1996) Vulnerable model in order to make a comparison with the existing 
warrant market price. However, extreme caution is required in evaluating the results for the 
Vulnerable pricing model. Calculating the parameter estimates of the Vulnerable model is 
very difficult. The asset value of the warrant issuer is only available infrequently and 
consequently it is difficult to generate accurate daily data. The initial debt of the issuer is 
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specific to the chosen date when the information is collected. The estimate of the 
correlation coefficient between the underlying security and the issuer’s assets is imprecise 
and depends on the accuracy of the issuer’s asset daily data. The estimation of the asset 
volatility is also very dependent on the issuer’s asset data. Similarly it is difficult to 
estimate a bankruptcy cost for the warrant issuer. Despite these difficulties I provide some 
estimates but am reluctant to place much reliance on them. The difficulty of estimating the 
parameters suggests that an alternative approach might be more fruitful. The losses from 
the subprime crisis and trading problems indicate that default risk has increased and that the 
market became aware of this over a short window of time. If credit risk is important we 
would expect warrant values to change (fall) after revaluation following the losses. The 
observation of the change in warrant price before and after this event should provide some 
indication of the importance of credit risk for warrant valuation. In effect, we take the 
subprime crisis and SG fraudulent trader where credit risk is obviously known to be altered 
and conduct a “natural experiment” on the UK’s covered warrants during that period to see 
how the price of the warrant before and after the event changes.66 This is based on the idea 
that default risk could be an important factor in pricing UK, and indeed any, covered 
warrants. By looking at the market prices and the prices calculated by means of the Black-
Scholes model as well as the Vulnerable model, the movement of these prices around the 
event can indicate the evidence of default risk.  
 
Hypothesis 6.4: The UK covered warrants should be overpriced during the period of 
financial distress because of the ignorance to take default risk into consideration. (evidence 
in both percentage and money-term)   
 
Hypothesis 6.5: There should be differences between Vulnerable warrant price (VP) and 
Black-Scholes price (BS) of UK’s covered warrant before and at/after financial distress.  
 
Hypothesis 6.6: There should be differences between Vulnerable warrant price (VP) and 
warrant market price of UK’s covered warrant before and at/after financial distress.  
 
                                                 
66 A natural experiment is a naturally occurring event or situation, which can be exploited by a researcher to 
help answer a research question. 
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Hypothesis 6.7: There should be negative abnormal returns around and after the event day 
(financial distress) under both market price and Black-Scholes price (BS) of UK’s covered 
warrant in order to indicate that credit risk has a significant impact upon covered warrant 
trading.  
 
6.4 Data/Sample construction 
6.4.1 Data sources and description 
 
 303 call covered warrants (plain vanilla European warrants with cash settlements) 
were issued and expired on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 11th April 2007 to 19th 
December 2008. Excluding 142 warrants listed after 24th January 2008, the event day (the 
day that Société Générale announced a loss of £5.3 billion ($10.6 billion) due to the 
subprime crisis and fraudulent trader) and 7 warrants with an error in the data, the total 
number left is 154 covered warrants in the sample. The data are collected from each 
warrant prospectus and the LSE. Financial data of the warrant issuer was collected from 
Société Générale’s website, Datastream and BBC news. Time to maturity, daily market 
prices of each warrant and the underlying stock price were obtained from Datastream. 
Exercise prices, expiration dates and parity ratios are accessible through each warrant 
prospectus. Nominal risk free interest rates are released by the Bank of England.  
 
 All covered warrants employed here are issued solely by Société Générale, the main 
issuer of such products. Each warrant has an issue size of 50 million units. They are all 
Plain Vanilla in style and have an individual stock as the underlying security. The 
settlement conditions are in cash which means that the issuer will pay a cash amount for the 
intrinsic value of the warrants at the expiry date for the European-style covered warrants 
used here. Appendix 6.1 gives the issuance status of all 154 call covered warrants in the 
sample. There are a total of 46 listed stocks underlying the warrants. Except for 7 stocks, 
the rest of the underlying stocks were included in the FTSE100.67 At issue, there were 9 in-
                                                 
67 The 7 underlying stocks that were not included in FTSE100 constituent are ARM HOLDINGS PLC, 
CENTRICA PLC, INVESCO PLC, PERSIMMON PLC, ROYAL & SUN ALL.IN. GROUP PLC, 
SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE PLC, and YELL GROUP PLC. 
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the-money and 145 out-of-the-money warrants.  The fundamental conversion ratios for the 
warrants are either 0.1 or 1.    
 
 For the part of the Vulnerable warrant pricing study, the sample size is reduced 
from 154 call covered warrants to 103 call covered warrants. I filter out 47 covered 
warrants which have not yet expired during the time I conducted this study and 4 more 
covered warrants are deleted due to incomplete data sets needed for the calculations of 
various parameters required by the Vulnerable warrant model, therefore, the sample size is 
finalized at 103 covered warrants. 
 
6.4.2 Data construction 
 
 Volatility estimation 
 Historical and implied estimates of volatilities are widely used for valuation 
purposes. Volatility is a key variable input into the Black-Scholes and other models for 
deriving ‘fair value’ prices. High volatility means large daily, weekly or monthly 
movements in prices and can lead to considerable advantages because of the limited loss, 
unlimited upside characteristic of warrants. 
 
 This study uses historical volatility measured by the standard deviation of past 
movements in the underlying stock price. We use historic volatility as an estimate of future 
volatility, as in practice it is difficult to forecast the true value of future volatility. Thus, the 
historical volatility is popularly used as a proxy.  
 
 A standard methodology for calculating historical volatility is to calculate annual 
volatility as a percentage, based on daily prices observed for a set period such as the 
previous 30, 60, or 250 days. This study employs estimates based on a 60 day-period 
because the market has been very volatile during the study period.68 The historical volatility 
is computed as the standard deviation of daily log returns, and annualised assuming that 
                                                 
68 Both 30 and 90-day periods were also tested and the empirical results are not qualitatively different to the 
ones reported in this study.  
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there are 252 trading days per year, as is conventional in derivatives pricing.69 The 
estimation of both the underlying stock return volatility ( Sσ ) and the asset volatility ( Vσ ), 
used in the pricing models are derived accordingly. 
  
 The underlying stock prices and the asset values of the issuer estimation 
I assume that both the stock prices (S) of the warrant’s underlying and asset values 
(V) of the warrant issuer follow a ‘diffusion process’. The diffusion processes of these two 
values are defined by 
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 µ  = the expected return on the underlying stock prices/asset values per unit  
        of time; µ  is constant 
 t∆  = a unit of time, here a day. 
 σ  = the standard deviation of the stock’s return during the unit of time 
 z  = a random variable that is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a  
        variance of t . z  is called a Wiener process. Over small intervals of   
        time, changes in z , z∆ , are normally distributed random variables,  
        with 0)( =∆zE  and tz ∆=∆ )var( . The covariance of any two z∆  is  
        zero; in other words, 0),cov( 12 =∆∆ tt zz . 
 z∆  is just a normally distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a 
variance per unit time of t∆ . Suppose t∆  is one day (use in this study). A value of z∆  can 
be drawn out of a probability distribution that has a mean of zero and a variance of one.  
The mean is always zero, and the variance is proportional to time. 
 
                                                 
69 Assuming that returns are “lognormally distributed” 
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The correlation coefficient estimation (between the underlying stock and the issuer 
asset value) 
This is the correlation between the price of underlying stock (S) and the asset value 
of the warrant issuer (V). The daily returns on underlying stock price and the stock price of 
the issuer (assumed as a representative of V) are used. The correlation is calculated for the 
period which warrant is being calculated. 
 
The bankruptcy costs estimation 
 The classic paper on this area is Warner (1977). He investigated 11 US bankruptcy 
railroads which the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) reported bankruptcy costs for 
between 1933 and 1955. Evidence on the direct costs of corporate bankruptcy reveals it to 
be about 1% on average of the market value of the firm in the seventh year prior to 
bankruptcy. At the time the firm filed a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy cost is 5.3% on 
average of the market value of the firm. Warner’s work is based on a narrow definition of 
bankruptcy costs (it only included direct costs of bankruptcy) and a very small and 
specialized sample. Later work by Altman (1984) provided additional evidence. He 
introduced for the first time a proxy methodology to calculate the indirect cost of 
bankruptcy. He examined 18 US firms (of retailers and industrial firms) which went 
bankrupt between 1970 and 1978. The average bankruptcy cost (of firm value), direct cost 
plus indirect bankruptcy cost, ranged from 11% to 17% up to three years before bankruptcy 
petition. Even though, percentages of bankruptcy costs are relatively small and reasonable 
to use according to these two classic papers, they are considerably too high for a financial 
institution. Thus, I do not apply these numbers directly to my study which is conducted on 
banking industry (issuer of covered warrants). Kareken & Wallace (1978) study of the 
banking industry indicates a lower bankruptcy cost. They analyze various banking industry 
equilibrium and assume that the bankruptcy is costly (reorganization cost is unavoidable) 
and report between zero and one percent as a bankruptcy value. I use Kareken & Wallace’s 
range of bankruptcy cost and then divide the study into three cases of 0%, 0.5%, and 1% of 
firm/bank value. In addition, it may be worth mention about the recent bankrutcy case of 
one of Wall Street's investment giants, Lehman Brothers. The investment bank filed for 
bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008 after tremendous losses in the mortgage 
market, a loss of investor confidence and its inability to find a buyer (Times, 2008). Instead 
of trying to intervene or bail-out Lehman Brothers, the US government allowed the bank to 
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collapse (Reuters, 2008). The bank’s demise creates huge effects throughout the financial 
system. A crisis of confidence exacerbated because of the uncertainty surrounding 
transactions which it has had with other banks and hedge funds. Some activities of the bank 
are simply being shut down and others sold off at much lower values than previously. The 
tighter in credit market was a direct consequence. This is forcing governments around the 
world to take immediate actions to try to clam panicked markets. Therefore, some might 
argue that due to Lehman’s bankruptcy, the costs associated are possibly far beyond zero 
and one percent of bank value. However, in the absence of reliable figures of the 
bankruptcy cost, this is the major weakness point in the estimation of my study here.   
 
6.5 Methodology 
6.5.1 Brief development of covered warrants model 
 
 The Black-Scholes (1973) pricing model is the standard benchmark for analysts 
valuing options or synthetic warrants. According to McHattie (2005), the model is adopted 
for UK covered warrant. Therefore, this study employs the model to calculate the covered 
warrant price. The approach here is to regard the Black-Scholes results as a benchmark and 
to use them to gauge whether market prices are overvalued or undervalued. Further 
investigation is required to test whether the credit risk of the issuer has a significant effect 
on the warrant price. Klein’s (1996) Vulnerable option pricing model is the most applicable 
theory to incorporate the credit risk into the warrant price calculation. This study tries to 
observe the change in price of the warrant before and after an obvious change in credit risk 
via the model modified by Klein. However, due to the difficulties in evaluating the 
parameters required by the model as well as its limited impact (Chen (2003)),  the estimates 
generated by the model may not be too reliable.  
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6.5.2 The pricing model for Vulnerable covered warrants 
 
 The generalized pricing model for Vulnerable options (Klein (1996)) is applied for 
the pricing of  UK covered warrants in this study. The asset value (V) of the warrant issuer 
includes the current market value of all assets of the issuer as well as the marked to market 
value of all derivative and other contracts. The assumption is that both V and the 
underlying stock price (S) of the covered warrant follow geometric Brownian motion with 
instantaneous volatility Vσ  and Sσ  . The appropriate risk neutral processes for V and S can 
be shown below using the risk neutrality approach of Cox & Ross (1976) and Harrison & 
Pliska (1981) for the purpose of pricing derivative securities dependent on V and S.  
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where r  denotes the risk free rate, w  and z  follow standard Wiener processes. These 
processes imply that TSln  and TVln  are normally distributed with mean of 
( )( )tTr S −− 22σ  and ( )( )tTr V −− 22σ , and standard deviation of  ( )
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tTS −σ  and 
( ) 21tTV −σ , respectively. tT −  is the time to maturity of the warrant. In addition, the 
joint distribution of  TSln  and TVln  are bivariate lognormally distributed as: 
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where 2n  is the probability density function of standard bivariate normal distribution. ρ  is 
the correlation coefficient between TSln  and TVln .  
 
The Vulnerable call covered warrant value (W) is the present value of the 
expectation of the value of the cash flow from a non-Vulnerable covered warrant times the 
value of a claim on the risky issuer at maturity. At maturity date, a default loss occurs 
(issuer is bankrupted) if  TV  is smaller than 
*D . Due to the possibility of a counterparty 
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continuing in operation even during the bankruptcy stage, *D can be smaller thanD . The 
proportion of ( ) DVTα−1  of nominal claim is paid out by the issuer in the event of a 
bankruptcy, where α  is the deadweight costs associated with bankruptcy expressed as a 
percentage of the asset value of the issuer.70 This means warrant holders cannot get full 
claims from the issuer at expiration date if the issuer is bankrupt. Under these conditions, 
W can be written as: 
              
( ) ])]|)1([]|1)([0,[max( ** DVDVDVKSEeW TTTT
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where E  is the risk neutral expectation over TS  and TV . K is the exercise price.  
It should be noted that under this equation (4), if there is no credit risk ( *D equal zero), the 
equation immediately simplifies to the standard expression for a non-Vulnerable warrant 
model (The Black-Scholes model). 
  
 Equation (4) can be restated and expressed as the following pricing formula for the 
value of a Vulnerable European call warrant: 
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where 2N = the bivariate (standard) normal cumulative distribution function 
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70 The deadweight costs include the direct cost of the bankruptcy or reorganization process plus/minus the 
effects of distress on the business operations of the firm (issuer). In other words, the deadweight costs 
represent both direct and indirect costs of the bankruptcy. 
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 Equation (5) shows that a Vulnerable warrant value can be influenced by many 
factors such as the exercise price ( K ), the warrant time to maturity ( tT − ), the issuer 
outstanding debt value at maturity (D ), the underlying stock price ( S ), the underlying 
stock return volatility (
Sσ ), the asset value (V ), the asset volatility( Vσ ), the correlation 
coefficient between the underlying stock and the issuer asset value ( ρ ) and the risk free 
rate ( r ). 
  
 This study applies this equation (5) to find the value of UK Vulnerable covered 
warrants. 
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6.6 Empirical Results 
6.6.1 Pricing using Vulnerable warrant model 
 
This study applies Klein’s (1996) Vulnerable option pricing model to price UK 
covered warrants because of the belief that default risk is an important factor. The results 
are presented in Table 6.1, average warrant price over each 103 warrant life. The 
Vulnerable warrants are separated into three cases where the bankruptcy costs are 0%, 
0.5%, and 1%.71 The outcomes are slightly differences across all three cases. This study 
then compares these Vulnerable warrant prices with the Black-Scholes prices and the 
market prices for each warrant over its life-time. Majority of the Vulnerable warrant prices 
are lower than both the Black-Scholes and market prices for all 103 warrants. However, the 
inclusion of the possibility of default for the issuer to the pricing model does not really 
make tremendous difference to the estimated Black-Scholes price. 
 
 
                                                 
71 Due to the recent financial crisis and the announcement of bankruptcy in September 2008 by Lehman 
Brothers investment bank, there is a possibility that the bankruptcy costs are higher than what we assume in 
our analysis here. Thus, Appendix 6.6 provides the Vulnerable warrant prices for 20% bankruptcy costs using 
the same sample set. As predicted, the Vulnerable warrant prices are lower than our assumption of lower 
bankruptcy costs. However, these outcomes are still not much difference across all cases. 
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price, Black-Scholes Price, and Market Value 
(on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-time)    
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock 
Trading 
Days α = 0% α = 0.5% α = 1% Black-Scholes model Market 
98748T 3I GP.PLC.  256 2.13 2.12 2.11 2.13 3.39 
1859J9 3I GROUP PLC  132 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.46 2.85 
1720FT ANGLO AMER.  192 36.21 34.34 34.31 36.21 33.26 
97092F ANGLO AMER.  251 28.86 27.96 27.92 28.86 21.16 
1842CP ANGLO AMER.  139 16.69 16.66 16.63 16.69 18.64 
1842CT ANTOFAGASTA  139 59.19 59.13 59.06 59.19 68.26 
1651RX ANTOFAGASTA  220 103.82 103.73 103.65 103.82 116.49 
97092H ANTOFAGASTA  251 149.55 149.10 149.03 149.55 162.51 
1794RR ANTOFAGOSTA  157 38.71 38.65 38.58 38.71 48.94 
98748X ARM HDGS.  256 6.83 6.82 6.80 6.83 9.15 
1859DP ARM HOLDINGS  132 2.44 2.44 2.43 2.44 2.31 
1651R2 AZEN.  220 7.56 7.54 7.52 7.56 11.36 
1842CV AZEN.  139 6.42 6.40 6.38 6.42 9.61 
1859DR AVIVA  132 2.49 2.48 2.48 2.49 2.44 
1651R1 AVIVA  220 3.50 3.49 3.49 3.50 3.87 
98749E AVIVA  256 1.53 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.46 
98749H BAE  256 29.20 29.14 29.09 29.20 35.65 
1859DV BAE SYSTEMS  132 8.45 8.42 8.39 8.45 16.89 
1807ND BARCLAYS  154 29.18 29.14 29.10 29.18 24.84 
1807NE BARCLAYS  154 19.79 19.75 19.71 19.79 16.79 
1720FV BARCLAYS  192 23.65 23.61 23.56 23.65 16.04 
1720FW BARCLAYS  192 12.52 12.48 12.45 12.52 7.22 
1842JH BG.GP.  139 14.67 13.77 13.76 14.67 15.85 
1842JJ BG.GP.  139 8.93 8.06 8.05 8.93 10.17 
1720F7 BHP BILLITON  192 16.72 15.69 15.67 16.72 16.98 
1720F8 BHP BILLITON  192 10.25 10.10 10.09 10.25 10.09 
97092J BHP BILLITON  251 29.64 28.85 28.83 29.64 29.87 
97092K BP PLC.  251 34.02 33.95 33.88 34.02 40.66 
97092L BP PLC.  251 8.72 8.68 8.63 8.72 12.98 
98751T BRIT.EN.  256 6.13 5.86 5.85 6.13 6.69 
1859D1 BRITISH ENERGY 132 11.54 11.01 11.01 11.54 11.62 
1842JK BRIT.LAND  139 5.21 5.20 5.19 5.21 5.46 
1842JL BRIT.LAND  139 3.17 3.17 3.16 3.17 3.22 
1651R9 BRIT.LAND  220 2.81 2.80 2.79 2.81 3.64 
1859D9 BRITISH SKY  132 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.82 
98751V BSB.  256 1.81 1.81 1.80 1.81 2.92 
1842JT BT GROUP  139 3.83 3.82 3.80 3.83 8.22 
1842JU BT GROUP  139 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.78 3.14 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Table 6.1(con’t): Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price, Black-Scholes Price, and Market 
Value (on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-time)    
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of underlying 
stock 
Trading 
Days α = 0% α = 0.5% α = 1% 
Black-Scholes 
model Market 
1859F6 CABLE & WIRELESS  132 2.30 2.29 2.29 2.30 5.42 
98769J CBW PLC.  255 4.11 4.10 4.08 4.11 7.07 
98769K PUT-CBW PLC.  255 14.38 14.36 14.35 14.38 23.83 
1859FU CENTRICA  132 3.42 3.41 3.40 3.42 6.01 
98769L CENTRICA  255 4.78 4.76 4.73 4.78 12.20 
1859JN DIAGEO PLC.  132 2.92 2.91 2.90 2.92 5.21 
98769N DIAGEO PLC.  255 1.92 1.91 1.90 1.92 3.41 
98769Q EXPERIAN GP.  255 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 2.02 
1859JQ EXPERIAN GROUP  132 1.66 1.66 1.65 1.66 2.31 
1859J2 HAMMERSON PLC.  132 4.59 4.58 4.57 4.59 5.11 
98769T HAMMERSON PLC.  255 1.88 1.87 1.86 1.88 4.55 
1859JW HBOS PLC  132 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.04 
98769W HBOS PLC.  255 1.64 1.63 1.63 1.64 1.93 
97108W HSBC HDG.  274 1.86 1.85 1.84 1.86 2.71 
97108X HSBC HDG.  274 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.63 
1842TH HSBC HDG.  138 2.36 2.35 2.34 2.36 3.02 
1842TJ HSBC HDG.  138 6.51 6.08 6.08 6.51 7.00 
98770E INVESCO PLC.  255 5.70 5.69 5.68 5.70 7.83 
1840PT LAND SECURITIES  140 8.17 8.16 8.14 8.17 11.29 
1840PU LAND SECURITIES  140 5.47 5.45 5.44 5.47 8.55 
1840PV LAND SECURITIES  140 3.61 3.60 3.59 3.61 6.40 
1859KD LEGAL & GENERAL  132 4.52 4.51 4.50 4.52 6.58 
98902F LGL.& GEN.  251 3.07 3.05 3.04 3.07 2.77 
97109C LLOYDS  274 15.70 15.65 15.59 15.70 20.71 
97109D LLOYDS  274 4.15 4.12 4.09 4.15 9.26 
1840PP LLOYDS TSB GROUP 140 19.29 19.26 19.22 19.29 19.12 
1840PQ LLOYDS TSB GROUP 140 10.54 10.51 10.48 10.54 10.77 
97109E MAN GROUP  274 47.36 45.07 45.00 47.36 57.22 
1842TL M&S.  138 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 1.04 
1842TN M&S.  138 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.57 
1655VU M&S.  219 2.26 2.25 2.25 2.26 2.87 
1863KU PERSIMMON  131 3.01 3.01 3.00 3.01 2.60 
98902N PERSIMMON  251 2.93 2.92 2.91 2.93 3.80 
1842TP PRUDENTIAL  121 4.07 4.07 4.06 4.07 4.36 
1842TQ PRUDENTIAL  121 1.77 1.76 1.76 1.77 2.05 
97107E RIO TINTO  274 143.18 140.92 140.88 143.18 141.08 
97107F RIO TINTO  274 130.18 127.92 127.87 130.18 127.69 
1859KV ROLLS ROYCE  132 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 1.27 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Table 6.1(con’t): Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price, Black-Scholes Price, and Market 
Value (on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-time) 
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying 
stock 
Trading 
Days α = 0% α = 0.5% α = 1% Black-Scholes model Market 
98902U ROLLS ROYCE  251 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.56 
1860EV RSA IN.GP.PLC. 132 3.11 3.10 3.09 3.11 4.49 
98902D RSA IN.GP.PLC. 251 4.31 4.29 4.28 4.31 6.10 
1720HL RBOS.  192 7.71 7.69 7.67 7.71 12.74 
1720HM RBOS.  192 4.79 4.77 4.75 4.79 7.96 
97107C RBOS.  274 3.09 3.07 3.04 3.09 10.97 
97109H ROYAL DUTCH  276 7.34 7.32 7.29 7.34 8.74 
97109J ROYAL DUTCH  276 3.66 3.64 3.62 3.66 4.74 
1860EX SAINSBURY  132 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.78 
98901W SAINSBURY  251 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.53 
1860F0 SCOT.& STHN.  132 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.43 3.56 
98901L SCOT.& STHN.  251 4.78 4.77 4.75 4.78 9.93 
98901P SCOT.& NEWC. 251 6.88 6.13 6.13 6.88 9.03 
1844W2 STD.CHT.  138 6.25 6.24 6.22 6.25 8.94 
1844W4 STD.CHT.  138 3.16 3.15 3.14 3.16 5.31 
98817H STD.LF.  251 4.63 4.61 4.59 4.63 8.07 
1840PW TESCO PLC  140 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76 1.29 
1860F3 UTD.UTILS.  132 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.20 2.48 
98817C UTD.UTILS.  251 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 2.58 
1720HP VODAFONE  192 6.49 6.47 6.46 6.49 7.13 
97107P VODAFONE  121 8.27 8.25 8.24 8.27 9.55 
1844W6 VODAFONE  138 2.67 2.66 2.65 2.67 4.31 
1844W7 VODAFONE  138 5.36 5.35 5.33 5.36 7.39 
1860F5 XSTRATA  132 31.22 27.96 27.93 31.22 43.38 
98817E XSTRATA  251 49.67 47.93 47.89 49.67 52.99 
1860F8 YELL  132 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.94 
98818H YELL  250 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.82 2.87 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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 In addition, we divide each warrant life-time into in-the-money, at-the-money, and 
out-of-the-money. The further examination is conducted to see the difference between 
Vulnerable warrant value (for the case α = 1%) and market value. Appendix 6.7 presents 
these results for the whole 103 call covered warrants. In total of 103 samples, 65 samples 
are always out-of-the-money during their life-time, 17 samples are out-of-the-money at 
most of the time, and the remaining 21 samples are either in-the-money or out-of-the-
money for at least twenty days. The 12 out of these 21 samples show that the mean 
difference between the vulnerable warrant value and the market value is larger when the 
warrant is in-the-money than out-of-the-money (Table 6.2). For example, 1842TJ (SCGN. 
HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08) warrant sample shows the mean difference of in-
the-money days is 49.5% in comparison to 3% of out-of-the-money days and on average 
there is 11.7% difference in mean for in-the-money versus 5.3% for out-of-the-money 
warrants. The negative signs in Table 6.2 mean that Vulnerable warrant price is less than 
market price. These outcomes are consistence with the claim that investors face higher 
default when the warrant is in-the-money than out-of-the-money. In other words, the 
Vulnerable warrant price is generally much lower than the market warrant price under in-
the-money in comparison to out-of-the-money status. This gap becomes narrow when 
warrant is out-of-the-money but never actually becomes zero because as long as out-of-the-
money warrant has not yet reached maturity, there is always a chance that it may get back 
to in-the-money status again. Therefore, default risk has to be taken into account to arrive at 
the true warrant value in any circumstances no matter in or out-of-the-money.  
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Table 6.2: Mean of Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant (α=1%) and Market Value 
(The case of In/Out-of-the-money for 12 call covered warrants) 
 
Mean of price difference 
Warrant DS Code Name of underlying stock in-the-money out-of-the-money 
97092H ANTOFAGASTA  -0.081 -0.043
1842JH BG.GP.  -0.108 -0.047
1842JJ BG.GP.  -0.226 -0.113
1720F7 BHP BILLITON  -0.073 -0.019
97092J BHP BILLITON  -0.024 -0.007
1859D1 BRITISH ENERGY  -0.034 -0.020
1842TJ HSBC HDG.  -0.495 -0.030
97109E MAN GROUP  -0.129 -0.127
97107E RIO TINTO  0.005 0.000
97107F RIO TINTO  0.012 0.003
1860F5 XSTRATA  -0.204 -0.203
98817E XSTRATA  -0.050 -0.032
Average -0.117 -0.053
Notes:  α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
          The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable  
             warrant price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that    
             Vulnerable warrant price is less than market price. 
          The high percentages of price differences in some cases presented in the table are possible due to the        
             following supporting evidences. Firstly, the absolute term between both prices may not be very   
             different but the percentage term may. For example, warrant 1842TJ on 11/06/2008 has the vulnerable  
             warrant price of 2.01 and the market price of 3.02, etc. Secondly, Black (1975) states that model prices  
             tend to differ from market prices in certain systematic ways. This is especially the case for options that   
             are either deep in or deep out of the money. In addition, the biases are usually based on the strong  
             assumption that the underlying stock follows a stationary geometric Brownian motion which implies the    
             stock price is lognormal distributed and the variance is constant.  
 
Furthermore, we illustrate the daily Vulnerable warrant prices over a warrant’s life-
time. Figure 6.2 shows the daily prices for SCGN. ARM HDGS. Covered WTS. 20/06/08 
over its 256 days to maturity. This represents the general pattern for price movement of 
most warrants. The price of the Vulnerable warrant varies over time because the underlying 
stock price varies and the debt and the asset value of the issuer varies. The price falls 
toward zero because it is presumably an out-of-the money warrant and when warrant is 
approaching the maturity.   
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Figure 6.2: Daily prices of Vulnerable warrant over its life-time (The case of SCGN. ARM 
HDGS. Covered WTS. 20/06/08: 98748X) 
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Note:  This warrant sample has 256 days to maturity.  
 
6.6.2 An event study around a period of financial distress 
 
A natural experiment is carried out to identify whether there are changes which 
might have affected covered warrant prices during a period of considerable financial 
distress (January 2008) in the financial market. The Black-Scholes (1973) pricing model is 
used as a benchmark. An event study methodology is used and the full discussion of this 
method can be found in Chapter 3. Event studies work by diversifying away risk but if all 
the events are at the same date, this is difficult. Brown & Warner (1980; 1985) refer to the 
simultaneous occurrence of events as event clustering. The event day behaviour is 
increasingly dependence when event clustering is involved. Even though this could lead to 
a lower power of the tests and too frequently rejected of the null hypothesis, their analyses 
suggest that the methodologies which incorporate information about the market’s realised 
return still perform well in comparison with others complicated event study methodologies. 
Moreover, later analysis here employed only the market model is because Brown & Warner 
(1980) show evidence that the market model perform substantially better even than another 
simple model of mean-adjusted return.  
 171 
In this study, the 31-day event window is defined as 15 trading days before and 15 
trading days after the event day (the 2008 financial distress, 24 January 2008) plus the 
event day itself. Day 0 stands for the event day. The daily price differences between the 
Black-Scholes price and market value of 154 call covered warrants are presented in Table 
6.3.  
 
 Table 6.3 shows that the daily market prices of covered warrants are consistently 
higher than the Black-Scholes prices on average before and on the event day. The Black-
Scholes price is around 23.77% on average (statistically significant abnormal return at 1% 
level) lower than the market price over the 15 days before the event day. It appears that the 
market prices of covered warrants are overpriced during the January 2008 period of 
financial distress (Black-Scholes model as a benchmark).72 This is similar to the finding for 
covered warrants under normal market condition in Taiwan (Chen (2003)). From the day 
following the event onward, both market prices and Black-Scholes prices of covered 
warrants decline. The main reason to explain this phenomenon is an increase in the default 
risk as a consequence of the financial distress. The market prices decline at a faster rate in 
comparison with the Black-Scholes prices which leads to the Black-Scholes prices 
becoming larger than the market prices. There are positive abnormal returns on average 
after the event day. The Black-Scholes price is approximately 5.02% on average (not 
statistically significant) higher than the market price for the 15-day periods after the event 
day.73 This percentage value is rather small as well as statistically insignificant.   
 
 
                                                 
72 The method of analyzing the relative difference between the market price and the model price in order to 
identify the mispricing of the derivatives is commonly used (See Lung & Marshall (2002) for an example).  
Even though it is very common to present the results in percentage differences like in Table 6.3, this study 
also provides another two alternative ways of presenting the results in Appendix 6.8, the differences presented 
in pence and Appendix 6.9, the differences presented base on the underlying security prices.  
73 The average cumulative abnormal returns provide all 1% significance level over the whole 31-day event 
window. 
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Table 6.3: Price Difference between Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 154 call covered 
warrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Note: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008.
      
 
                      a 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is calculated as:  
                    (Black-Scholes price - market value)/market value. 
                  
                 The high percentages of price differences in some cases presented in the table are possible due                   
                     to the following supporting evidences. Firstly, the absolute term between both prices may not be   
                     very different but the percentage term may. For example, the maximum value in day 1 of 6.422   
                     comes from the percentage difference between Black-Scholes price (pence) of 2.1524 and       
                     market value (pence) of 0.29, the minimum value in day -3 of -0.9931 comes from the percentage       
                     difference between Black-Scholes price (pence) of 0.0024 and market value (pence) of 0.35, etc.  
                     Secondly, Black (1975) states that model prices tend to differ from market prices in certain   
                     systematic ways. This is especially the case for options that are either deep in or deep out of the  
                     money. In addition, the biases are usually based on the strong assumption that the underlying  
                     stock follows a stationary geometric Brownian motion which implies the stock price is lognormal  
                     distributed and the variance is constant.    
  Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
a
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 1.5227 -0.8623 -0.2398 0.3297 
-14 1.4111 -0.8819 -0.2733 0.3390 
-13 1.6346 -0.8885 -0.2505 0.3656 
-12 1.4596 -0.9163 -0.2494 0.3523 
-11 1.6421 -0.9417 -0.2625 0.3668 
-10 1.7033 -0.9434 -0.2317 0.3969 
-9 1.8227 -0.9492 -0.2386 0.4151 
-8 2.1988 -0.9387 -0.2253 0.4252 
-7 2.4651 -0.9777 -0.2492 0.4439 
-6 2.1541 -0.9711 -0.2383 0.4462 
-5 2.5150 -0.9611 -0.2026 0.4681 
-4 2.7665 -0.9626 -0.2164 0.4751 
-3 1.5825 -0.9931 -0.3623 0.4315 
-2 2.6570 -0.9505 -0.1621 0.5579 
-1 2.9819 -0.8893 -0.1630 0.5467 
0 4.5732 -0.8315 -0.0114 0.7115 
1 6.4220 -0.8365 0.0945 0.8935 
2 5.7865 -0.8558 0.0824 0.8207 
3 5.0645 -0.8099 0.0866 0.8153 
4 4.6650 -0.8323 0.0652 0.7528 
5 4.5815 -0.8515 0.0677 0.7364 
6 5.2050 -0.8033 0.0734 0.7454 
7 4.4704 -0.7683 0.0500 0.7314 
8 3.2001 -0.8469 -0.0109 0.6038 
9 3.3605 -0.8757 0.0381 0.6755 
10 4.0716 -0.9341 0.0098 0.7266 
11 4.1667 -0.9226 0.0558 0.7384 
12 4.5292 -0.9624 0.0272 0.7337 
13 3.5819 -0.9015 0.0415 0.6485 
14 3.2145 -0.8498 0.0556 0.6703 
15 3.2591 -0.8772 0.0166 0.6587 
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This study also compares the daily differences between Black-Scholes prices and 
market prices in money-term (pence) as a comparison to the previous results presented in 
percentage-term (Table 6.3). Figure 6.3 shows these two daily prices on average for the 154 
call covered warrants. The Black-Scholes warrant prices are generally lower than the 
warrant market prices during the whole 31-day period, with a maximum difference of 3.09 
pence or 23.98%.  The difference is gradually decreasing over times as can be seen in 
Figure 6.4, supporting the previous discussion that both market prices and Black-Scholes 
prices of covered warrants have declined after the event day. Hence, financial distress has 
an effect on covered warrant prices suggesting that the issuer’s credit risk should be taken 
into account when calculating the fair value of the covered warrant.   
 
Figure 6.3: Comparison of Black-Scholes Price and Market Value (on average for the case of 
154 call covered warrants) 
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Note: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008.
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Figure 6.4: Price difference between Black-Scholes Price and Market Value (on average for 
the case of 154 call covered warrants) 
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Note: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008.
      
 
 
Due to the faster decline rate of market prices compared with the Black-Scholes 
price immediately after the event day, the Black-Scholes price become slightly larger than 
the market price (see Table 6.3 where the mean percentage of the price difference turns 
positive after the event day). This suggests that Black-Scholes pricing model might no 
longer be an accurate approximation of the covered warrants values. In other words, the 
model inadequately captures major relevant factors that should be considered when pricing 
the warrant. Following Klein (1996), the model can be adjusted by adding in the default 
risk of the issuer in order to get the fair value of a covered warrant. We would expect to see 
Klein’s Vulnerable warrant prices to be lower than the Black-Scholes prices. Chen (2003)’s 
comparison of Klein’s model with Black-Scholes model for Taiwan covered warrants 
revealed little difference in price suggesting that the credit risk is very small. However, his 
analysis did not cover a major period of financial turmoil. 
 
For further analysis, we continue using the same data set of the 103 UK Vulnerable 
call covered warrant prices presented at the beginning of the empirical results section. The 
results under three bankruptcy costs (0%, 0.5%, and 1% of firm/bank value) are only 
slightly difference. This suggests that they are not so sensitive to different bankruptcy costs. 
Therefore, we present here only the results under the case of 1% bankruptcy cost as shown 
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in Table6.4 (The daily price differences between Vulnerable Warrant Price for the case α = 
1%, Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 103 call covered warrants).74 
 
Table 6.4 shows that the average daily price of each Vulnerable warrant is generally 
lower than Black-Scholes warrant price during the event period of financial distress. The 
maximum average difference between the Vulnerable warrant and Black-Scholes warrant 
prices is a negative 1.12% on day -3 and the minimum average difference between these 
two prices is a negative 0.63% on day 7. Therefore, there are price differences between the 
Vulnerable warrant and the Black-Scholes warrant during the period of financial distress. 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between Black-Scholes price and market price 
provided in Table 6.4 is similar to the results for the 154 call covered warrants which have 
already been discussed in the previous part of this study’s empirical results.75 Table 6.4 also 
compares Vulnerable warrant prices and market prices during the period of financial 
distress. Since the Vulnerable warrant prices are only slightly lower than the Black-Scholes 
prices, the results of comparison both of them with the market prices are pretty much 
similar. The average daily price of all of the Vulnerable warrants values are generally much 
lower than their market prices before the event of financial distress which suggests that UK 
covered warrants may possibly be overvalued. The largest and smallest average difference 
between the two prices during that period are 38.97% on day -3 and 18.06% on day -2 
respectively. After the event, both market prices and Vulnerable prices of covered warrants 
decline but the market prices decrease at a faster rate due to an increase in the credit risk as 
a consequence of the financial distress. The differences between the two prices are smaller 
in comparison to the case of the differences between Black-Scholes prices and market 
prices, therefore, Vulnerable model seems to provide a slight better valuation of covered 
warrants than the Black-Schloes model.    
 
The comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price, Black-Scholes Price and Market 
Value for the 103 call covered warrants is provided in Table 6.5. The average of Vulnerable 
warrant prices, under all three cases of α = 0%, 0.5%, and 1%, fall during a short period 
                                                 
74 The daily price differences between Vulnerable Warrant Price for the case α = 0%/ α = 0.5%, Black-
Scholes Price and Market Value of 103 call covered warrants are shown in Appendix 6.2/6.3. 
75 These are discussion of Table 6.3, Figure 6.3, and Figure 6.4. 
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around 6 days before the event day. The information of losses from the subprime crisis and 
trading problems indicate that default risk has increased and that the market becomes aware 
of this and reacts over a short period of time. However, there is a slight effect from the 
increase in default risk on the prices of UK covered warrants. Furthermore, both the 
average market price of warrant and the average Black-Scholes price of warrant show 
similar decreasing trend over a short period leading to the event day.   
 
Figure 6.5 shows consistent results with the expected relationship under the 
consideration of credit risk factor among the three prices (the Vulnerable warrant price, the 
Black-Scholes warrant price, and the market warrant price) which are the Vulnerable price 
should be the smallest following by Black-Scholes price and then the actual market price 
should present the highest value among all.  
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Table 6.4: Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant Price (for the case α = 1%), Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 103 call covered 
warrants 
  Vulnerable Warrant Price and Black-Scholes Price
a
 Vulnerable Warrant Price  and Market Value
b
 Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
c
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 -0.0004 -0.0296 -0.0064 0.0046 1.5043 -0.8643 -0.2334 0.3623 1.5227 -0.8623 -0.2292 0.3638
-14 -0.0005 -0.0328 -0.0074 0.0052 1.3911 -0.8838 -0.2736 0.3694 1.4111 -0.8819 -0.2690 0.3712
-13 -0.0006 -0.0319 -0.0074 0.0052 1.6117 -0.8905 -0.2474 0.4040 1.6346 -0.8885 -0.2426 0.4063
-12 -0.0005 -0.0323 -0.0074 0.0052 1.4381 -0.9180 -0.2513 0.3878 1.4596 -0.9163 -0.2466 0.3900
-11 -0.0006 -0.0329 -0.0081 0.0060 1.6170 -0.9434 -0.2694 0.4038 1.6421 -0.9417 -0.2646 0.4059
-10 -0.0006 -0.0364 -0.0079 0.0057 1.6770 -0.9448 -0.2423 0.4262 1.7033 -0.9434 -0.2372 0.4288
-9 -0.0006 -0.0378 -0.0081 0.0058 1.7965 -0.9505 -0.2506 0.4404 1.8227 -0.9492 -0.2455 0.4431
-8 -0.0005 -0.0398 -0.0079 0.0058 2.1717 -0.9401 -0.2343 0.4568 2.1988 -0.9387 -0.2292 0.4597
-7 -0.0006 -0.0482 -0.0090 0.0067 2.4337 -0.9788 -0.2651 0.4751 2.4651 -0.9777 -0.2597 0.4780
-6 -0.0007 -0.0432 -0.0090 0.0063 2.1258 -0.9723 -0.2559 0.4731 2.1541 -0.9711 -0.2504 0.4759
-5 -0.0009 -0.0407 -0.0088 0.0061 2.4836 -0.9627 -0.2134 0.5039 2.5150 -0.9611 -0.2075 0.5071
-4 -0.0007 -0.0407 -0.0090 0.0063 2.7292 -0.9641 -0.2265 0.5176 2.7665 -0.9626 -0.2208 0.5207
-3 -0.0010 -0.0525 -0.0112 0.0078 1.5528 -0.9935 -0.3897 0.4582 1.5825 -0.9931 -0.3847 0.4605
-2 -0.0009 -0.0359 -0.0088 0.0058 2.6240 -0.9522 -0.1806 0.6134 2.6570 -0.9505 -0.1745 0.6182
-1 -0.0010 -0.0298 -0.0088 0.0057 2.9502 -0.8926 -0.1915 0.5860 2.9819 -0.8893 -0.1856 0.5899
0 -0.0008 -0.0261 -0.0071 0.0045 4.5361 -0.8341 0.0056 0.8133 4.5732 -0.8315 0.0120 0.8191
1 -0.0007 -0.0263 -0.0067 0.0043 6.3747 -0.8389 0.1320 1.0389 6.4220 -0.8365 0.1390 1.0463
2 -0.0007 -0.0286 -0.0070 0.0044 5.7393 -0.8581 0.1032 0.9371 5.7865 -0.8558 0.1103 0.9439
3 -0.0007 -0.0273 -0.0066 0.0044 5.0237 -0.8127 0.1058 0.9384 5.0645 -0.8099 0.1126 0.9455
4 -0.0006 -0.0284 -0.0068 0.0044 4.6241 -0.8371 0.0753 0.8569 4.6650 -0.8323 0.0821 0.8634
5 -0.0005 -0.0290 -0.0067 0.0044 4.5394 -0.8558 0.0801 0.8355 4.5815 -0.8515 0.0869 0.8419
6 -0.0003 -0.0278 -0.0064 0.0043 5.1561 -0.8088 0.0929 0.8530 5.2050 -0.8033 0.0997 0.8599
7 -0.0003 -0.0261 -0.0063 0.0042 4.4288 -0.7722 0.0656 0.8372 4.4704 -0.7683 0.0721 0.8440
8 -0.0003 -0.0287 -0.0074 0.0047 3.1598 -0.8503 -0.0193 0.6582 3.2001 -0.8469 -0.0124 0.6638
9 -0.0004 -0.0295 -0.0071 0.0045 3.3189 -0.8794 0.0402 0.7438 3.3605 -0.8757 0.0472 0.7498
10 -0.0004 -0.0333 -0.0081 0.0055 4.0187 -0.9355 0.0032 0.7959 4.0716 -0.9341 0.0105 0.8025
11 -0.0004 -0.0323 -0.0077 0.0051 4.1120 -0.9251 0.0489 0.8225 4.1667 -0.9226 0.0564 0.8294
12 -0.0004 -0.0363 -0.0082 0.0055 4.4642 -0.9638 0.0066 0.8082 4.5292 -0.9624 0.0142 0.8157
13 -0.0003 -0.0306 -0.0073 0.0049 3.5350 -0.9045 0.0276 0.7080 3.5819 -0.9015 0.0347 0.7138
14 -0.0003 -0.0272 -0.0073 0.0047 3.1715 -0.8539 0.0423 0.7294 3.2145 -0.8498 0.0495 0.7357
15 -0.0003 -0.0287 -0.0076 0.0050 3.2104 -0.8807 -0.0075 0.7036 3.2591 -0.8772 -0.0004 0.7103
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
a 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and Black-Scholes price is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - Black-Scholes price)/Black-Scholes price. 
b 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - market value)/market value. 
c 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is calculated as: (Black-Scholes price - market value)/market value. 
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Table 6.5: Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price, Black-Scholes Price and Market Value 
(on average for the case of 103 call covered warrants) 
Average Vulnerable Warrants 
Prices (pences) 
Day α = 0% α = 0.5% α = 1% 
 Average Black-Scholes Prices 
(pences) 
 Average Market Prices 
(pences) 
-15 17.45 17.43 17.40 17.45 20.17
-14 14.77 14.75 14.73 14.77 17.51
-13 13.74 13.71 13.69 13.74 16.27
-12 14.25 14.23 14.21 14.25 16.78
-11 12.89 12.87 12.85 12.89 15.36
-10 12.44 12.42 12.40 12.44 14.86
-9 12.68 12.66 12.64 12.68 15.15
-8 13.32 13.30 13.28 13.32 15.71
-7 11.14 11.12 11.10 11.14 13.51
-6 9.55 9.53 9.51 9.55 11.75
-5 9.12 9.10 9.08 9.12 11.02
-4 9.41 9.39 9.37 9.41 11.29
-3 6.65 6.64 6.63 6.65 9.52
-2 8.72 8.70 8.69 8.72 10.76
-1 8.38 8.36 8.35 8.38 10.30
0 11.51 11.49 11.47 11.51 12.25
1 12.39 12.37 12.35 12.39 13.14
2 11.24 11.22 11.20 11.24 12.12
3 12.98 12.96 12.94 12.98 13.54
4 12.75 12.73 12.71 12.75 13.47
5 13.12 13.10 13.08 13.12 13.62
6 15.57 15.55 15.53 15.57 16.13
7 15.81 15.79 15.77 15.81 16.66
8 13.13 13.11 13.09 13.13 14.24
9 13.14 13.12 13.10 13.14 14.38
10 11.99 11.97 11.96 11.99 13.30
11 13.33 13.31 13.29 13.33 14.16
12 12.58 12.56 12.55 12.58 13.71
13 14.76 14.74 14.72 14.76 15.75
14 14.66 14.64 14.62 14.66 15.72
15 14.63 14.61 14.59 14.63 16.03
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Figure 6.5: Price difference between Vulnerable warrant price for the case α = 1%, Black-
Scholes Price and Market Value (on average for the case of 103 call covered warrants)
76
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   Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
                              α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
According to the previous discussed results, there is a slight difference in the price 
of UK covered warrants if we compare the Vulnerable model with Black-Scholes model. 
The small difference in price suggests that the credit risk is small or some error in estimated 
parameters of the model. Thus, this study examines the problem by taking an additional 
different perspective. It takes an event where credit risk is known to have changed. It then 
asks whether there is an observed change in price of the warrant before versus after the 
event, significant changes are evidenced in market prices as follows.  
 
In order to analyse the effect of the financial distress on the prices of covered 
warrants, the market prices are examined using an event study methodology via the market 
model. By taken into account the beta of the covered warrant, the abnormal returns and the 
                                                 
76 The similar results can be seen under Appendix 6.4 and 6.5 for the case that Vulnerable warrant prices are 
calculate based on  α = 0% and α = 0.5% respectively. 
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cumulative abnormal returns are calculated and presented in Table 6.6.77 The calculations 
are based on 154 call covered warrants. Day 0 represent the event day (financial distress) 
where the default risks were largely indicated due to the subprime crisis and the SG 
fraudulent trader. It can be seen that there are generally negative returns around the event 
period. Significant negative abnormal returns are reported from day -1 to day 6. Moreover, 
a negative 9.01% abnormal return is presented at 1% significance level on the event day 
shows a decrease in price of the covered warrants as a consequence from the financial 
distress. However, the effect is only temporary existed around the event day and does not 
go beyond a week after the event. Figure 6.6 plots the graph of the cumulative abnormal 
returns of the market prices during the period of the financial distress. Even if there might 
be various other explanations, the financial distress from the crisis as well as the issuer’s 
credit risk is the most possible reason to explain the decreasing trend around the event 
period of the study. Moreover, this credit risk explanation is consistent with the earlier 
finding of the section 6.6.2 that after the period of the financial distress the market price 
falls towards the Black-Scholes price which means the warrants became less overvalued, 
suggesting that the credit risk factor becomes important factor in deriving a fair value of the 
warrant.  Therefore, the results of significant negative abnormal returns as well as 
cumulative abnormal returns of the covered warrant market prices around the event period 
could possibly be suggested as a consequence of the default risks involved with the covered 
warrants traded in the UK market.  
                                                 
77 To estimate the beta for a covered warrant for the period from t=-16 to t=-75 (60 days preceding the event 
window) via regression analysis use: 
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  where itR  measures the rate of return of the covered 
warrant i in period t  , 
mtR  measures the rate of return of the market portfolio in period t , imσ  is the 
covariance between the rates of return of the covered warrant and the market portfolio, and 
2
mσ is the variance 
of the rate of return of the market portfolio. The market portfolio is represented by FTSE100 in this study. 
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Table 6.6: Abnormal returns (AR) and Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of market prices 
around the financial distress event for 154 call covered warrants via the market model 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The sample period extends form January 2007 until December 2008. 
            Abnormal return (under the market-adjusted model) calculation is ititit RRAR
ˆ−=    
            where ˆit i i mtR Rα β= +  
 
            ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 
Market Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-15 -0.0213 -1.6354 -0.0213 -1.6354 
-14 -0.0247 -1.5337 -0.0459 -1.1474 
-13 -0.0283 -1.5837 -0.0742 -1.5605 
-12 -0.0102 -1.128 -0.0844 -1.422 
-11 -0.0301 -1.6173 -0.1145 -1.5207 
-10 -0.0057 -0.7092 -0.1202 -1.5991 
-9 0.0115 1.055 -0.1087 -1.4388 
-8 0.0166 1.0336 -0.0921 -1.2352 
-7 -0.0115 -1.1174 -0.1035 -1.5585 
-6 -0.0124 -1.1846 -0.116 -1.9591* 
-5 0.0116 1.3058 -0.1044 -1.5696 
-4 -0.0104 -1.0996 -0.1147 -1.5107 
-3 0.0128 0.6331 -0.102 -1.8261* 
-2 0.0267 1.4268 -0.0753 -1.3783 
-1 -0.0895 -4.3053*** -0.1648 -2.7940*** 
0 -0.0901 -5.3286*** -0.2549 -4.7437*** 
1 -0.0622 -4.4349*** -0.3171 -5.2158*** 
2 -0.0233 -2.5969*** -0.3403 -4.8684*** 
3 -0.0185 -2.4104** -0.3588 -3.6069*** 
4 -0.0154 -1.8156* -0.3742 -2.3585** 
5 -0.0128 -1.7788* -0.3869 -4.8130*** 
6 -0.0258 -2.0549** -0.4127 -2.4133** 
7 0.0218 1.4552 -0.3909 -1.3105 
8 -0.0274 -1.5889 -0.4183 -1.089 
9 0.015 1.522 -0.4033 -1.3268 
10 -0.0175 -1.2495 -0.4208 -1.5386 
11 -0.0182 -1.3799 -0.439 -1.3982 
12 -0.0124 -1.353 -0.4514 -1.3503 
13 0.0171 1.557 -0.4342 -1.3857 
14 0.0158 1.6043 -0.4185 -1.421 
15 -0.0124 -1.215 -0.4309 -1.5485 
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Figure 6.6: Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of market price around the financial distress 
event for 154 call covered warrants via the market model 
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Note: The sample period extends form January 2007 until December 2008. 
 
 
6.7 Conclusions and discussion 
 
Chapter 6 presents an empirical analysis of the UK call covered warrant pricing. 
Most of the previous studies emphasize on option pricing. There are hardly any empirical 
work on covered warrant pricing and none within the UK market so far. I apply Klein’s 
(1996) Vulnerable option model to study the UK covered warrant prices. After taken the 
credit risk of the warrant issuer into consideration for the pricing model, the Vulnerable 
warrant value is generally lower than both the Black-Scholes price and warrant market 
price during the warrant’s lifetime. This may suggest the overvalued of warrant prices in 
the UK. Moreover, there are only small differences in Vulnerable warrants value among 
three cases of bankruptcy costs (0%, 0.5% and 1%) which proved the robustness of the 
results. In other words, the use of different bankruptcy costs does not very much alter the 
results of the study. The moneyness of warrants is the next focus of this study. We show 
that mean difference between the Vulnerable warrant price and market price is larger when 
warrant is in-the-money rather than out-of-the-money and far from maturity rather than 
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nearer to maturity. This is because investor faces higher rate of default under in-the-money 
case in comparison to out-of-the-money case. There are evidences that the Vulnerable 
warrant prices are normally associate with a high fluctuation until they reach the zero value 
at maturity.  
 
Furthermore, an event study has been employed to analyze effect of warrant prices 
around a period of financial distress. The warrants are shown to be overpriced during the 
financial distress under the assumption that the issuer’s credit risk should be considered to 
achieve fair value of the warrant pricing. These overpricing warrant results are consistent 
with Chen (2003) and Horst & Veld (2008) who find call warrants are overvalued in 
Taiwan and Dutch markets respectively. There seem to be a small difference between 
Vulnerable warrant and Black-Scholes prices which might be because of a small effect 
from the issuer’s credit risk or some error in parameters’ estimation for the Vulnerable 
model. However, the Vulnerable warrant price is reasonably lower than the market price. 
There is also an indication that the market becomes aware of the credit risk on a short-term 
basis. By taken into account the beta of the covered warrant, the report on significant 
negative abnormal returns surrounding and after the event day of financial distress for the 
covered warrant market prices provide some support of credit risk upon covered warrants 
traded in the UK market.  
 
In order to make an analysis of the covered warrants market in the UK becomes 
more complete, this Chapter 6 is an additional on the valuation study of the UK covered 
warrants to an interesting finding of the effects on price, volume and volatility of the 
underlying securities which were introduced in the previous Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 7 : Conclusion 
Covered warrant trading is now well established in the European markets and it has 
retained its popularity over time and has recently been introduced to the UK market (in 
2002). Its popularity has elevated since introduction and become a typical discussion issue 
in the financial markets among practitioners and regulators. The interaction between 
covered warrants and their underlying securities is one of the main concerns. Moreover, 
there has not yet been any clear or generally accepted pricing model introduced specifically 
for this financial instrument, but rather the fundamental options pricing Black-Scholes 
(1973) model has been adapted for current usage. The reason behind this adaptation is large 
similarities in characteristics between options and covered warrants, though it may be 
argued that various differences do exist. The empirical studies investigating the impacts of 
covered warrants trading on the underlying market have also been very limited, while the 
academic community has focused its research more on examining the effects of straight 
options trading. Therefore, there is still lively debate among all parties involved over the 
economic impact of covered warrants.  
 
This thesis attempts to bridge this gap by providing valuable empirical evidence of 
the impacts of UK covered warrants trading which have been introduced and expired 
during the period July 2004 – December 2006. This covers both call and put covered 
warrants. Furthermore, the study is divided into an examination of the announcement, 
listing, and expiration of the warrants. The impacts of the warrants underlying securities are 
categorized into price, volume and volatility effects. In addition, this thesis also attempts to 
redress another concern, namely, the issue of the most appropriate covered warrants pricing 
model. The empirical work is based on the recently traded UK covered warrants which 
have been introduced and expired over the period April 2007 to December 2008. Hence, 
this thesis provides answers to the hypotheses raised throughout chapters 4, 5 and 6 as 
outlined in the summary in this chapter.  
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7.1 Comparison of main findings  
 
7.1.1 Price and Volume effects 
 
In my investigation of the underlying price and volume effects from covered 
warrants trading, three general models as benchmark calculations of normal returns (Market 
model, Market-adjusted model, and mean-adjusted return model) are employed under the 
event study methodology. The findings suggest that both call and put covered warrants 
trading had a detrimental effect on the underlying stocks prices upon their introductions in 
the UK market. This is possibly due to the following reasons: the relaxation of short-sell 
constraints, movement of trading from stocks to warrants because of lower transaction costs 
and higher leverage, and the sentiment held by some market participants that the 
introduction of covered warrants acts as a destabilizing factor for the underlying stocks. 
This is supported by Kabir (1999), whose study shows a decline in stock prices once 
options were introduced in the Netherlands. Aitken & Segara (2005) report similar 
outcomes on Australian derivatives warrants and suggest that warrant issuers have the 
ability to time their warrant issues when there is a high interest in the underlying securities 
and when they expect to see a decline in the underlying stock prices. Moreover, there is 
more reliable and clearer evidence of the impact of the announcement date in comparison to 
the listing date. According to Draper, Mak & Tang (2001), this is probably because the 
information has here been released to the market for the first time.  
 
Further results on in-the-money call warrants expiration report a temporary decrease 
in the underlying stock price which indicates a fall in price a day before and on the delisting 
date, not persisting beyond the delisting date. A possible explanation is the early unwinding 
by the warrant holders and selling activities by other speculators as they expect stock prices 
to fall in the future, hoping to take this early advantage before the actual fall takes place. 
This outcome is consistent with Draper et al. (2001) and Chen & Wu (2001), who 
demonstrate a negative price effect before the derivative warrant expiration day and a 
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positive effect after expiration, but is inconsistent with Klemkosky (1978) and Officer & 
Trennepohl (1981). The put warrants show a similar decreasing stock price effect. 
However, there is no impact observed in the case of out-of-the-money call warrants.  
 
 My study shows no impact on the underlying stocks trading volume from the 
introduction and expiration of both call and put covered warrants in the UK market. There 
is no relationship between abnormal return patterns and abnormal trading volumes. 
However, this lack of  change in trading volume is consistent with other research such as 
those of Chamberlain, Cheung & Kwan (1993) and Draper et al. (2001).  
 
7.1.2 Volatility effects 
 
In investigating the impact of covered warrants trading on the stocks’ volatility, I 
use both parametric and non-parametric tests to confirm the robustness of the results. Given 
the ongoing controversies over the inconclusive volatility impact, this study helps to move 
this discussion along by supporting the negative side-effect that shows an increase in 
volatility of the underlying stock market in the UK. The significant increase in volatility 
following the introduction (announcement and listing events) of both call and put covered 
warrants is clearly reported. The evidence here is in line with the idea that stock exchanges 
generally allow the issuance of derivatives mostly on stocks which they expect to show an 
increase in volatility (Mayhew & Mihov (2000)). There have been various claims made by 
both market observers and policy makers that most of the stable stocks turn out to be more 
volatile as a consequence of the increased speculation in the derivatives by informed traders 
(Ma & Roa (1988)). Moreover, there is a profit motive of warrants issuers relating to their 
ability to time when there would be a change in volatility of stock movement in order to 
secure high premiums (Aitken & Segara (2005)). However, counter empirical arguments 
exist that covered warrants introduction produces no impact on the underlying stock return 
variance. This is supported by Draper et al. (2001), who also report no significant impact on 
the underlying stock return volatility after Hong Kong covered warrant introduction. The 
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early research in this area conducted mostly on options trading provides evidence of a 
decrease in volatility from the derivatives introductions.78  
 
On the other hand, this thesis analyzes the delisting event and indicates a significant 
decrease in the volatility of the underlying stocks for both call and put covered warrants.  
This research also extends the call warrant delisting analysis into in-the-money and out-of-
the-money cases. A significant decrease in stock variance after the delisting for the in-the-
money call warrants is also found. Even though a no-significance result for out-of-the-
money call warrants is presented, a decreasing trend in the underlying volatility after the 
delisting is still reported.  
 
7.1.3 Covered warrants valuation 
 
There are four issues which need to be understood as background to this part of the 
thesis: no guarantees are provided by the London Stock Exchange (LSE); no perfect 
hedging is made by warrants issuers due to market imperfections; the recent financial crisis 
stemmed from subprime defaults; and there was a recent case of trader fraud at Société 
Générale (SG). This thesis presents empirical evidence suggesting that the most appropriate 
way to price covered warrants is via Klein’s (1996) Vulnerable valuation model.79 The 
event study methodology based on the Market-adjusted model for normal returns 
calculation is also used in order to test whether we can observe a change in price of the 
warrants before and after the financial problem event where credit risk is known to have 
changed.  
 
 This thesis suggests that covered warrants have been overpriced in the UK due to 
the neglect of default risk; the evidence is provided inside the body of Chapter 6 in both 
percentage and money terms. These overpriced warrant outcomes are consistent with Chen 
(2003) and Horst & Veld (2008). The Vulnerable warrant price is lower than the Black-
Scholes price and the market covered warrant price. The robustness of the results is tested 
across various bankruptcy costs employed in the Vulnerable pricing model. Because of the 
                                                 
78 For detail discussion, please refer back to Chapter 5. 
79 Société Générale is the major issuer in the UK’s covered warrants market 
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higher default risk faced by investors associated with larger exercise potential for in-the-
money warrants, the Vulnerable warrant price under this in-the-money case is much less 
than the warrant market price, in contrast with the out-of-the-money case. Moreover, the 
possibility of some parameter estimation error of the Vulnerable warrant model may 
explain the small differences between Vulnerable warrant price and Black-Scholes warrant 
price. Furthermore, the significant negative abnormal returns of the covered warrant market 
prices, around and after the event day, suggest some supporting evidence of the default risk 
upon covered warrants trading within the UK. However, the effect can only be seen on a 
short-term basis.  
 
7.2 Limitations 
 
Besides the considerable time and effort in assembling a comprehensive dataset and 
in robust checks, there are several limitations in my data and my methodological issues 
associated with the study, which necessitate a careful interpretation of the empirical results.   
 
 In Chapter 4, I have to use the percentage change in daily trading volume of the 
underlying securities from the previous day trading volume of the underlying securities for 
the analysis instead of using the general relative volume which is the ratio of the number of 
securities traded over the number of securities outstanding. This is due to the infrequent 
(almost static) movement of the daily outstanding trading volume of securities and too large 
a difference between the number of securities traded and the number of securities 
outstanding which leads a very small value for the ratio. 
 
The dataset employed throughout Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for the analyses of put 
covered warrants are subject to the assumption that effects of put covered warrants on the 
underlying securities can be explained by the warrants which have both call and put 
features on the same underlying securities. The reason behind this is a lack of availability of 
securities with only put covered warrants, and without call warrants. Moreover, because of 
this small sample size, the separation between in-and-out-of-the-money put covered 
warrants is not possible. 
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In Chapter 6, the accuracy of the covered warrant price calculated by both the Black-
Scholes model and Vulnerable Warrant model depends greatly upon a volatility factor. 
There are various ways to estimate the volatility of the underlying security; a historical 
volatility is used in this study. Even though this appeared to give reasonable outcomes, a 
change in volatility estimating method could lead to significantly different results.   
 
7.3 Discussions and suggestions for further research 
 
This thesis serves the purpose of narrowing the gap in empirical research on the 
impact of the covered warrants announcement/listing/expiration on the underlying market 
which has been very limited so far, largely due to the lack of readily available data of 
covered warrants and characteristics of the existing covered warrants. Employing some 
available data as well as a unique set of hand-collected data, supplemented by public and 
private data from the main covered warrants issuer and the Datastream database, I am able 
to provide much supporting evidence in relation to the UK market to augment the current 
debates and controversies based on other international markets trading warrants effects. 
Furthermore, quantitative evidence on the best approximate model for covered warrants 
price estimation is also sparse. I contribute to this research area by providing UK empirical 
evidence to suggest the default risk add-on factor in order to arrive at a more appropriate 
covered warrants pricing model. The finding of this thesis would therefore be very useful 
for both practitioners and regulators and may also provide some guidance for other 
countries that are interested in launching this new financial innovation of covered warrants 
into their existing stock exchanges.   
 
The suggestions for future research concern four main analyses. Firstly, most 
empirical testing evidence can be extended by an expansion of the data set when it becomes 
available in the future. This aims to analyze the consistency of the results over time, 
especially when the market reaches the maturity stage. Comparisons between the initial 
markets and more mature markets may provide additional insights. Secondly, it would be 
useful to be able to detect the driving factors which lead to the continually increasing 
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popularity of the exchange traded covered warrants. Thirdly, examinations of the effects of 
other new innovative warrants types on the spot markets, such as those covering the 
movements in a basket of equities or an index and those based on commodities, may give a 
broader perspective on the issues involved in pricing and hedging with warrants in general. 
The evidence generated from these wider studies could be compared with the results from 
this thesis, which focused purely on equities based warrants (covered warrants), and this 
may allow us to make wider generalisations as to the affects that such instruments have on 
the market for the underlying security. Fourthly, parameter estimation of the warrant 
pricing model may be improved. In particular, the volatility estimation of the underlying 
stock return, instead of using historic volatility employed in this study as an estimate of 
future volatility, could instead utilize implied volatility. Additionally, existing studies (for 
example Klein (1996)), typically make simplified assumptions in estimating correlations 
between the asset price of issuer and those of the stock underlying the warrant. Further 
research could examine the correlation structure more carefully. For example, where asset 
prices do not follow joint elliptic distributions, the concept of correlation may be 
meaningless (Eydeland & Wolyniec (2003)). Moreover, where stochastic volatility exists, 
correlations may be measured with error. Future research could therefore examine the 
extent to which such issues pose problems in incorporating credit risk into covered warrant 
pricing.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1: Abnormal returns around the listing event for put event 
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the listing event of the UK put covered warrants where 
market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0036 1.4775 0.0036 1.4775 0.0042 1.6435 0.0042 1.6435 0.0049 1.7024* 0.0049 1.7024* 
-9 0.0023 1.5569 0.0059 2.1497** 0.0026 1.7375* 0.0067 2.3636** 0.0018 1.0744 0.0067 2.2395** 
-8 0.0017 1.1963 0.0076 2.3220** 0.0022 1.5602 0.0090 2.6540*** 0.0023 1.5304 0.0090 2.4751** 
-7 -0.0016 -1.1832 0.0060 1.9863** -0.0018 -1.2522 0.0072 2.3456** -0.0038 -2.4012** 0.0052 1.5461 
-6 -0.0041 -2.5969*** 0.0019 0.5950 -0.0032 -1.9062* 0.0040 1.2079 -0.0026 -1.3069 0.0026 0.7342 
-5 0.0006 0.2396 0.0025 0.6085 0.0009 0.3615 0.0049 1.1515 0.0006 0.2393 0.0033 0.7354 
-4 -0.0026 -1.6463 -0.0001 -0.0307 -0.0022 -1.4310 0.0027 0.6297 -0.0021 -1.3290 0.0012 0.2451 
-3 0.0012 0.7260 0.0011 0.2835 0.0020 1.1725 0.0047 1.1482 0.0027 1.5288 0.0039 0.9158 
-2 0.0008 0.5168 0.0019 0.4651 0.0012 0.7497 0.0059 1.3750 0.0021 1.2854 0.006 1.3590    
-1 0.0003 0.2094 0.0022 0.4999 0.0006 0.5022 0.0065 1.4389 0.0004 0.3259 0.0064 1.3835 
0 0.0001 0.0382 0.0023 0.3803 0.0002 0.0585 0.0067 1.0817 -0.0010 -0.2703 0.0054 0.9175 
1 0.0015 1.7735* 0.0039 0.6539 0.0027 2.9896*** 0.0094 1.5540 0.0051 4.6665*** 0.0105 1.8626* 
2 0.0007 0.4637 0.0045 0.7083 0.0007 0.4839 0.0101 1.5550 -0.0014 -0.9093 0.0091 1.4951 
3 -0.0030 -1.4455 0.0015 0.2181 -0.0027 -1.2366 0.0074 1.0335 -0.0027 -1.0624 0.0064 0.9179 
4 -0.0010 -0.4859 0.0006 0.0801 -0.0003 -0.1723 0.0070 0.9743 -0.0004 -0.1680 0.0060 0.8810 
5 -0.0012 -0.7607 -0.0007 -0.0918 -0.0008 -0.4955 0.0062 0.8428 -0.0023 -1.2459 0.0037 0.5345 
6 -0.0044 -3.7189*** -0.0051 -0.7300 -0.0038 -3.1693*** 0.0024 0.3364 -0.0022 -1.5723 0.0015 0.2233 
7 -0.0036 -2.3291** -0.0087 -1.1525 -0.0033 -2.0299** -0.0008 -0.1093 -0.0025 -1.1142 -0.0010 -0.1362 
8 -0.0018 -0.9727 -0.0104 -1.5197 -0.0024 -1.3127 -0.0032 -0.4636 -0.0059 -2.7892*** -0.0069 -0.9819 
9 0.0023 1.4276 -0.0082 -1.2346 0.0023 1.3806 -0.0009 -0.1409 0.0001 0.0400 -0.0068 -1.0161 
10 0.0002 0.1090 -0.0080 -1.2103 0.0019 1.0857 0.0009 0.1392 0.0069 3.7424*** 0.0001 0.0166 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.2: Abnormal returns around the listing event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the listing event of the UK put covered warrants where market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted 
return model are used to generate normal return.  
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                       Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.3: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 25 in-the-money call warrants    
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 25 UK in-the-money call covered warrants where market model and market-
adjusted model are used to generate normal return. 
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                         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
           The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.3.1: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 15 in-the-money call warrants    
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 15 UK in-the-money call covered warrants where market model and market-
adjusted model are used to generate normal return. 
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                         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
           The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.4: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 11 out-of-the-money call warrants  
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 11 UK out-of-the-
money call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0007 0.6562 0.0007 0.6562 0.0022 1.5437 0.0022 1.5437 0.0076 4.5011*** 0.0076 4.5011*** 
-9 -0.0005 -0.2010 0.0002 0.0682 0.0007 0.2587 0.0029 0.7977 0.0060 2.1929** 0.0135 3.5837*** 
-8 0.0013 0.4770 0.0015 0.5674 0.0007 0.2667 0.0037 1.0689 0.0003 0.1056 0.0138 4.3219*** 
-7 0.0040 2.3204** 0.0055 2.1690** 0.0015 0.7875 0.0052 1.9411* -0.0050 -2.3470** 0.0088 3.4530*** 
-6 -0.0098 -1.5306 -0.0043 -0.7784 -0.0135 -2.1385** -0.0083 -1.4334 -0.0238 -3.6717*** -0.0149 -2.7081*** 
-5 0.0000 -0.0023 -0.0043 -0.6740 0.0006 0.2068 -0.0077 -1.1744 0.0039 1.3355 -0.0111 -1.6547* 
-4 -0.0003 -0.0895 -0.0046 -0.7105 -0.0014 -0.3957 -0.0091 -1.3998 -0.0007 -0.1522 -0.0118 -1.3808 
-3 0.0026 0.8471 -0.0020 -0.2294 0.0044 1.4888 -0.0048 -0.5780 0.0118 4.0060*** -0.0001 -0.0052 
-2 0.0007 0.3527 -0.0013 -0.1360 0.0008 0.4114 -0.0039 -0.4517 0.0035 1.3853 0.0034 0.3141 
-1 0.0002 0.0561 -0.0010 -0.1465 -0.0005 -0.1342 -0.0045 -0.7450 -0.0018 -0.4356 0.0016 0.1727 
0 -0.0105 -1.4483 -0.0115 -0.9437 -0.0110 -1.5371 -0.0155 -1.3142 -0.0132 -1.9076* -0.0116 -0.8305 
1 0.0064 1.5046 -0.0051 -0.5451 0.0068 1.6319 -0.0087 -1.0404 0.0106 2.5019** -0.0009 -0.0806 
2 -0.0003 -0.1101 -0.0054 -0.5112 -0.0031 -1.0164 -0.0118 -1.1367 -0.0103 -2.9865*** -0.0112 -0.7903 
3 -0.0040 -1.4500 -0.0094 -0.7990 -0.0029 -0.9904 -0.0147 -1.2892 0.0012 0.4185 -0.0100 -0.6919 
4 0.0055 2.4748** -0.0039 -0.3475 0.0061 2.3993** -0.0085 -0.8077 0.0078 2.2242** -0.0021 -0.1721 
5 -0.0009 -0.6295 -0.0048 -0.4106 -0.0043 -2.7712*** -0.0128 -1.1149 -0.0128 -7.2057*** -0.0149 -1.0756 
6 -0.0010 -0.2987 -0.0058 -0.4129 -0.0031 -0.9302 -0.0159 -1.1575 -0.0108 -3.1401*** -0.0257 -1.6109 
7 0.0041 1.6483 -0.0017 -0.1137 0.0062 2.1515** -0.0096 -0.6731 0.0119 2.9364*** -0.0138 -0.8891 
8 0.0040 1.4484 0.0023 0.1597 0.0058 1.7164* -0.0038 -0.2728 0.0115 3.1067*** -0.0023 -0.1561 
9 0.0034 1.2117 0.0058 0.4417 0.0046 1.7102* 0.0007 0.0629 0.0082 2.5350** 0.0059 0.4585 
10 0.0002 0.0512 0.0059 0.4801 0.0001 0.0362 0.0008 0.0799 0.0038 1.0859 0.0097 0.7915 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
 196 
Appendix 4.4.1: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 5 out-of-the-money call warrants  
 
The table presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities around the delisting event of the 5 UK out-of-the-
money call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
 
Market Model Market-adjusted Model Mean-adjusted return Model 
Day AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) AR T-test(AR) CAR T-test(CAR) 
-10 0.0019 0.4859 0.0019 0.4859 0.0022 0.5946 0.0022 0.5946 0.0082 2.6682*** 0.0082 2.6682*** 
-9 0.0034 0.5877 0.0053 0.6831 0.0036 0.6232 0.0058 0.7679 0.0092 1.5508 0.0174 2.2580** 
-8 -0.0011 -0.1828 0.0042 1.1698 -0.0017 -0.2738 0.0040 0.9649 -0.0021 -0.3373 0.0153 4.3566*** 
-7 0.0023 0.4045 0.0065 1.1045 0.0009 0.1606 0.0049 0.8791 -0.0058 -1.1940 0.0095 1.5757 
-6 -0.0179 -0.9977 -0.0114 -0.8277 -0.0199 -1.0996 -0.0150 -1.0158 -0.0306 -1.6493 -0.0211 -1.4980 
-5 0.0031 0.5464 -0.0082 -0.4932 0.0030 0.5237 -0.0119 -0.6736 0.0065 1.1493 -0.0146 -0.8787 
-4 0.0008 0.1542 -0.0074 -0.6160 0.0000 0.0087 -0.0119 -0.9038 -0.0008 -0.0970 -0.0153 -1.1473 
-3 0.0040 0.6828 -0.0034 -0.2051 0.0044 0.7199 -0.0075 -0.4166 0.0120 2.0027** -0.0033 -0.1964 
-2 -0.0022 -0.5137 -0.0056 -0.3224 -0.0025 -0.5738 -0.0100 -0.5263 -0.0002 -0.0440 -0.0035 -0.1906 
-1 0.0031 0.2918 -0.0025 -0.3171 0.0024 0.2294 -0.0076 -0.8170 0.0013 0.1206 -0.0022 -0.2209 
0 -0.0184 -0.9441 -0.0209 -0.7869 -0.0190 -0.9690 -0.0266 -0.9338 -0.0202 -1.0399 -0.0225 -0.8304 
1 0.0110 0.9101 -0.0099 -0.6481 0.0108 0.9155 -0.0158 -0.9201 0.0142 1.1924 -0.0082 -0.5092 
2 -0.0003 -0.0370 -0.0102 -0.4819 -0.0018 -0.2521 -0.0176 -0.7651 -0.0094 -1.3626 -0.0176 -0.8286 
3 -0.0049 -0.9014 -0.0151 -0.5779 -0.0049 -0.8479 -0.0224 -0.7877 -0.0001 -0.0128 -0.0177 -0.6680 
4 0.0004 0.0432 -0.0148 -0.5600 0.0002 0.0248 -0.0222 -0.7833 0.0030 0.2851 -0.0147 -0.5989 
5 0.0029 0.9749 -0.0119 -0.4286 0.0011 0.3406 -0.0212 -0.7066 -0.0081 -1.6503* -0.0228 -0.8724 
6 -0.0029 -0.7614 -0.0148 -0.4944 -0.0043 -1.0665 -0.0255 -0.7905 -0.0108 -1.8864* -0.0337 -1.1933 
7 -0.0066 -2.3359** -0.0214 -0.6840 -0.0061 -2.0548** -0.0315 -0.9342 0.0014 0.2048 -0.0323 -1.0529 
8 -0.0025 -0.3871 -0.0239 -0.8064 -0.0021 -0.3139 -0.0336 -1.0214 0.0047 0.6994 -0.0276 -0.9220 
9 0.0080 1.0425 -0.0158 -0.6019 0.0081 1.0831 -0.0255 -0.8727 0.0127 1.4000 -0.0149 -0.5238 
10 0.0021 0.3637 -0.0138 -0.5763 0.0017 0.3117 -0.0238 -0.9100 0.0043 0.5733 -0.0106 -0.4512 
Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
 The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
 The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.5: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for 11 out-of-the-money call warrants  
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 11 UK out-of-the-money call covered warrants where market model, market-
adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.5.1: Abnormal returns around the delisting event for out-of-the-money 5 call warrants  
 
The figure presents abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 5 UK out-of-the-money call covered warrants where market model, market-
adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal return.  
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                    Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.6: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the announcement event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model 
and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
 
      
 
Market Model
-0.2000
-0.1500
-0.1000
-0.0500
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Event time(day)
A
V
,C
A
V
AV
CAV
 
 
      
 
Market-adjusted Model
-0.2000
-0.1500
-0.1000
-0.0500
0.0000
0.0500
0.1000
0.1500
0.2000
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
Event time(day)
A
V
,C
A
V
AV
CAV
 
 
                  
 
Mean-adjusted return Model
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         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.7: Abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the listing event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume. 
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                     Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.8: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the announcement event of the UK put covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model 
and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
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            Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.9: Abnormal trading volumes around the listing event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the listing event of the UK put covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume. 
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            Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11. 
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Appendix 4.10: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for call event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the UK call covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
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         Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
         The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.11:  Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for 25 in-the-money call 
warrants 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 25 UK in-the-money call covered warrants where market model, market-
adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
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            Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.12: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for 11 out-of-the-money call 
warrants 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the 11 UK out-of-the-money call covered warrants where market model, market-
adjusted model and mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
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            Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.13: Abnormal trading volumes around the delisting event for put event 
 
The figure presents abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities 
around the delisting event of the UK put covered warrants where market model, market-adjusted model and 
mean-adjusted return model are used to generate normal volume.  
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            Notes:  The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006. 
            The estimation window consists of 300 days which range from day -310 to -11.
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Appendix 4.14: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event (the small group) 
 
The below presents the small group’s abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event 
of the UK call covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
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Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
             The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006.                  
             The small group is categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
 
Market Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0919 0.9398 0.0919 0.9398
-9 -0.0716 -0.8163 0.0203 0.1904
-8 -0.0565 -0.6703 -0.0361 -0.2799
-7 0.0746 1.0536 0.0385 0.3087
-6 0.0684 0.9997 0.1069 0.8986
  -5 -0.0850 -1.3185 0.0219 0.2563
-4 0.0599 0.7074 0.0818 0.6053
-3 -0.0500 -0.4857 0.0318 0.2082
-2 0.0198 0.2151 0.0516 0.3445
-1 0.0085 0.0950 0.0600 0.5433
0 -0.1487 -2.1263** -0.0887 -0.7021
1 -0.0087 -0.0961 -0.0974 -0.7030
2 -0.0610 -0.8994 -0.1584 -1.0894
 3 -0.0059 -0.0555 -0.1644 -0.9616
4 -0.0110 -0.1514 -0.1754 -1.2608
5 0.1607 2.2625** -0.0147 -0.0868
6 -0.1225 -1.1586 -0.1372 -0.8117
7 -0.0501 -0.7145 -0.1872 -1.1393
8 0.0418 0.3437 -0.1455 -0.9014
9 0.1303 1.0243 -0.0151 -0.1036
10 -0.0061 -0.0759 -0.0213 -0.1370
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Appendix 4.15: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for call event (the large group) 
 
The below presents the large group’s abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event 
of the UK call covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
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Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
             The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006.                  
             The large group is categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
Market Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.0081 0.1068 0.0081 0.1068 
-9 0.1706 1.4572 0.1788 1.5685 
-8 -0.0373 -0.4715 0.1415 1.2219 
-7 -0.1046 -1.4327 0.0369 0.3316 
-6 0.0156 0.1224 0.0524 0.2704 
-5 -0.0550 -0.4874 -0.0026 -0.0137 
-4 0.0648 0.7551 0.0623 0.3276 
-3 -0.0208 -0.2256 0.0414 0.2196 
-2 0.1604 1.4862 0.2019 1.1877 
-1 -0.1844 -1.7720* 0.0175 0.0956 
0 -0.0736 -0.3976 -0.0561 -0.2681 
1 -0.0736 -0.7036 -0.1297 -0.7310 
2 -0.0079 -0.0640 -0.1376 -0.8669 
3 0.0938 0.6938 -0.0437 -0.2495 
4 0.0579 0.6419 0.0142 0.1000 
5 0.2259 1.7105* 0.2401 1.4664 
6 -0.2836 -2.7249*** -0.0435 -0.2223 
7 -0.0981 -0.8947 -0.1416 -0.8552 
8 0.2386 2.1976** 0.0969 0.5528 
9 0.0841 0.8186 0.1810 0.9489 
10 -0.1123 -0.7006 0.0687 0.4065 
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Appendix 4.16: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put event (the small group) 
 
The below presents the small group’s abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event 
of the UK put covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
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Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
             The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006.                  
             The small group is categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
 
 
Market Model 
Day AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.1115 1.8944* 0.1115 1.8944* 
-9 -0.0108 -0.1628 0.1007 1.4539 
-8 0.2044 1.5020 0.2835 2.2185** 
-7 0.1646 2.1583** 0.4308 3.2927*** 
-6 -0.0006 -0.0058 0.4302 3.8476*** 
-5 -0.0717 -0.8502 0.3585 2.9187*** 
-4 -0.1883 -2.1178** 0.1702 3.0373*** 
-3 -0.1238 -1.3289 0.0465 0.4660 
-2 0.0810 0.9330 0.1274 1.9623** 
-1 -0.0990 -1.6190 0.0284 0.2973 
0 0.2121 4.1021*** 0.2405 2.2060** 
1 -0.1733 -3.1936*** 0.0672 0.5054 
2 -0.0215 -0.2847 0.0502 0.4181 
3 0.0700 0.6075 0.1054 1.0585 
4 -0.2436 -2.2785** -0.0869 -0.7804 
5 0.3114 3.9188*** 0.2245 2.0468** 
6 -0.0103 -0.1089 0.2142 1.5834 
7 0.1620 1.1364 0.3762 1.9862** 
8 -0.4940 -4.1100*** -0.1179 -0.7421 
9 0.2224 2.1211** 0.0811 0.3453 
10 0.0355 0.5249 0.1129 0.4938 
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Appendix 4.17: Abnormal trading volumes around the announcement event for put event (the large group) 
 
The below presents the large group’s abnormal volume (AV) and cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the underlying securities around the announcement event 
of the UK put covered warrants where market model is used to generate normal volume.  
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Notes:  ***significant at 1%    **significant at 5%    *significant at 10% 
             The sample period extends form July 2004 until December 2006.                  
             The large group is categorized by the equation: 
Market value (MV) of warrant issue
MV of the outstanding underlying securities
 
 
Market Model 
Day   AV T-test(AV) CAV T-test(CAV) 
-10 0.1295 1.5708 0.1295 1.5708 
-9 0.1851 1.3295 0.3145 2.8128*** 
-8 -0.0049 -0.0325 0.3102 2.4993** 
-7 -0.1251 -1.1182 0.1998 2.7935*** 
-6 0.1878 1.8680* 0.3877 3.4304*** 
-5 0.0555 0.3733 0.4432 5.7371*** 
-4 -0.0018 -0.0142 0.4414 3.8219*** 
-3 -0.1933 -1.7021* 0.2482 2.2157** 
-2 -0.0189 -0.2121 0.2292 2.1184** 
-1 0.0001 0.0010 0.2293 1.8749* 
0 0.2715 1.9699** 0.5008 2.5864*** 
1 -0.1239 -0.9335 0.3768 3.0908*** 
2 0.1387 0.9069 0.4829 2.5919*** 
3 0.0481 0.6134 0.5197 3.0241*** 
4 -0.6082 -5.9174*** 0.0546 0.3462 
5 0.1154 2.1973** 0.1700 0.9734 
6 -0.0442 -0.3761 0.1258 0.6577 
7 0.1103 0.8535 0.2361 1.2946 
8 -0.0494 -0.5476 0.1867 1.1841 
9 -0.0427 -0.4227 0.1440 0.9703 
10 0.0008 0.0094 0.1448 0.9172 
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Appendix 4.18: The details of all covered warrant samples used in the analysis of call covered warrants  
 
Warrants Name Underlying security name Announcement Date Listing Date Delisting Date 
Societe Generale British Sky Broadcasting Covered Warrants  BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP 12/01/2006 17/01/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Man Group Covered Warrants  MAN GROUP 14/02/2006 21/02/2006 10/10/2006 
Societe Generale William Hill Covered Warrants  WILLIAM HILL 19/01/2006 26/01/2006 28/11/2006 
Dresdner Bank Astrazeneca Covered Warrants  ASTRAZENECA 11/04/2006 21/04/2006 05/07/2006 
Dresdner Bank HBOS Public Limited Company Covered Warrants  HBOS 11/03/2005 03/12/2005 05/12/2006 
Societe Generale Glaxosmithkline Covered Warrants  GLAXOSMITHKLINE 01/02/2006 02/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Glaxosmithkline Covered Warrants  GLAXOSMITHKLINE 10/03/2006 21/03/2006 22/10/2006 
Dresdner Bank Glaxosmithkline Covered Warrants  GLAXOSMITHKLINE 21/04/2006 28/04/2006 25/11/2006 
Societe Generale Tesco Covered Warrants  TESCO 12/07/2004 19/07/2004 12/10/2004 
Societe Generale BT Group Covered Warrants  BT GROUP 21/02/2006 24/02/2006 15/08/2006 
Societe Generale BT Group Covered Warrants  BT GROUP 23/04/2006 30/04/2006 12/10/2006 
Societe Generale Smiths Industries Covered Warrants  SMITHS GROUP 12/01/2006 12/01/2006 30/09/2006 
Societe Generale BP Covered Warrants  BP 23/02/2006 24/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale BP Covered Warrants  BP 25/03/2006 04/04/2006 12/11/2006 
Dresdner Bank BP Public Limited Company Covered Warrants  BP 11/05/2006 23/05/2006 27/12/2006 
Goldman Sachs Jersey Next Covered Warrants  NEXT 26/07/2004 31/07/2004 28/07/2005 
Goldman Sachs Jersey Next Covered Warrants  NEXT 26/07/2005 05/07/2005 30/07/2006 
Societe Generale British American Tobacco Covered Warrants  BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO 12/01/2006 18/01/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale BAE Systems Covered Warrants  BAE SYSTEMS 18/03/2006 19/03/2006 25/11/2006 
Dresdner Bank Barclays Bank Covered Warrants  BARCLAYS 11/04/2004 21/04/2004 05/03/2005 
Societe Generale Royal Bank of Scotland Covered Warrants  ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. 12/01/2004 18/01/2004 15/09/2004 
Societe Generale Royal Bank of Scotland Covered Warrants  ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. 20/03/2004 26/03/2004 30/11/2004 
Societe Generale British Land Covered Warrants  BRITISH LAND 12/01/2006 19/01/2006 15/09/2006 
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Appendix 4.18(con’t): The details of all covered warrant samples used in the analysis of call covered warrants  
 
Warrants Name Underlying security name Announcement Date Listing Date Delisting Date 
Societe Generale Land Securities Covered Warrants  LAND SECURITIES 01/02/2006 02/02/2006 12/08/2006 
Societe Generale Cable and Wireless Covered Warrants  CABLE & WIRELESS 12/04/2006 17/04/2006 10/11/2006 
Societe Generale Rio Tinto Covered Warrants  RIO TINTO 20/03/2006 23/03/2006 23/11/2006 
Societe Generale Anglo American Covered Warrants  ANGLO AMERICAN 12/01/2006 17/01/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale British Airways Covered Warrants  BRITISH AIRWAYS 12/01/2005 18/01/2005 15/09/2005 
Societe Generale Sainsbury Covered Warrants  SAINSBURY  10/03/2005 16/03/2005 19/11/2005 
Societe Generale WPP Covered Warrants  WPP GROUP 12/01/2006 15/01/2006 25/09/2006 
Societe Generale Antofagasta Covered Warrants  ANTOFAGASTA 09/03/2006 15/03/2006 17/11/2006 
Societe Generale Antofagasta Covered Warrants  ANTOFAGASTA 12/04/2006 13/04/2006 18/12/2006 
Societe Generale Reuters Covered Warrants  REUTERS GROUP 01/02/2006 25/02/2006 08/09/2006 
Societe Generale Rolls Royce Covered Warrants  ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP 12/01/2006 13/01/2006 18/10/2006 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 20/08/2004 30/08/2004 08/12/2004 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 11/09/2006 18/09/2006 09/01/2005 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 17/10/2004 30/10/2004 11/02/2005 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 29/11/2004 30/11/2004 21/08/2005 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 31/12/2004 10/12/2004 30/09/2005 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 01/02/2005 08/02/2005 14/11/2006 
Dresdner Bank Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 10/03/2006 20/03/2006 15/12/2006 
Societe Generale Corus Covered Warrants  CORUS GROUP 12/04/2006 19/04/2006 20/09/2006 
Societe Generale Qinetiq Group Public Limited Company Covered 
Warrants  QINETIQ GROUP 09/02/2006 16/02/2006 07/10/2006 
Societe Generale Party Gaming Covered Warrants  Party Gaming 12/01/2006 19/01/2006 15/07/2006 
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Appendix 4.19: The details of all covered warrant samples used in the analysis of put covered warrants  
 
Warrants Name Underlying security name Announcement Date Listing Date Delisting Date 
Societe Generale Man Group Covered Warrants  MAN GROUP 12/12/2004 18/12/2004 20/02/2006 
Societe Generale Man Group Covered Warrants  MAN GROUP 09/05/2005 11/05/2005 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Astrazeneca Covered Warrants ASTRAZENECA 25/10/2005 22/10/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Astrazeneca Covered Warrants  ASTRAZENECA 25/12/2005 22/12/2005 21/06/2006 
Societe Generale Astrazeneca Covered Warrants  ASTRAZENECA 21/02/2006 24/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Astrazeneca Covered Warrants  ASTRAZENECA 21/04/2006 23/04/2006 15/11/2006 
Societe Generale HSBC Holdings Covered Warrants  HSBC 01/09/2004 09/09/2004 11/10/2005 
Societe Generale HSBC Holdings Covered Warrants HSBC  21/12/2004 24/12/2004 26/05/2006 
Societe Generale Arm Holdings Covered Warrants  ARM HOLDINGS 12/04/2006 18/04/2006 23/09/2006 
Societe Generale Arm Holdings Covered Warrants  ARM HOLDINGS 12/06/2006 18/06/2006 23/12/2006 
Societe Generale Shire Pharmaceuticals Covered Warrants SHIRE 12/01/2006 27/01/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Shire Pharmaceuticals Covered Warrants  SHIRE 12/02/2006 27/02/2006 15/11/2006 
Societe Generale HBOS Covered Warrants  HBOS 01/05/2005 04/05/2005 06/04/2006 
Societe Generale HBOS Covered Warrants  HBOS 05/08/2005 07/08/2005 10/09/2006 
Societe Generale Billiton Covered Warrants  BHP BILLITON 12/09/2004 18/09/2004 15/09/2005 
Societe Generale Billiton Covered Warrants BHP BILLITON 08/12/2006 15/12/2006 18/09/2006 
Societe Generale Glaxosmithkline Covered Warrants  GLAXOSMITHKLINE 25/10/2005 23/12/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Glaxosmithkline Covered Warrants  GLAXOSMITHKLINE 25/12/2005 23/2/2006 21/12/2006 
Societe Generale BP Covered Warrants  BP 25/10/2005 23/12/2005 30/06/2006 
Societe Generale BP Covered Warrants  BP 25/03/2006 23/05/2005 21/10/2006 
Societe Generale Royal Dutch Covered Warrants ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B 21/02/2006 23/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Royal Dutch Covered Warrants ROYAL DUTCH SHELL B 21/04/2006 23/04/2006 15/11/2006 
Societe Generale Marks and Spencer Covered Warrants  MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 12/01/2004 18/01/2004 15/09/2005 
Societe Generale Marks and Spencer Covered Warrants MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 12/05/2004 17/05/2004 15/01/2006 
Societe Generale BAE Systems Covered Warrants  BAE SYSTEMS 12/04/2006 18/04/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale BAE Systems Covered Warrants  BAE SYSTEMS 12/05/2006 18/05/2006 09/10/2006 
Societe Generale Barclays Covered Warrants BARCLAYS 25/10/2005 23/12/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Barclays Covered Warrants BARCLAYS 21/12/2005 23/12/2005 10/09/2006 
Societe Generale Royal Bank of Scotland Covered Warrants  ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. 25/08/2005 23/08/2005 21/01/2006 
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Appendix 4.19(con’t): The details of all covered warrant samples used in the analysis of put covered warrants  
 
Warrants Name Underlying security name Announcement Date Listing Date Delisting Date 
Societe Generale Royal Bank of Scotland Covered Warrants ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. 25/10/2005 23/12/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Standard Chartered Covered Warrants STANDARD CHARTERED 21/02/2004 23/02/2004 15/09/2005 
Societe Generale Standard Chartered Covered Warrants  STANDARD CHARTERED 10/01/2005 18/01/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Prudential Covered Warrants PRUDENTIAL 21/02/2006 24/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Prudential Covered Warrants  PRUDENTIAL 21/03/2006 24/03/2006 15/10/2006 
Societe Generale British Land Covered Warrants BRITISH LAND 12/04/2006 18/04/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale British Land Covered Warrants BRITISH LAND 12/05/2006 18/05/2006 20/12/2006 
Societe Generale Land Securities Covered Warrants  LAND SECURITIES 12/01/2006 18/01/2006 10/08/2006 
Societe Generale Land Securities Covered Warrants  LAND SECURITIES 12/06/2006 18/06/2006 15/11/2006 
Societe Generale Rio Tinto Covered Warrants  RIO TINTO 01/05/2005 31/05/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Rio Tinto Covered Warrants  RIO TINTO 23/10/2005 25/10/2005 21/06/2006 
Societe Generale Rio Tinto Covered Warrants RIO TINTO 01/02/2006 03/02/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Rio Tinto Covered Warrants  RIO TINTO 01/03/2006 03/03/2006 15/10/2006 
Societe Generale Anglo American Covered Warrants  ANGLO AMERICAN 20/10/2005 26/10/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale  Anglo American Covered Warrants ANGLO AMERICAN 25/12/2005 26/12/2005 21/06/2006 
Societe Generale Anglo American Covered Warrants  ANGLO AMERICAN 12/04/2006 18/04/2006 18/12/2006 
Societe Generale Anglo American Covered Warrants  ANGLO AMERICAN 04/01/2006 10/01/2006 18/10/2006 
Societe Generale Billiton Covered Warrants  BHP BILLITON 12/04/2006 18/04/2006 15/09/2006 
Societe Generale Billiton Covered Warrants  BHP BILLITON 12/06/2006 18/06/2006 15/11/2006 
Societe Generale Cairn Energy Covered Warrants CAIRN ENERGY 07/01/2006 09/01/2006 10/08/2006 
Societe Generale Cairn Energy Covered Warrants  CAIRN ENERGY 12/04/2006 12/04/2006 10/09/2006 
Societe Generale BG Group Covered Warrants BG GROUP 21/02/2006 21/02/2006 12/11/2006 
Societe Generale BG Group Covered Warrants BG GROUP 01/02/2006 26/02/2006 08/12/2006 
Societe Generale Reuters Covered Warrants  REUTERS GROUP 01/03/2004 04/07/2004 12/11/2004 
Societe Generale Reuters Covered Warrants  REUTERS GROUP 23/05/2004 20/06/2004 12/08/2005 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 01/05/2005 29/6/2005 21/04/2006 
Societe Generale Vodafone Covered Warrants  VODAFONE GROUP 25/10/2005 24/11/2005 21/10/2006 
Societe Generale Lloyds Covered Warrants  LLOYDS BRITISH  21/08/2005 27/08/2005 18/04/2006 
Societe Generale Lloyds Covered Warrants  LLOYDS BRITISH  21/02/2006 27/02/2006 18/10/2006 
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Appendix 6.1: Issuance status of 154 call covered warrant samples 
Name of Warrant Date of Issuance Underlying Company Date of Listing 
Offer Price 
(£) 
Strike Price 
(£) Moneyness Parity 
SCGN. 3I GP.PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 3I GROUP PLC 28/06/2007 1.52 13.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. 3I GROUP PLC COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 3I GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.10 13 out 10/1 
SCGN. 3I GROUP PLC COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 3I GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.11 11 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 10/12/2007 0.42 45 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 14/11/2007 0.57 36 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 14/11/2007 0.44 40 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 26/09/2007 0.36 33 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 05/07/2007 0.37 35 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANGLO AMER. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 ANGLO AMERICAN PLC 10/12/2007 0.42 37 out 10/1 
SCGN. ANTOFAGASTA COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 ANTOFAGASTA PLC 14/11/2007 1.13 10 out 1/1 
SCGN. ANTOFAGASTA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 ANTOFAGASTA PLC 10/12/2007 1.26 8 out 1/1 
SCGN. ANTOFAGASTA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/8/2007 ANTOFAGASTA PLC 17/08/2007 0.99 7.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. ANTOFAGASTA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 ANTOFAGASTA PLC 05/07/2007 0.81 6.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. ANTOFAGOSTA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  8/11/2007 ANTOFAGASTA PLC 14/11/2007 1.03 9 out 1/1 
SCGN. ARM HDGS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 ARM HOLDINGS PLC 28/06/2007 0.18 1.6 out 1/1 
SCGN. ARM HOLDINGS COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 ARM HOLDINGS PLC 19/12/2007 0.19 1.55 out 1/1 
SCGN. ARM HOLDINGS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 ARM HOLDINGS PLC 19/12/2007 0.16 1.4 out 1/1 
SCGN. AZEN. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 ASTRAZENECA PLC 10/12/2007 0.15 29 out 10/1 
SCGN. AZEN. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  16/8/2007 ASTRAZENECA PLC 17/08/2007 0.38 26 out 10/1 
SCGN. AZEN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/8/2007 ASTRAZENECA PLC 17/08/2007 0.32 25 out 10/1 
SCGN. AZEN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 ASTRAZENECA PLC 10/12/2007 0.26 23 in 10/1 
SCGN. AVIVA COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 AVIVA PLC 19/12/2007 0.09 8 out 10/1 
SCGN. AVIVA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 AVIVA PLC 19/12/2007 0.09 7 out 10/1 
SCGN. AVIVA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/8/2007 AVIVA PLC 17/08/2007 0.93 7.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. AVIVA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 AVIVA PLC 28/06/2007 0.76 8.75 out 10/1 
SCGN. BAE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 BAE SYSTEMS PLC 28/06/2007 0.47 5 out 1/1 
SCGN. BAE SYSTEMS COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 BAE SYSTEMS PLC 19/12/2007 0.50 5.75 out 1/1 
SCGN. BAE SYSTEMS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 BAE SYSTEMS PLC 19/12/2007 0.33 5.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 10/12/2007 0.87 6 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 10/12/2007 0.55 7 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/11/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 19/11/2007 0.62 5.5 out 1/1 
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Appendix 6.1(con’t):  Issuance status of 154 call covered warrant samples 
Name of Warrant Date of Issuance Underlying Company Date of Listing 
Offer Price 
(£) 
Strike Price 
(£) Moneyness Parity 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/11/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 19/11/2007 0.45 6 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 26/09/2007 0.73 6.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 26/09/2007 0.39 7.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. BARCLAYS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 BARCLAYS BANK PLC 26/09/2007 0.50 8 out 1/1 
SCGN. BG GP. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 BG GROUP PLC 14/11/2007 0.13 10 out 10/1 
SCGN. BG.GP. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BG GROUP PLC 10/12/2007 0.12 11 out 10/1 
SCGN. BG.GP. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BG GROUP PLC 10/12/2007 0.08 12 out 10/1 
SCGN. BHP BILLITON COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 BHP BILLITON PLC 10/12/2007 0.37 17 out 10/1 
SCGN. BHP BILLITON COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 BHP BILLITON PLC 10/12/2007 0.30 19 out 10/1 
SCGN. BHP BILLITON COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 BHP BILLITON PLC 26/09/2007 0.17 18 out 10/1 
SCGN. BHP BILLITON COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 BHP BILLITON PLC 26/09/2007 0.12 20 out 10/1 
SCGN. BHP BILLITON COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 BHP BILLITON PLC 05/07/2007 0.13 15 out 10/1 
SCGN. BP PLC. COVERED WTS. 19/09/08  10/10/2007 BP PLC 11/10/2007 0.44 6.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. BP PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 BP PLC 05/07/2007 0.80 6 in 1/1 
SCGN. BP PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 BP PLC 05/07/2007 0.40 7 out 1/1 
SCGN. BRIT.EN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP PLC 28/06/2007 0.84 6 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRITISH ENERGY COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.05 6.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRITISH ENERGY COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 5.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRIT.LAND COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 BRITISH LAND CO PLC 10/12/2007 0.09 12 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRIT.LAND COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BRITISH LAND CO PLC 10/12/2007 0.10 10 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRIT.LAND COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BRITISH LAND CO PLC 10/12/2007 0.07 11 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRIT.LAND COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/8/2007 BRITISH LAND CO PLC 17/08/2007 0.14 14 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRITISH SKY COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.07 7 out 10/1 
SCGN. BRITISH SKY COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 6.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. BSB. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP PLC 28/06/2007 0.61 7.25 out 10/1 
SCGN. BT GROUP COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 BT GROUP PLC 14/11/2007 0.32 3.75 out 1/1 
SCGN. BT GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BT GROUP PLC 10/12/2007 0.33 3 out 1/1 
SCGN. BT GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 BT GROUP PLC 10/12/2007 0.17 3.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. CABLE & WIRELESS COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 CABLE & WIRELESS PLC 19/12/2007 0.23 2.3 out 1/1 
SCGN. CABLE & WIRELESS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 CABLE & WIRELESS PLC 19/12/2007 0.23 2 out 1/1 
SCGN. CBW PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 CABLE & WIRELESS PLC 29/06/2007 0.27 2.15 out 1/1 
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Appendix 6.1(con’t): Issuance status of 154 call covered warrant samples 
Name of Warrant Date of Issuance Underlying Company Date of Listing 
Offer Price 
(£) 
Strike Price 
(£) Moneyness Parity 
SCGN. PUT-CBW PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 CABLE & WIRELESS PLC 29/06/2007 0.16 1.75 in 1/1 
SCGN. CENTRICA COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 CENTRICA PLC 19/12/2007 0.32 4.25 out 1/1 
SCGN. CENTRICA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 CENTRICA PLC 19/12/2007 0.32 4 out 1/1 
SCGN. CENTRICA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 CENTRICA PLC 29/06/2007 0.38 4.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. DIAGEO PLC. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 DIAGEO PLC 19/12/2007 0.08 13 out 10/1 
SCGN. DIAGEO PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 DIAGEO PLC 19/12/2007 0.11 11 out 10/1 
SCGN. DIAGEO PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 DIAGEO PLC 29/06/2007 0.81 12 out 10/1 
SCGN. EXPERIAN GP. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 EXPERIAN GROUP LIMITED 29/06/2007 0.71 7 out 10/1 
SCGN. EXPERIAN GROUP COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 EXPERIAN GROUP LIMITED 19/12/2007 0.05 5 out 10/1 
SCGN. EXPERIAN GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 EXPERIAN GROUP LIMITED 19/12/2007 0.04 4.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. GLXSX. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  11/6/2007 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC 12/06/2007 0.11 15 out 10/1 
SCGN. HAMMERSON PLC COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 HAMMERSON PLC 19/12/2007 0.09 14 out 10/1 
SCGN. HAMMERSON PLC COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 HAMMERSON PLC 19/12/2007 0.09 12 out 10/1 
SCGN. HAMMERSON PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 HAMMERSON PLC 29/06/2007 1.99 16.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. HBOS PLC COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 HBOS PLC 19/12/2007 0.10 10 out 10/1 
SCGN. HBOS PLC COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 HBOS PLC 19/12/2007 0.09 9 out 10/1 
SCGN. HBOS PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 HBOS PLC 29/06/2007 0.95 11.25 out 10/1 
SCGN. HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 HSBC HOLDING PLC 14/11/2007 0.06 11 out 10/1 
SCGN. HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 HSBC HOLDING PLC 04/06/2007 0.09 10 out 10/1 
SCGN. HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 HSBC HOLDING PLC 04/06/2007 0.03 12 out 10/1 
SCGN. HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 HSBC HOLDING PLC 11/12/2007 0.06 9 out 10/1 
SCGN. HSBC HDG. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 HSBC HOLDING PLC 11/12/2007 0.10 8 in 10/1 
SCGN. INVESCO PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 INVESCO PLC 29/06/2007 0.86 6.75 out 10/1 
SCGN. LAND SECS. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  16/8/2007 LAND SECURITIES PLC 20/08/2007 0.23 20 out 10/1 
SCGN. LAND SECURITIES COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 LAND SECURITIES PLC 07/12/2007 0.18 16 out 10/1 
SCGN. LAND SECURITIES COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 LAND SECURITIES PLC 07/12/2007 0.14 17 out 10/1 
SCGN. LAND SECURITIES COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 LAND SECURITIES PLC 07/12/2007 0.11 18 out 10/1 
SCGN. LEGAL & GENERAL COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.15 1.6 out 1/1 
SCGN. LEGAL & GENERAL COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.15 1.4 out 1/1 
SCGN. LGL.& GEN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC 05/07/2007 0.18 1.75 out 1/1 
SCGN. LLOYDS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 04/06/2007 0.78 6 out 1/1 
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Name of Warrant Date of Issuance Underlying Company Date of Listing 
Offer Price 
(£) 
Strike Price 
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SCGN. LLOYDS COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 04/06/2007 0.42 7 out 1/1 
SCGN. LLOYDS TSB GROUP COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 07/12/2007 0.49 6 out 1/1 
SCGN. LLOYDS TSB GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 07/12/2007 0.60 5 out 1/1 
SCGN. LLOYDS TSB GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC 07/12/2007 0.41 5.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. MAN GROUP COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 MAN GROUP PLC 14/11/2007 0.76 6.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. MAN GROUP COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 MAN GROUP PLC 04/06/2007 0.90 6 out 1/1 
SCGN. M&S. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 14/11/2007 0.06 7.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. M&S. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 11/12/2007 0.07 6 out 10/1 
SCGN. M&S. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 11/12/2007 0.04 7 out 10/1 
SCGN. M&S. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  16/8/2007 MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC 20/08/2007 0.08 6.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. PERSIMMON COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 PERSIMMON PLC 20/12/2007 0.09 10 out 10/1 
SCGN. PERSIMMON COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 PERSIMMON PLC 20/12/2007 0.07 9 out 10/1 
SCGN. PERSIMMON COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 PERSIMMON PLC 05/07/2007 1.52 13.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. PRUDENTIAL COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  16/8/2007 PRUDENTIAL PLC 20/08/2007 0.14 7 out 10/1 
SCGN. PRUDENTIAL COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 PRUDENTIAL PLC 14/11/2007 0.10 9 out 10/1 
SCGN. PRUDENTIAL COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 PRUDENTIAL PLC 03/01/2008 0.10 7 in 10/1 
SCGN. PRUDENTIAL COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 PRUDENTIAL PLC 03/01/2008 0.07 8 out 10/1 
SCGN. RIO TINTO COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 RIO TINTO PLC 14/11/2007 0.57 55 in 10/1 
SCGN. RIO TINTO COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 RIO TINTO PLC 14/11/2007 0.73 50 in 10/1 
SCGN. RIO TINTO COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 RIO TINTO PLC 04/06/2007 0.59 38 out 10/1 
SCGN. RIO TINTO COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 RIO TINTO PLC 04/06/2007 0.51 40 out 10/1 
SCGN. ROLLS ROYCE COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 6.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. ROLLS ROYCE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 5.75 out 10/1 
SCGN. ROLLS ROYCE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP PLC 05/07/2007 0.49 6.25 out 10/1 
SCGN. RSA IN.GP.PLC. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 ROYAL & SUN ALL.IN. GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.17 1.8 out 1/1 
SCGN. RSA IN.GP.PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 ROYAL & SUN ALL.IN. GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.16 1.6 out 1/1 
SCGN. RSA IN.GP.PLC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 ROYAL & SUN ALL.IN. GROUP PLC 05/07/2007 0.17 1.75 out 1/1 
SCGN. RBOS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. PLC 26/09/2007 0.68 5.5 out 1/1 
SCGN. RBOS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. PLC 26/09/2007 0.48 6 out 1/1 
SCGN. RBOS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. PLC 04/06/2007 0.74 7 out 1/1 
SCGN. ROYAL DUTCH COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-B SHS 14/11/2007 0.23 23 out 10/1 
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SCGN. ROYAL DUTCH COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-B SHS 31/05/2007 0.15 22 out 10/1 
SCGN. ROYAL DUTCH COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-B SHS 31/05/2007 0.10 24 out 10/1 
SCGN. SAINSBURY COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 J SAINSBURY PLC 19/12/2007 0.05 4.75 out 10/1 
SCGN. SAINSBURY COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 J SAINSBURY PLC 05/07/2007 0.57 6.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. SCOT.& STHN. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY PLC 19/12/2007 0.13 20 out 10/1 
SCGN. SCOT.& STHN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY PLC 19/12/2007 0.13 18 out 10/1 
SCGN. SCOT.& STHN. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY PLC 05/07/2007 1.55 16.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. SCOT.& NEWC. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE PLC 05/07/2007 0.72 7.25 out 10/1 
SCGN. STD.CHT. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC 11/12/2007 0.27 23 out 10/1 
SCGN. STD.CHT. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC 14/11/2007 0.21 21 out 10/1 
SCGN. STD.CHT. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC 11/12/2007 0.26 20 out 10/1 
SCGN. STD.CHT. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC 11/12/2007 0.19 22 out 10/1 
SCGN. STD.LF. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 STANDARD LIFE PLC 05/07/2007 0.29 4 out 1/1 
SCGN. TESCO PLC COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  7/12/2007 TESCO PLC 07/12/2007 0.05 5.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. TESCO PLC COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 TESCO PLC 07/12/2007 0.05 5 out 10/1 
SCGN. UTD.UTILS. COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 UNITED UTILITIES PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 9 out 10/1 
SCGN. UTD.UTILS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 UNITED UTILITIES PLC 19/12/2007 0.07 8 out 10/1 
SCGN. UTD.UTILS. COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 UNITED UTILITIES PLC 05/07/2007 0.75 8.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  8/11/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 14/11/2007 0.21 2.2 out 1/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  25/9/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 26/09/2007 0.11 2 out 1/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  31/5/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 03/01/2008 0.12 1.7 in 1/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 11/12/2007 0.13 2.1 out 1/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 11/12/2007 0.21 1.9 out 1/1 
SCGN. VODAFONE COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  7/12/2007 VODAFONE GROUP PLC 11/12/2007 0.34 1.8 in 1/1 
SCGN. XSTRATA COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 XSTRATA PLC 19/12/2007 0.64 45 out 10/1 
SCGN. XSTRATA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 XSTRATA PLC 19/12/2007 0.53 40 out 10/1 
SCGN. XSTRATA COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 XSTRATA PLC 05/07/2007 4.69 35 out 10/1 
SCGN. YELL COVERED WTS. 19/12/08  17/12/2007 YELL GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.07 5 out 10/1 
SCGN. YELL COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  17/12/2007 YELL GROUP PLC 19/12/2007 0.06 4.5 out 10/1 
SCGN. YELL COVERED WTS. 20/06/08  27/6/2007 YELL GROUP PLC 06/07/2007 1.04 5.5 out 10/1 
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Appendix 6.2: Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant Price (for the case α = 0%), Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 103 call covered 
warrants 
  Vulnerable Warrant Price and Black-Scholes Price
a
 Vulnerable Warrant Price  and Market Value
b
 Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
c
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5227 -0.8623 -0.2292 0.3638 1.5227 -0.8623 -0.2292 0.3638
-14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4111 -0.8819 -0.2690 0.3712 1.4111 -0.8819 -0.2690 0.3712
-13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.6346 -0.8885 -0.2426 0.4063 1.6346 -0.8885 -0.2426 0.4063
-12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.4596 -0.9163 -0.2466 0.3900 1.4596 -0.9163 -0.2466 0.3900
-11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.6421 -0.9417 -0.2646 0.4059 1.6421 -0.9417 -0.2646 0.4059
-10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.7033 -0.9434 -0.2372 0.4288 1.7033 -0.9434 -0.2372 0.4288
-9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.8227 -0.9492 -0.2455 0.4431 1.8227 -0.9492 -0.2455 0.4431
-8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.1988 -0.9387 -0.2292 0.4597 2.1988 -0.9387 -0.2292 0.4597
-7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.4651 -0.9777 -0.2597 0.4780 2.4651 -0.9777 -0.2597 0.4780
-6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.1541 -0.9711 -0.2504 0.4759 2.1541 -0.9711 -0.2504 0.4759
-5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.5150 -0.9611 -0.2075 0.5071 2.5150 -0.9611 -0.2075 0.5071
-4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.7665 -0.9626 -0.2208 0.5207 2.7665 -0.9626 -0.2208 0.5207
-3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.5825 -0.9931 -0.3847 0.4605 1.5825 -0.9931 -0.3847 0.4605
-2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.6570 -0.9505 -0.1745 0.6182 2.6570 -0.9505 -0.1745 0.6182
-1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.9819 -0.8893 -0.1856 0.5899 2.9819 -0.8893 -0.1856 0.5899
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.5732 -0.8315 0.0120 0.8191 4.5732 -0.8315 0.0120 0.8191
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6.4220 -0.8365 0.1390 1.0463 6.4220 -0.8365 0.1390 1.0463
2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.7865 -0.8558 0.1103 0.9439 5.7865 -0.8558 0.1103 0.9439
3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.0645 -0.8099 0.1126 0.9455 5.0645 -0.8099 0.1126 0.9455
4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.6650 -0.8323 0.0821 0.8634 4.6650 -0.8323 0.0821 0.8634
5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.5815 -0.8515 0.0869 0.8419 4.5815 -0.8515 0.0869 0.8419
6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.2050 -0.8033 0.0997 0.8599 5.2050 -0.8033 0.0997 0.8599
7 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.4704 -0.7683 0.0721 0.8440 4.4704 -0.7683 0.0721 0.8440
8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.2001 -0.8469 -0.0124 0.6638 3.2001 -0.8469 -0.0124 0.6638
9 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.3605 -0.8757 0.0472 0.7498 3.3605 -0.8757 0.0472 0.7498
10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.0716 -0.9341 0.0105 0.8025 4.0716 -0.9341 0.0105 0.8025
11 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.1667 -0.9226 0.0564 0.8294 4.1667 -0.9226 0.0564 0.8294
12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.5292 -0.9624 0.0142 0.8157 4.5292 -0.9624 0.0142 0.8157
13 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.5819 -0.9015 0.0347 0.7138 3.5819 -0.9015 0.0347 0.7138
14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.2145 -0.8498 0.0495 0.7357 3.2145 -0.8498 0.0495 0.7357
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 3.2591 -0.8772 -0.0004 0.7103 3.2591 -0.8772 -0.0004 0.7103
 Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
a 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and Black-Scholes price is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - Black-Scholes price)/Black-Scholes price. 
b 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - market value)/market value. 
c 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is calculated as: (Black-Scholes price - market value)/market value. 
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Appendix 6.3: Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant Price (for the case α = 0.5%), Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 103 call covered 
warrants 
  Vulnerable Warrant Price and Black-Scholes Price
a
 Vulnerable Warrant Price  and Market Value
b
 Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
c
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 -0.0002 -0.0149 -0.0032 0.0023 1.5135 -0.8633 -0.2313 0.3631 1.5227 -0.8623 -0.2292 0.3638
-14 -0.0003 -0.0165 -0.0037 0.0026 1.4011 -0.8829 -0.2713 0.3703 1.4111 -0.8819 -0.2690 0.3712
-13 -0.0003 -0.0160 -0.0037 0.0026 1.6232 -0.8895 -0.2450 0.4051 1.6346 -0.8885 -0.2426 0.4063
-12 -0.0003 -0.0162 -0.0037 0.0026 1.4488 -0.9171 -0.2490 0.3889 1.4596 -0.9163 -0.2466 0.3900
-11 -0.0003 -0.0165 -0.0040 0.0030 1.6295 -0.9425 -0.2670 0.4049 1.6421 -0.9417 -0.2646 0.4059
-10 -0.0003 -0.0183 -0.0040 0.0028 1.6901 -0.9441 -0.2398 0.4275 1.7033 -0.9434 -0.2372 0.4288
-9 -0.0002 -0.0190 -0.0041 0.0029 1.8096 -0.9499 -0.2481 0.4418 1.8227 -0.9492 -0.2455 0.4431
-8 -0.0002 -0.0200 -0.0039 0.0029 2.1852 -0.9394 -0.2317 0.4582 2.1988 -0.9387 -0.2292 0.4597
-7 -0.0003 -0.0243 -0.0045 0.0034 2.4494 -0.9782 -0.2624 0.4766 2.4651 -0.9777 -0.2597 0.4780
-6 -0.0003 -0.0218 -0.0045 0.0032 2.1399 -0.9717 -0.2532 0.4745 2.1541 -0.9711 -0.2504 0.4759
-5 -0.0004 -0.0205 -0.0044 0.0031 2.4993 -0.9619 -0.2104 0.5055 2.5150 -0.9611 -0.2075 0.5071
-4 -0.0003 -0.0206 -0.0045 0.0032 2.7478 -0.9634 -0.2237 0.5191 2.7665 -0.9626 -0.2208 0.5207
-3 -0.0005 -0.0265 -0.0056 0.0039 1.5676 -0.9933 -0.3872 0.4594 1.5825 -0.9931 -0.3847 0.4605
-2 -0.0004 -0.0181 -0.0044 0.0029 2.6405 -0.9514 -0.1776 0.6158 2.6570 -0.9505 -0.1745 0.6182
-1 -0.0005 -0.0149 -0.0044 0.0029 2.9660 -0.8909 -0.1886 0.5879 2.9819 -0.8893 -0.1856 0.5899
0 -0.0004 -0.0131 -0.0035 0.0023 4.5546 -0.8328 0.0088 0.8162 4.5732 -0.8315 0.0120 0.8191
1 -0.0004 -0.0132 -0.0033 0.0021 6.3980 -0.8377 0.1354 1.0426 6.4220 -0.8365 0.1390 1.0463
2 -0.0003 -0.0144 -0.0035 0.0022 5.7629 -0.8570 0.1068 0.9405 5.7865 -0.8558 0.1103 0.9439
3 -0.0003 -0.0137 -0.0033 0.0022 5.0438 -0.8113 0.1092 0.9419 5.0645 -0.8099 0.1126 0.9455
4 -0.0003 -0.0143 -0.0034 0.0022 4.6446 -0.8347 0.0787 0.8602 4.6650 -0.8323 0.0821 0.8634
5 -0.0003 -0.0146 -0.0034 0.0022 4.5604 -0.8536 0.0835 0.8387 4.5815 -0.8515 0.0869 0.8419
6 -0.0002 -0.0140 -0.0032 0.0021 5.1805 -0.8060 0.0963 0.8565 5.2050 -0.8033 0.0997 0.8599
7 -0.0002 -0.0131 -0.0032 0.0021 4.4496 -0.7703 0.0689 0.8406 4.4704 -0.7683 0.0721 0.8440
8 -0.0002 -0.0144 -0.0037 0.0023 3.1799 -0.8485 -0.0159 0.6610 3.2001 -0.8469 -0.0124 0.6638
9 -0.0002 -0.0148 -0.0036 0.0023 3.3397 -0.8775 0.0437 0.7468 3.3605 -0.8757 0.0472 0.7498
10 -0.0002 -0.0168 -0.0041 0.0027 4.0451 -0.9348 0.0068 0.7992 4.0716 -0.9341 0.0105 0.8025
11 -0.0002 -0.0162 -0.0039 0.0026 4.1393 -0.9238 0.0527 0.8259 4.1667 -0.9226 0.0564 0.8294
12 -0.0002 -0.0183 -0.0041 0.0028 4.4964 -0.9631 0.0104 0.8119 4.5292 -0.9624 0.0142 0.8157
13 -0.0002 -0.0154 -0.0037 0.0025 3.5585 -0.9030 0.0312 0.7109 3.5819 -0.9015 0.0347 0.7138
14 -0.0002 -0.0137 -0.0036 0.0024 3.1929 -0.8519 0.0459 0.7326 3.2145 -0.8498 0.0495 0.7357
15 -0.0002 -0.0144 -0.0038 0.0025 3.2348 -0.8790 -0.0040 0.7070 3.2591 -0.8772 -0.0004 0.7103
 Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
a 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and Black-Scholes price is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - Black-Scholes price)/Black-Scholes price. 
b 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant price - market value)/market value. 
c 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is calculated as: (Black-Scholes price - market value)/market value. 
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Appendix 6.4: Price difference between Vulnerable warrant price for the case α = 0%, Black-
Scholes Price and Market Value (on average for the case of 103 call covered warrants). 
 
Comparison of Vulnerable warrant price for the 
case α = 0%, Black-Scholes price, and warrant 
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  Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
               α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
 
Appendix 6.5: Price difference between Vulnerable warrant price for the case α = 0.5%, Black-
Scholes Price and Market Value (on average for the case of 103 call covered warrants). 
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  Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
               α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Appendix 6.6: Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price for the case α = 20%, Black-Scholes 
Price, and Market Value (on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-time) 
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock 
Trading 
Days α = 21.49% Black-Scholes model Market 
98748T 3I GP.PLC.  256 1.97 2.13 3.39 
1859J9 3I GROUP PLC  132 1.36 1.46 2.85 
1720FT ANGLO AMER.  192 33.69 36.21 33.26 
97092F ANGLO AMER.  251 27.22 28.86 21.16 
1842CP ANGLO AMER.  139 16.15 16.69 18.64 
1842CT ANTOFAGASTA  139 57.89 59.19 68.26 
1651RX ANTOFAGASTA  220 102.14 103.82 116.49 
97092H ANTOFAGASTA  251 147.66 149.55 162.51 
1794RR ANTOFAGOSTA  157 37.45 38.71 48.94 
98748X ARM HDGS.  256 6.56 6.83 9.15 
1859DP ARM HOLDINGS  132 2.32 2.44 2.31 
1651R2 AZEN.  220 7.14 7.56 11.36 
1842CV AZEN.  139 6.08 6.42 9.61 
1859DR AVIVA  132 2.39 2.49 2.44 
1651R1 AVIVA  220 3.36 3.50 3.87 
98749E AVIVA  256 1.41 1.53 1.46 
98749H BAE  256 28.05 29.20 35.65 
1859DV BAE SYSTEMS  132 7.83 8.45 16.89 
1807ND BARCLAYS  154 28.34 29.18 24.84 
1807NE BARCLAYS  154 19.04 19.79 16.79 
1720FV BARCLAYS  192 22.78 23.65 16.04 
1720FW BARCLAYS  192 11.86 12.52 7.22 
1842JH BG.GP.  139 13.60 14.67 15.85 
1842JJ BG.GP.  139 7.86 8.93 10.17 
1720F7 BHP BILLITON  192 15.36 16.72 16.98 
1720F8 BHP BILLITON  192 9.80 10.25 10.09 
97092J BHP BILLITON  251 28.52 29.64 29.87 
97092K BP PLC.  251 32.63 34.02 40.66 
97092L BP PLC.  251 7.79 8.72 12.98 
98751T BRIT.EN.  256 5.74 6.13 6.69 
1859D1 BRITISH ENERGY 132 10.94 11.54 11.62 
1842JK BRIT.LAND  139 5.05 5.21 5.46 
1842JL BRIT.LAND  139 3.04 3.17 3.22 
1651R9 BRIT.LAND  220 2.66 2.81 3.64 
1859D9 BRITISH SKY  132 1.17 1.25 1.82 
98751V BSB.  256 1.69 1.81 2.92 
1842JT BT GROUP  139 3.56 3.83 8.22 
1842JU BT GROUP  139 0.67 0.78 3.14 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Appendix 6.6 (con’t): Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price for the case α = 20%, Black-
Scholes Price, and Market Value (on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-
time) 
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of underlying 
stock 
Trading 
Days α = 21.49% Black-Scholes model Market 
1859F6 CABLE & WIRELESS  132 2.13 2.30 5.42 
98769J CBW PLC.  255 3.80 4.11 7.07 
98769K PUT-CBW PLC.  255 14.00 14.38 23.83 
1859FU CENTRICA  132 3.13 3.42 6.01 
98769L CENTRICA  255 4.26 4.78 12.20 
1859JN DIAGEO PLC.  132 2.75 2.92 5.21 
98769N DIAGEO PLC.  255 1.71 1.92 3.41 
98769Q EXPERIAN GP.  255 0.84 0.90 2.02 
1859JQ EXPERIAN GROUP  132 1.59 1.66 2.31 
1859J2 HAMMERSON PLC.  132 4.43 4.59 5.11 
98769T HAMMERSON PLC.  255 1.72 1.88 4.55 
1859JW HBOS PLC  132 0.92 0.98 1.04 
98769W HBOS PLC.  255 1.51 1.64 1.93 
97108W HSBC HDG.  274 1.67 1.86 2.71 
97108X HSBC HDG.  274 0.17 0.21 0.63 
1842TH HSBC HDG.  138 2.22 2.36 3.02 
1842TJ HSBC HDG.  138 5.95 6.51 7.00 
98770E INVESCO PLC.  255 5.48 5.70 7.83 
1840PT LAND SECURITIES  140 7.89 8.17 11.29 
1840PU LAND SECURITIES  140 5.22 5.47 8.55 
1840PV LAND SECURITIES  140 3.40 3.61 6.40 
1859KD LEGAL & GENERAL  132 4.32 4.52 6.58 
98902F LGL.& GEN.  251 2.85 3.07 2.77 
97109C LLOYDS  274 14.61 15.70 20.71 
97109D LLOYDS  274 3.59 4.15 9.26 
1840PP LLOYDS TSB GROUP 140 18.56 19.29 19.12 
1840PQ LLOYDS TSB GROUP 140 9.96 10.54 10.77 
97109E MAN GROUP  274 43.69 47.36 57.22 
1842TL M&S.  138 0.78 0.82 1.04 
1842TN M&S.  138 0.25 0.27 0.57 
1655VU M&S.  219 2.16 2.26 2.87 
1863KU PERSIMMON  131 2.91 3.01 2.60 
98902N PERSIMMON  251 2.77 2.93 3.80 
1842TP PRUDENTIAL  121 3.96 4.07 4.36 
1842TQ PRUDENTIAL  121 1.68 1.77 2.05 
97107E RIO TINTO  274 140.15 143.18 141.08 
97107F RIO TINTO  274 127.09 130.18 127.69 
1859KV ROLLS ROYCE  132 0.64 0.69 1.27 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Appendix 6.6 (con’t): Comparison of Vulnerable Warrant Price for the case α = 20%, Black-
Scholes Price, and Market Value (on average for each of 103 call covered warrants over its life-
time) 
 
Average Warrants Prices (pence) 
Vulnerable model Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying 
stock 
Trading 
Days α = 21.49% Black-Scholes model Market 
98902U ROLLS ROYCE  251 0.93 1.02 1.56 
1860EV RSA IN.GP.PLC. 132 2.93 3.11 4.49 
98902D RSA IN.GP.PLC. 251 4.04 4.31 6.10 
1720HL RBOS.  192 7.26 7.71 12.74 
1720HM RBOS.  192 4.44 4.79 7.96 
97107C RBOS.  274 2.67 3.09 10.97 
97109H ROYAL DUTCH  276 6.88 7.34 8.74 
97109J ROYAL DUTCH  276 3.31 3.66 4.74 
1860EX SAINSBURY  132 0.95 0.99 0.78 
98901W SAINSBURY  251 0.94 1.02 1.53 
1860F0 SCOT.& STHN.  132 1.28 1.43 3.56 
98901L SCOT.& STHN.  251 4.45 4.78 9.93 
98901P SCOT.& NEWC. 251 5.91 6.88 9.03 
1844W2 STD.CHT.  138 5.97 6.25 8.94 
1844W4 STD.CHT.  138 2.96 3.16 5.31 
98817H STD.LF.  251 4.27 4.63 8.07 
1840PW TESCO PLC  140 0.70 0.76 1.29 
1860F3 UTD.UTILS.  132 1.10 1.20 2.48 
98817C UTD.UTILS.  251 0.90 1.02 2.58 
1720HP VODAFONE  192 6.18 6.49 7.13 
97107P VODAFONE  121 8.00 8.27 9.55 
1844W6 VODAFONE  138 2.50 2.67 4.31 
1844W7 VODAFONE  138 5.12 5.36 7.39 
1860F5 XSTRATA  132 27.31 31.22 43.38 
98817E XSTRATA  251 47.18 49.67 52.99 
1860F8 YELL  132 0.30 0.32 0.94 
98818H YELL  250 0.76 0.82 2.87 
Notes: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
            α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
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Appendix 6.7: Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and Market 
Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
98748T 3I GP.PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 256 0.60 -1.00 -0.56 0.43 
1859J9 3I GROUP PLC  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.28 -1.00 -0.65 0.21 
1720FT ANGLO AMER.  S>X 65 0.28 -16.06 -0.11 1.16 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 127 0.94 -0.73 0.11 0.23 
97092F ANGLO AMER.  S>X 7 1.02 -309.91 -1.22 19.56 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 244 1.65 -0.73 0.40 0.30 
1842CP ANGLO AMER.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 139 0.50 -3.06 -0.20 0.41 
1842CT ANTOFAGASTA  S>X 22 0.00 -0.41 -0.03 0.07 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 117 0.06 -1.00 -0.22 0.30 
1651RX ANTOFAGASTA  S>X 99 0.19 -0.42 -0.05 0.10 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 121 0.20 -1.00 -0.14 0.24 
97092H ANTOFAGASTA  S>X 225 0.19 -0.65 -0.08 0.12 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 26 0.00 -3.49 -0.04 0.25 
1794RR ANTOFAGOSTA  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 157 0.32 -1.00 -0.34 0.29 
98748X ARM HDGS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 256 3.37 -1.00 -0.02 0.93 
1859DP ARM HOLDINGS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 3.13 -1.00 0.50 1.08 
1651R2 AZEN.  S>X 13 0.00 -0.20 -0.01 0.04 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 207 0.00 -1.00 -0.44 0.23 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
1842CV AZEN.  S>X 5 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 0.04 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 134 0.00 -1.00 -0.41 0.22 
1859DR AVIVA  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 0.75 -1.00 -0.01 0.38 
1651R1 AVIVA  S>X 9 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.01 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 211 1.07 -1.00 -0.07 0.38 
98749E AVIVA  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 256 4.23 -1.00 0.19 0.82 
98749H BAE  S>X 17 0.05 -0.23 -0.01 0.03 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 239 0.18 -1.02 -0.28 0.28 
1859DV BAE SYSTEMS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.34 -1.00 -0.64 0.22 
1807ND BARCLAYS  S>X 9 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.03 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 145 2.04 -1.00 0.14 0.52 
1807NE BARCLAYS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 154 1.10 -1.00 0.11 0.54 
1720FV BARCLAYS  S>X 6 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.05 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 186 3.85 -1.00 0.88 1.14 
1720FW BARCLAYS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 192 7.45 -1.01 1.62 2.03 
1842JH BG.GP.  S>X 104 0.03 -8.83 -0.11 0.75 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 35 0.00 -0.37 -0.05 0.09 
1842JJ BG.GP.  S>X 55 0.00 -27.80 -0.23 2.36 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 84 0.00 -0.49 -0.11 0.12 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
1720F7 BHP BILLITON  S>X 58 0.14 -12.88 -0.07 0.93 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 134 0.30 -0.72 -0.02 0.15 
1720F8 BHP BILLITON  S>X 10 0.04 -0.13 0.00 0.01 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 182 0.55 -34.44 -0.18 2.50 
97092J BHP BILLITON  S>X 169 0.11 -4.33 -0.02 0.28 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 82 0.23 -0.60 -0.01 0.09 
97092K BP PLC.  S>X 85 0.16 -0.26 -0.03 0.08 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 166 0.24 -1.09 -0.15 0.17 
97092L BP PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 2.14 -1.02 -0.21 0.51 
98751T BRIT.EN.  S>X 69 0.09 -7.56 -0.03 0.47 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 187 0.30 -0.72 -0.12 0.17 
1859D1 BRITISH ENERGY S>X 94 0.24 -4.94 -0.03 0.43 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 38 0.11 -0.31 -0.02 0.05 
1842JK BRIT.LAND  S>X 9 0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 130 0.15 -1.00 -0.30 0.39 
1842JL BRIT.LAND  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 139 0.26 -1.00 -0.32 0.45 
1651R9 BRIT.LAND  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 220 0.28 -1.01 -0.40 0.37 
1859D9 BRITISH SKY  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.01 -1.00 -0.49 0.33 
98751V BSB.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 256 0.10 -1.00 -0.46 0.30 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
 229 
 
Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of  
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
1842JT BT GROUP  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 139 -0.39 -1.00 -0.68 0.20 
1842JU BT GROUP  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 139 -0.53 -1.01 -0.82 0.15 
1859F6 CABLE & WIRELESS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.41 -1.00 -0.71 0.15 
98769J CBW PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 0.02 -1.00 -0.55 0.27 
98769K PUT-CBW PLC.  S>X 108 1.34 -0.29 0.17 0.32 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 147 0.00 -1.00 -0.43 0.41 
1859FU CENTRICA  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.22 -1.00 -0.67 0.26 
98769L CENTRICA  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 -0.48 -1.01 -0.72 0.16 
1859JN DIAGEO PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.22 -1.00 -0.55 0.24 
98769N DIAGEO PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 0.09 -1.00 -0.52 0.28 
98769Q EXPERIAN GP.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 -0.30 -1.03 -0.71 0.23 
1859JQ EXPERIAN GROUP  S>X 3 0.00 -0.24 -0.01 0.03 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 129 0.04 -1.00 -0.37 0.22 
1859J2 HAMMERSON PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 1.05 -1.00 -0.31 0.48 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
98769T HAMMERSON PLC. S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 -0.17 -1.00 -0.64 0.23 
1859JW HBOS PLC  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 3.27 -1.00 -0.11 0.84 
98769W HBOS PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 255 2.06 -1.00 -0.20 0.64 
97108W HSBC HDG.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 274 0.21 -1.00 -0.35 0.29 
97108X HSBC HDG.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 274 0.10 -1.13 -0.73 0.29 
1842TH HSBC HDG.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 0.00 -1.01 -0.29 0.23 
1842TJ HSBC HDG.  S>X 91 0.04 -61.36 -0.50 5.22 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 47 0.10 -0.43 -0.03 0.08 
98770E INVESCO PLC.  S>X 27 0.00 -0.19 -0.01 0.03 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 145 0.02 -1.00 -0.29 0.23 
1840PT LAND SECURITIES  S>X 8 0.00 -0.25 -0.01 0.05 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 0.00 -1.00 -0.37 0.24 
1840PU LAND SECURITIES  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 140 -0.21 -1.00 -0.48 0.23 
1840PV LAND SECURITIES  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 140 -0.25 -1.00 -0.56 0.22 
1859KD LEGAL & GENERAL S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 0.06 -1.00 -0.42 0.28 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
98902F LGL.& GEN.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 2.22 -1.00 0.08 0.67 
97109C LLOYDS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 274 4.03 -1.00 0.17 1.01 
97109D LLOYDS  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 274 6.72 -1.01 0.14 1.52 
1840PP LLOYDS TSB GROUP  S>X 1 0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.01 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 139 0.60 -1.00 -0.13 0.41 
1840PQ LLOYDS TSB GROUP  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 140 0.81 -1.00 -0.14 0.48 
97109E MAN GROUP  S>X 35 0.00 -26.03 -0.13 1.57 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 239 0.23 -0.54 -0.13 0.18 
1842TL M&S.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 1.43 -1.00 -0.15 0.84 
1842TN M&S.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 1.22 -1.01 -0.52 0.61 
1655VU M&S.  S>X 2 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.01 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 217 2.87 -1.07 -0.19 0.82 
1863KU PERSIMMON  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 131 0.79 -1.00 -0.16 0.56 
98902N PERSIMMON  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 1.27 -1.01 -0.22 0.56 
1842TP PRUDENTIAL  S>X 13 0.14 -0.24 -0.01 0.05 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 108 0.15 -1.00 -0.14 0.29 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
1842TQ PRUDENTIAL  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 121 0.14 -1.00 -0.27 0.35 
97107E RIO TINTO  S>X 215 0.36 -2.64 0.01 0.17 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 59 0.16 -0.23 0.00 0.05 
97107F RIO TINTO  S>X 198 0.39 -2.90 0.01 0.18 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 76 0.24 -0.25 0.00 0.07 
1859KV ROLLS ROYCE  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 0.04 -1.00 -0.55 0.29 
98902U ROLLS ROYCE  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 0.06 -1.00 -0.45 0.30 
1860EV RSA IN.GP.PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 0.11 -1.02 -0.42 0.26 
98902D RSA IN.GP.PLC.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 0.03 -1.00 -0.42 0.25 
1720HL RBOS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 192 1.79 -1.00 -0.22 0.66 
1720HM RBOS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 192 3.25 -1.00 -0.21 0.82 
97107C RBOS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 274 4.43 -1.02 -0.33 0.90 
97109H ROYAL DUTCH  S>X 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 275 0.88 -1.87 -0.13 0.29 
97109J ROYAL DUTCH  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 276 0.83 -1.01 -0.21 0.37 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
1860EX SAINSBURY  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 1.33 -1.00 -0.14 0.67 
98901W SAINSBURY  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 4.15 -1.00 -0.06 1.31 
1860F0 SCOT.& STHN.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.41 -1.00 -0.75 0.19 
98901L SCOT.& STHN.  S>X 8 0.00 -0.40 -0.01 0.07 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 243 0.00 -1.01 -0.59 0.21 
98901P SCOT.& NEWC.  S>X 171 6.87 -8.14 -0.10 0.82 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 80 0.00 -0.83 -0.17 0.27 
1844W2 STD.CHT.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 -0.01 -1.02 -0.38 0.23 
1844W4 STD.CHT.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 -0.11 -1.00 -0.50 0.22 
98817H STD.LF.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 2.59 -1.00 -0.29 0.58 
1840PW TESCO PLC  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 140 -0.11 -1.00 -0.52 0.22 
1860F3 UTD.UTILS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.34 -1.00 -0.61 0.18 
98817C UTD.UTILS.  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 251 -0.44 -1.00 -0.67 0.15 
1720HP VODAFONE  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 192 0.10 -1.00 -0.32 0.32 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.7 (con’t): Price Difference between Vulnerable Warrant for the case α = 1% and 
Market Value (In case of In-the-money, At-the-money, and Out-of-the-money for 103 call covered 
warrants) 
Warrant 
DS Code 
Name of 
underlying stock Moneyness Days Max Min Mean SD 
97107P VODAFONE  S>X 31 0.00 -0.27 -0.04 0.07 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 90 0.49 -1.00 -0.07 0.32 
1844W6 VODAFONE  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 138 -0.16 -1.00 -0.67 0.27 
1844W7 VODAFONE  S>X 1 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.02 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 137 0.00 -1.00 -0.50 0.25 
1860F5 XSTRATA  S>X 42 0.00 -15.62 -0.20 1.36 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 90 0.00 -0.49 -0.20 0.17 
98817E XSTRATA  S>X 120 0.33 -5.54 -0.05 0.36 
    S=X 0         
    S<X 131 0.52 -0.47 -0.03 0.15 
1860F8 YELL  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 132 -0.40 -1.00 -0.83 0.22 
98818H YELL  S>X 0         
    S=X 0         
    S<X 250 -0.27 -1.00 -0.83 0.16 
Notes:  
The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008. 
 α = Bankruptcy costs (both direct and indirect costs) 
 
The price difference between Vulnerable warrant price and market value is calculated as: (Vulnerable warrant 
price - market value)/market value. Therefore, the negative signs in the table mean that Vulnerable warrant 
price is less than market price. 
           S = stock price 
           X = exercise price 
           S>X   in-the-money 
           S=X   at-the-money 
           S<X   out-of-the-money 
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Appendix 6.8: Price Difference (in pence) between Black-Scholes Price and Market Value of 154 
call covered warrants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008.
      
 
                      a 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is  
                     calculated as: Black-Scholes price - market value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
a
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 16.7700 -19.6070 -2.5640 5.3819
-14 15.7800 -18.1380 -2.5903 5.2397
-13 15.0700 -16.7340 -2.4756 5.0508
-12 16.3300 -16.8230 -2.4745 5.1832
-11 15.8600 -17.0990 -2.3844 5.1328
-10 16.5100 -16.6260 -2.2739 5.0187
-9 15.9800 -17.5750 -2.2910 4.9538
-8 15.5900 -17.8080 -2.1628 4.9672
-7 12.9800 -17.7170 -2.1128 4.7777
-6 13.1420 -15.4410 -1.8802 4.5839
-5 15.6120 -16.4220 -1.5569 4.7250
-4 16.6890 -16.0990 -1.5474 4.9131
-3 9.2380 -22.5930 -2.5624 4.7953
-2 20.0430 -19.0290 -1.2638 5.1871
-1 17.7990 -16.7070 -1.0573 4.9984
0 21.6940 -14.3440 -0.4337 5.6478
1 25.9800 -14.4520 0.2569 5.9066
2 25.9060 -14.2590 0.1654 5.6848
3 27.8100 -13.7490 0.4457 5.9055
4 27.1400 -15.8190 0.3280 5.8549
5 28.2800 -13.8850 0.4471 5.8499
6 19.2830 -9.5670 0.0183 3.8390
7 19.6730 -9.4790 0.2486 4.0756
8 13.4740 -8.9870 -0.1003 3.3197
9 12.8280 -6.9290 0.0837 3.2340
10 12.1130 -6.9079 0.1040 3.0749
11 13.0390 -9.2000 0.1181 3.6638
12 11.1140 -6.1860 0.0259 2.9530
13 12.9140 -9.0330 0.0382 3.2217
14 13.5490 -6.7470 0.0231 3.3257
15 10.5750 -7.3300 0.0825 2.8666
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Appendix 6.9: Price Difference between Black-Scholes Price and Market Value (based on the 
underlying security price) of 154 call covered warrants 
 
  Black-Scholes Price and Market Value
a
 
Day Max Min  Mean SD 
-15 0.0186 -0.0622 -0.0073 0.0128
-14 0.0177 -0.0614 -0.0074 0.0130
-13 0.0193 -0.0610 -0.0069 0.0125
-12 0.0153 -0.0611 -0.0071 0.0126
-11 0.0177 -0.0625 -0.0070 0.0127
-10 0.0176 -0.0613 -0.0068 0.0124
-9 0.0175 -0.0588 -0.0067 0.0122
-8 0.0177 -0.0555 -0.0064 0.0119
-7 0.0206 -0.0538 -0.0062 0.0118
-6 0.0202 -0.0500 -0.0060 0.0117
-5 0.0221 -0.0497 -0.0055 0.0115
-4 0.0205 -0.0509 -0.0059 0.0120
-3 0.0166 -0.0495 -0.0073 0.0131
-2 0.0264 -0.0416 -0.0052 0.0120
-1 0.0366 -0.0384 -0.0046 0.0118
0 0.0442 -0.0382 -0.0031 0.0122
1 0.0499 -0.0342 0.0021 0.0113
2 0.0446 -0.0347 0.0022 0.0105
3 0.0431 -0.0356 0.0018 0.0105
4 0.0436 -0.0341 0.0019 0.0106
5 0.0412 -0.0340 0.0020 0.0104
6 0.0409 -0.0360 0.0014 0.0105
7 0.0409 -0.0375 0.0020 0.0100
8 0.0292 -0.0319 -0.0015 0.0076
9 0.0549 -0.0387 0.0023 0.0112
10 0.0536 -0.0584 0.0026 0.0117
11 0.0534 -0.0384 0.0017 0.0106
12 0.0557 -0.0380 0.0018 0.0101
13 0.0571 -0.0373 0.0015 0.0101
14 0.0573 -0.0399 0.0014 0.0101
15 0.0562 -0.0445 0.0022 0.0106
Note: The sample period extends form April 2007 until December 2008.
      
 
                      a 
The price difference between Black-Scholes price and market value is  
                     calculated as: (Black-Scholes price - market value)/underlying security price 
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